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In this thesis, I will provide an interpretation of the right to ongoing self-determination as a 
standard that can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of how international law both 
distributes sovereignty and authorises the exercise of sovereignty by states. From an 
examination of both the civil and political dimension and the economic, social and cultural 
dimension of the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development, I will establish that all peoples have the right to 1) pursue 
their development by means of policies they choose in a manner that is free from external 
interference and manipulation or undue influence by their domestic states, and 2) through their 
participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of development. I will base these findings on 
the argument that the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely pursue their 
development is best understood as a manifestation of the totality of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights. Furthermore, I will establish that that the ongoing self-determination 
right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources provides that all peoples 
have the right to both benefit from the exploration, development and disposition of their 
territory’s natural resources and exercise control of such exploration, development and 
disposition of their natural wealth and resources without external interference and manipulation 
or undue influence by their domestic states. I will examine the ongoing self-determination 
rights of both the ‘entire populations’ of sovereign states and non-self-governing territories and 
of ‘subpopulation groups’. This will include an analysis of the method by which the ongoing 
self-determination rights of subpopulation groups whose status as peoples has been recognised 
by international law is balanced with the ongoing self-determination rights of the ‘entire 
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“[A]t every stage of history our concern must be to dismantle those forms of authority and 
oppression that survive from an era when they might have been justified in terms for the 
security or survival or economic development, but now contribute – rather than alleviate – 
material and cultural deficit”.1 
 
In this thesis, I will analyse right to self-determination and its role within international law in 
general and human rights law in specific with the aim to establish a contemporary standard for 
mitigating the adverse effects of how international law distributes and authorises the exercise 
of sovereignty. In the first chapter, I will examine the development of self-determination as a 
legal right. Firstly, this will include with an analysis of 1) the principle of self-determination 
and equal rights as codified by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 (“UN Charter”), 2) 
the development of self-determination as a rule of customary international law, 3) the 
codification of the right to self-determination of peoples in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (“ICESCR”) and its twin the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (“ICCPR”), and 4) the codification of the right 
to self-determination of peoples in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“African Charter”). Secondly, from my analysis, I will establish how the development of the 
right to self-determination passed through several phases with their own driving forces and that 
these phases all added their own characteristics to the right to self-determination as we know 
it today. This will show how the right to self-determination started as a right of sovereign 
member states of the United Nations and development into a right of all peoples, which came 
to include not just the population of sovereign states and non-self-governing territories as a 
whole (“entire populations”) but also specific subsections of these populations (“subpopulation 
peoples”). Moreover, it will also show how this development shifted the emphasis away from 
the external dimension of the right – the relationship between peoples and foreign states – 
towards its internal dimension – the relationship between peoples and their own state. Finally, 
I will show how this development influenced the theoretical approaches to the right to self-
determination. This will include an analysis of the internal-external dichotomy approach that 
divides self-determination into a ‘right to internal self-determination’ and a ‘right to external 
self-determination’ and the alternative approach that divides self-determination into a ‘right to 
                                               
1 Noam Chomsky, On Anarchism (Penguin 2014) 2. 
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constitutive self-determination’ – the right of peoples to freely determine their political status 
– and a ‘right to ongoing self-determination’ – the right of peoples to freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development and freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources. I will explain why I have chosen to adopt the latter approach for my thesis. 
Moreover, I will show how the relationship between the right to self-determination and 
sovereignty changed by the different phases that the development of the right went through. 
Finally, I explain that I have chosen to focus on the right to ongoing self-determination because 
1) I believe that the right to ongoing self-determination is the more relevant of the two self-
determination rights in the post-colonial context, and 2) because I believe that the different 
methods by which constitutive self-determination can be exercised are not a goal by themselves 
but a means to enable peoples to freely exercise their ongoing self-determination rights. 
 
The thread throughout the second, third, fourth and fifth chapter of thesis will be an analysis 
of how to interpret the term ‘freely’ in the ongoing self-determination rights of peoples to 1) 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and 2) freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources. This will include both an examination of 1) the relevant treaty 
provisions according to the rules of treaty interpretation set out by the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties of 1969 (“Vienna Convention”) and the way the interpretation of these 
provisions has changed over the years, and 2) the interpretation of the customary international 
legal right to self-determination. I will argue that the inclusion of ‘freely’ in the right to self-
determination establishes that the pursuit of economic, social and cultural development of 
peoples should be free from 1) external interference by foreign states, 2) civil and political 
obstacles to the ability of peoples to pursue the development of their choice, and 3) economic, 
social and cultural obstacles to the ability of peoples to pursue the development of their choice. 
In other words, I will argue that the right to ongoing self-determination includes the right of 
peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development by freely participating 
in, contributing to, and enjoying all aspects of the civil, political, cultural, social, economic and 
public life of their state. In the second chapter, I will examine the civil and political dimension 
of the right to ongoing self-determination of entire populations. This chapter will build upon 
Antonio Cassese’s view that internal self-determination is a manifestation of the totality of all 
rights included in the ICCPR.2 In this chapter, I will argue that the civil and political dimension 
                                               
2 See, Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge 
University Press 1995) 52–66. 
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of the right to ongoing self-determination includes the right of entire populations to 1) pursue 
their development free from external interference, including the interference of foreign states, 
and 2) pursue their development in a manner that respects the will of the population by the 
policies of their choice. I will argue that this latter aspect of the civil and political dimension 
of the right to ongoing self-determination is the foundation of a right to a democratic system 
of governance that is both representative and participatory. 
 
In the third chapter, I will analyse the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination in relation to distinct subsections of the population of a state as a whole 
(“subpopulation groups”), including those whose status as ‘peoples’ have been provided by 
international law (“subpopulation peoples”). The starting point of this chapter will be the 
argument, made by the former president of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) Judge 
Rosalyn Higgins in the last decade of the previous century, that it is no longer necessary to 
answer the difficult question of whether a particular subpopulation group is a people for 
purposes of the right to self-determination because all members of subpopulations groups are 
the holders of the right of self-determination as members of the entire population.3 As I will 
establish, in time since Higgins made this argument, indigenous peoples have been 
acknowledged as subpopulation groups with the right to self-determination. In order to 
determine the validity of Higgins’ argument in contemporary international law, I will juxtapose 
the ongoing political self-determination rights of indigenous peoples with those of other 
subpopulation groups whose status as peoples has not been recognised. I will establish that the 
civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination provides subpopulation 
peoples with a more extensive right to self-determination than other subpopulation groups. 
Whereas this dimension of the right to self-determination of entire populations provides all 
subpopulation groups with the right to freely participate in the exercise of the entire population 
to which they belong of its right to freely pursue its development, this civil and political 
dimension provides subpopulation peoples with another pillar on which their self-
determination rights are build. Namely, subpopulation peoples also have the right to freely 
pursue their own economic, social and cultural development distinct from the entire population 
to which they belong. I will show that this right is not absolute and clarify the way by which 
the international human rights framework has balanced the civil and political dimension of the 
                                               
3 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford 
University Press 1995) 124. 
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right to ongoing self-determination of subpopulation peoples with this dimension of the right 
to ongoing self-determination of the entire peoples to which they belong. 
  
In the fourth chapter, I will analyse the social, economic and cultural dimension of the right to 
self-determination. I will argue that, if it is accepted that the civil and political dimension of 
the right to ongoing self-determination is a manifestation of the totality of civil and political 
rights, it should equally be recognised that the socio-economic dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination is also a manifestation of the totality of economic, social and 
cultural rights. This argument is based upon the idea that in order for peoples to freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development they should not only be able to pursue their 
development according to the policy they have freely chosen but also be able to pursue such 
development by their participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of such development. In 
relation to this issue, I will examine the relationship between the socio-economic dimension of 
the right to self-determination and the right to development. I will show that whereas it is 
generally accepted that the right to self-determination is a prerequisite for the right to 
development, an argument can be made that the right to development should not be viewed as 
a distinct right but instead a delineation of duties that correspond to the right to ongoing self-
determination in general and its socio-economic dimension in specific. Interpreted in this 
manner, the right to development provides guidance on how states should fulfil their 
obligations in relation to the right to self-determination. Conversely, this establishes that the 
right to development should be interpreted in a manner that corresponds with the obligations 
of states in relation to the right to self-determination. I will examine how 1) the internal 
dimension of the right to development provides guidance on the actions that states should 
undertake in order to remove obstacles to the development of their own population, and 2) the 
external dimension of the right to development provides guidance on the actions states should 
take in order to exercise their obligation to promote the realisation of the right of self-
determination of all peoples, which is provided for by the provisions on the right to self-
determination of peoples in the Twin Covenants.  
 
In the fifth and final chapter, I will analyse the second ongoing self-determination right of 
peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and its relationship with the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. Once again, this includes 
an examination of the interpretation of ‘freely’. I will argue that, as a consequence of the fact 
that this ongoing self-determination right should be interpreted in manner consistent with the 
 9 
self-determination right of peoples to freely pursue their development, the inclusion of ‘freely’ 
in this second ongoing self-determination right provides peoples should be able to dispose of 
their natural wealth and resources 1) without external interference, 2) without obstacles put in 
place by an international economic order that restricts the ability of peoples to dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources in a manner of their choice, 3) through a free, informed and 
genuine democratic process, and 4) without being subjected to restrictions arising out of 
international economic co-operation and international law that have come into existence 
without such a free, informed and genuine democratic process. The last point relates to the 
‘limitation clause’ that is included in the treaty provision on the right of peoples freely dispose 
of their natural resources, which establishes that this right should be exercised without 
prejudice to obligations arising out of international economic co-operation and international 
law. I will argue that this limiting clause only applies to obligations that have come into 




Chapter 1 – The development of the right to self-determination 
 
In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the development of self-determination as 
customary rule of international law and a human right codified by treaty law. I examine whether 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples included in the UN Charter was 
the first time a right to self-determination of peoples was codified in international law or if it 
was solely intended to bestow a right of independence and equal rights of the already sovereign 
member states of the United Nations. I will analyse how the principle of equal rights and self-
determination has developed by examining the relevant General Assembly resolutions, 
judgements and Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice and scholarship. This 
will include an analysis of the role the development of the human right to self-determination, 
which was codified in the ICESCR and the ICCPR, in the development of principle of equal 
rights and self-determination. Furthermore, I will analyse what the driving force behind these 
developments was and how this development passed through several phases that all added a 
distinct character to the right to self-determination. Firstly, the phase that was primarily 
influenced by the issue of decolonisation and added colonial peoples as the beneficiaries of the 
right to self-determination. Secondly, the phase that expanded the group of beneficiaries with 
the populations of sovereign states. Finally, the phase that was greatly influenced by the 
development of the right of indigenous peoples which added these peoples as beneficiaries of 
the right to self-determination. I will examine how these developments shifted the emphasis of 
scholarship, and other commentary, on the right to self-determination from its external 
dimension to its internal dimension. After the overview of the development of the right to self-
determination, I will set out the theoretical framework that will provided the foundation of the 
interpretation of the right to self-determination that I will establish in this thesis. This will 
include an examination of the internal-external dichotomy approach that divides self-
determination into a ‘right to internal self-determination’ and a ‘right to external self-
determination’ and the alternative approach that divides self-determination into a ‘right to 
constitutive self-determination’ and a ‘right to ongoing self-determination’. It will also include 
an examination of the changing relationship between the right to self-determination and state 
sovereignty under international law. 
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The principle of equal rights and self-determination in the UN Charter 
The principle of self-determination was first codified in international law by the UN Charter. 
The idea to include a provision on the principle of self-determination in the UN Charter was 
suggested by the Soviet Union at the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
in San Francisco. This proposed provision stated that one of the goals of the United Nations 
was to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace”.4 This provision was later adopted as Article 1(2) of the UN Charter.5 There 
has been some debate on whether the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
provided by Article 1(2) was a legal right.6 However, as mentioned by Judge Ammoun in his 
separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction case,7 its status as a right was clearly presented in 
the French version of the text.8 In the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations of 1970 (“Declaration on Friendly Relations”), the General Assembly 
stated that principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is of “paramount 
importance for the promotion of friendly relations among states, based on respect for the 
principle of sovereign equality”.9 It also stated that by virtue of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations “all peoples 
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.10 This statements reflects the right to 
self-determination as we know it today.  
                                               
4 Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the International Legal Order? (Routledge-Cavendish 
2008) 31. 
5 Charter of the United Nations 1945, Article 1: ‘The Purposes of the United Nations are: [...] 
2] To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace’. 
6 See, E Rodríguez-Santiago, ‘The Evolution of Self-Determination of Peoples in 
International Law’ in FR Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) 217–218. 
7 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p 3, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, p 286, p 311, para. 19. 
8 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (n 5) (French version), Article 1(2): Développer entre les 
nations des relations amicales fondées sur le respect du principe de l’égalité de droits des 
peuples et de leur droit à disposer d’eux-mêmes". 
9 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 




According to Rosalyn Higgins, the former president of the International Court of Justice, the 
right to self-determination as a right of all peoples to freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development was not provided for by the UN 
Charter and “[t]he common assumption that the UN Charter underwrites self-determination in 
the current sense of the term is in fact a retrospective rewriting of history”.11 She argued that 
in 1946 the focus was on the rights of sovereign member states. Higgins observed that the 
coupling of ‘self-determination’ and ‘equal rights’ in Article 1(2) cannot be ignored as it was 
the equal rights of states that the UN Charter provided for.12 This argument was also put 
forward by Elizabeth Rodríguez-Santiago who stated that the principle of self-determination 
and equal rights was nothing more than a reference to the respect of the principle of state 
sovereignty and that the term peoples in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter should be understood 
as a synonym of states. To substantiate her argument, Rodríguez-Santiago observed that the 
French version of the text refers to the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to 
self-determination. According to Rodríguez-Santiago this proves that Article 1(2) refers to the 
equal rights among the members states of the UN and the right of those member states to self-
determination.13 Furthermore, from his analysis of the preparatory works of the UN Charter, 
also Cassese concluded that the principle of self-determination in Article 1(2) was only 
intended for the member states of the UN and did not mean to provide 1) a right to secession 
of minority or ethnical or national groups, 2) a right to independence of colonial peoples, or 3) 
a right to freely choose the rules through elections.14  
 
The development of the right to self-determination as a right of all peoples to freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development 
happened in the decades subsequent to the adoption of the UN Charter. The first phase in this 
development linked the right to self-determination to the framework on non-self-governing 
territories created by the UN Charter. Whereas the UN Charter did create the specific obligation 
for the administering powers of non-self-governing territories “to develop self-government and 
                                               
11 R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University 
Press 1996) 111–112. 
12 ibid 112. 
13 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 6) 217–218. 
14 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 37–42. 
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to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions”,15 the UN 
Charter did not establish a relationship between the principle of equal rights and self-
determination and non-self-governing territories. Indeed, there is no mention of the principle 
of self-determination in Chapters XI and XII of the UN Charter, which deal with non-self-
governing territories and the international trustee system. Elizabeth Rodríguez-Santiago argued 
that “Chapter XI was never intended to recognize the self-determination right of the peoples of 
the non-self-governing territories”.16 Again, she substantiated this argument by pointing to the 
French version of the text, which refers to the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories as 
populations instead of as peoples.17 The principle equal rights and self-determination included 
in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter did not create a right to self-determination for all peoples nor 
did it create such a right for the peoples of the non-self-governing territories. Instead, Article 
1(2) only regulated the relationship between sovereign states. 
 
The General Assembly Resolutions and the development of customary law 
In 1952, the General Assembly adopted its resolution on ‘the right of peoples and nations to 
self-determination’ (“GA Resolution 637 (VII)”), in which it recommended that “[t]he States 
Members of the United Nations shall recognize and promote the realization of the right of self-
determination of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories who are under their 
administration”.18 In the years following the adoption of this resolution, the General Assembly 
adopted a number of resolutions recalling GA Resolution 637 (VII). This resulted in the 
reinterpretation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination set out in Article 1(2) of 
the UN Charter from a right of sovereign states to a right of peoples.19 In 1960, the General 
                                               
15 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (n 5), Article 73(b): ‘to develop self-government, to take 
due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement’. 
16 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 6) 219. 
17 ibid 219–220. 
18 UN General Assembly, The right of peoples and nations to self-determination, 16 December 
1952, A/RES/637, para. 2: ‘The States Members of the United Nations shall recognize and 
promote the realization of the right of self-determination of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories who are under their administration and shall facilitate the exercise of this 
right by the peoples of such Territories according to the principles and spirit of the Charter of 
the United Nations in regard to each Territory and to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned, the wishes of the people being ascertained through plebiscites or other recognized 
democratic means, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations’. 
19 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 6) 222. 
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Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (“Declaration on Decolonisation”), in which it declared that “[a]ll peoples have the 
right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.20 This expanded the 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination to all colonial peoples that had not yet attained 
independence.21 In the same year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1541 (XV) in 
which it established that non-self-governing territories could exercise their rights under the UN 
Charter by 1) emergence as a sovereign independent state, 2) free association with an 
independent state, and 3) the integration with an independent state.22 Combined, the 
Declaration on Decolonisation and GA Resolution 1541 (XV) established a link between the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination and the right of colonial peoples to freely 
determine their political status by one of the three methods set out in the latter resolution.  
 
As observed by Cassese, achieving political independence soon turned out to be only one step 
towards real independence for colonial countries. Within the United Nations, the issue arose 
how the rights claimed by these newly independent states related to their natural wealth and 
resources.23 The General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions in relation to the natural 
resources of peoples, which resulted in the development of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. As observed by Antony Anghie, the idea of 
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources “was closely tied to the concept of 
self-determination, which in itself suggests the close links between political sovereignty and 
economic sovereignty”.24 In GA Resolution 1314 (XIII) of 1958, the General Assembly 
established  the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and instructed 
it to conduct a survey of the status of permanent sovereignty as a basic constituent of the right 
                                               
20 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV), para. 2. 
21 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1971, p 16, p 31 para. 52. 
22 UN General Assembly, Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or 
not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, 
15 December 1960, A/RES/1541. 
23 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 99. 
24 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2004) 211. 
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to self-determination.25 As will be discussed in the fifth chapter of this thesis, the fact that both 
the principle of state sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples were promoted as the 
basis for the principle of permanent sovereignty created a certain ambiguity on who the 
beneficiaries of the right to permanent sovereignty are. However, in its Declaration on the 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of 1962 (“Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty”), the General Assembly declared that the right to permanent sovereignty is a right 
of peoples that must be exercised in the interest of the national development and the well-being 
of the peoples.26  
 
Gradually, the attention shifted away from the subject of decolonisation. In its Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
of 1970 (“Declaration on Friendly Relations”), the General Assembly reiterated the self-
determination rights of colonial peoples established by the above discussed resolutions. 
However, the main object of the Declaration on Friendly Relations was the relations among 
sovereign states.27 The General Assembly declared that all peoples have the right freely to 
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.28 Therefore, it did not limit the 
beneficiaries of this self-determination right to colonial peoples but also included the peoples 
from sovereign states among its beneficiaries. The most important contribution the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations made to the development of self-determination as a rule of customary 
law is the statement by the General Assembly that nothing in the preceding paragraphs on the 
principle of self-determination 
 
“shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
                                               
25 UN General Assembly, Recommendations concerning international respect for the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination, 12 December 1958, A/RES/1314 (XIII). 
26 UN General Assembly, Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 14 December 1962, 
A/RES/1803 (XVII), para. 1: ‘The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned’. 
27 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 6) 224. 
28 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV) (n 9). 
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independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction 
as to race, creed or colour”.29 
 
This statement was included to establish a balance between the self-determination right of 
peoples and the territorial integrity of states. As I will examine in Chapter 3, Cassese has argued 
that the inclusion of the statement “without distinction as to race, creed or colour” means that 
these groups are peoples with a possible claim to self-determination if they are denied access 
to the government.30 However, this statement could also be interpreted in a way that reflects 
the idea that the self-determination of ‘the whole people belonging to the territory’ is violated 
if a state is not possessed of a government that represents it without such distinction. Either 
way, the General Assembly acknowledged that the self-determination right of peoples includes 
obligations of states in relation to the people belonging to their own territory. 
 
More recently, the General Assembly has drawn a connection between the right to self-
determination and the rights of indigenous peoples. In the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (“Declaration on Indigenous Peoples”), the General Assembly 
proclaimed that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination by virtue of which they 
have the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.31 However, as observed by Dorothée Cambou,32 the General 
Assembly made it clear that this right is only to be exercised within the borders of an existing 
state by proclaiming that “[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions”.33 Whereas it had 
                                               
29 ibid. 
30 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 108–120. 
31 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, 
A/RES/61/295, Article 4: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development’. 
32 Dorothée Cambou, ‘The UNDRIP and the Legal Significance of the Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach with a Multidimensional 
Perspective’ (2019) 23 The International Journal of Human Rights 34, 36. 
33 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, 
A/RES/61/295 (n 31), Article 4. 
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already acknowledged that that the self-determination right of peoples includes obligations of 
states in relation to the people belonging to their own territory in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, the General Assembly now also acknowledged that that the self-determination right 
of peoples includes obligations of states in relation to specific subsections of the people 
belonging to their own territory. Thus far, indigenous peoples are the only subpopulation group 
whose status as peoples with the right to self-determination has been specifically acknowledged 
by the General Assembly.  
  
General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding. The UN Charter does not grant the 
General Assembly the power to make legally binding decisions on anything other than the 
organisational matters included in Article 17.34 Chapter IV of the UN Charter, in which the 
functions and powers of the General Assembly are set out, only grants the General Assembly 
the power to “discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or 
relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter”,35 to 
make ‘recommendations’ on such matters,36 and to “recommend measures for the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations”.37 The ICJ has acknowledged that the ‘persuasive 
force’ of General Assembly resolutions is considerable but that they are not binding in law.38 
Yet, GA resolutions are an important factor in the emergence of customary rules of 
international law, which is included in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice includes as one of the forms of international law that will be applied by the ICJ. In the 
second paragraph customary international law is described as “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”.39 This includes two elements. Firstly, evidence 
                                               
34 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (n 5), Article 17: ‘1] The General Assembly shall 
consider and approve the budget of the Organization. 2) The expenses of the Organization shall 
be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. 3] The General Assembly 
shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies 
referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized 
agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.’ 
35 ibid, Article 10. 
36 ibid, Article 10. 
37 ibid, Article 14. 
38 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, p 6 [98]; Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p 
174. 
39 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945, Article 38(b). 
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of general practice, known as ‘state practice’ or ‘usus’, Secondly, the acceptance that such 
practice is prescribed by law, known as opinio juris.  
 
As explained by Cassese, General Assembly resolutions are neither state practice nor opinio 
juris. However, these resolutions relate to both of these elements of customary international 
law in two important ways. First, in the process of drafting General Assembly resolutions, 
states express their legal opinions on the matter at hand. Not only does this clarify the legal 
views of states it could also indicate whether states vote in favour of a particular resolution 
because they believe doing so is in line with their obligations under international law. 
Therefore, this establishes both opinio juris and state practise. Secondly, after the adoption of 
a resolution by the General Assembly, generally states gradually adopt attitudes consistent with 
the included provisions. Therefore, establishing state practise.40 The importance of General 
Assembly resolutions for the emergence of customary rules was acknowledged by the ICJ in 
the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua when it 
stated that “opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, the 
attitude of the Parties and the attitude of states towards certain General Assembly 
resolutions”.41 For the above named reasons, an analysis of the relevant GA resolutions should 
be an important aspect of any examination of self-determination as a customary rule of 
international law. 
 
The development of the human right to self-determination 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”). Latin American states played a key role in debating the provision to be 
included in the UDHR. In his review of the UDHR, Johannes Morsink showed that John 
Humphrey – who was appointed to prepare the first draft of the UDHR – included large parts 
of the proposals by Chile and Panama in his own draft.42 According to Glendon, Humphrey 
chose to do so because of the compatibility of these drafts with a broad range of cultures and 
philosophies represented in the United Nations.43 Especially the inclusion of economic, social 
                                               
40 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 69–70. 
41 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14, at pp. 99–100, para. 188. 
42 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins Drafting & Intent 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1999) 131. 
43 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the 
Universal Human Rights Idea’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 27, 32. 
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and cultural rights resulted from the active role the Latin American states played in the drafting 
of the UDHR.44 However, the influence of these states is also found in the adoption of certain 
civil and political rights. For instance, the provision in Article 8 on the right to an effective 
remedy was included after an amendment proposed by Mexico and supported by Chile, Cuba, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.45 Even though the principle of self-determination is not specifically 
referred to in the UDHR, some of the features of the human right to self-determination were 
already present in Article 21. Firstly, Article 21 includes the statement that the “will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government”.46 Secondly, it states the necessity of 
periodic and genuine elections to express the will of the people.47 Thirdly, it includes a 
provision on the right of the members of these people to “take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.48 In Chapter 2, I will establish that 
these are now important features of the human right to self-determination. 
 
The right to self-determination as it is understood today was first codified into international 
law in Article 1 of the ICESCR and its twin the ICCPR. The first paragraph of Common Article 
1 replicated the clause on the right to self-determination from the Declaration on 
Decolonisation by providing that by virtue of their right of self-determination all peoples freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.49 However, as observed by Cassese, the drafters of Article 1 advanced a broad 
approach to self-determination that, unlike the doctrine that had developed after the adoption 
of the UN Charter, did not equate the achievement of independent status by colonial peoples 
as the final realisation of self-determination. The human right to self-determination does not 
end with independence and the issue of whether the actions of a government of a sovereign 
state comply with the rights and obligations established by Common Article 1(1) is a legitimate 
question.50  
 
                                               
44 Morsink (n 42) 131. 
45 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (Random House 2001) 162. 
46 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 21. 
47 ibid, Article 21. 
48 ibid, Article 21. 
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 1(1). 
50 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 55. 
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The Twin Covenants also adopted the link between the right to self-determination and the right 
to permanent sovereignty over natural resources that had been developed by the General 
Assembly in the above discussed resolutions on the issue. In Common Article 1(2), it is 
provided that all peoples, for their own ends, may freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources.51 The inclusion of this provision resulted from the argument made by developing 
countries – especially those that had gained independence through decolonisation – that 
political independence alone was inadequate if the natural wealth and resources were still under 
the control of foreign states or entities from such foreign states. This was reflected by the 
statement by Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first President of the Republic of Senegal, during the 
negotiations of the Twin Covenants that “legal independence without economic independence 
is but a new form of dependency, worse than the first because it is less obvious”.52 One of the 
earliest references to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources was put forward 
in Chile’s proposal, during the eighth session of the Commission on Human Rights, to include 
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources in the provisions on the right to self-
determination of the Twin Covenants.53 At first Chile’s proposal to include a reference to the 
right to permanent sovereignty in Common Article 1 of the Twin Covenants failed as it “was 
considered dangerous in that it would sanction unwarranted expropriation or confiscation of 
foreign property and would subject international agreements and arrangements to unilateral 
renunciation”.54 However, from their review of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jaqueline Mowbray found that the link 
between permanent sovereignty and the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources was later revived by the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty and the addition 
of Article 25 of the ICESCR and identical Article 47 of the ICCPR later in the drafting of these 
Twin Covenants.55 This self-determination right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural 
                                               
51 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (n 49), Article 1(2). 
52 Official documents of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1961, Vol. II, p. 540. 
53 The proposal of Chile stated: ‘The right of the peoples to self-determination shall also include 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. In no case may people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be claimed by 
other states.’ in UN Economic and Social Council, 16 April 1952, E/CN.4/L.24. 
54 UN General Assembly Official Records, Agenda Item 28 (Part II), Annexes Tenth Session, 
New York, 1955, A/2929 15. 
55 Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jacqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 
2014) 64. 
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resources under the provisions of the Twin Covenants and customary international law will be 
examined in the fifth chapter of this thesis.  
 
The third and final paragraph of Common Article 1 provides for an obligation on state Parties 
to “promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and [to] respect that right, in 
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”.56 It includes a, now 
obsolete, reference to those states Parties that have responsibility for the administration of Non-
Self-Governing and Trust Territories.57 Consequently, the obligation to promote the right to 
self-determination provided by Common Article 1(3) is largely neglected in the contemporary 
discourse on the right to self-determination. However, as I will argue in Chapter 4, the 
obligation to promote the realisation of the right to self-determination itself is not obsolete. It 
provides an obligation to take positive actions to facilitate the realisation of and respect for the 
right to self-determination of peoples. Consequently, it provides a legal foundation of 
provisions included by the General Assembly in its Declaration on the Right to Development 
(“Declaration on Development”). Conversely, the Declaration on Development provides a 
framework for the positive actions that states have to take in order to abide by their obligation 
to facilitate the realisation of and respect for the right to self-determination of peoples. 
 
As argued by Cassese, Common Article 1 of the Twin Covenants did not only codify the right 
to self-determination into human rights law but also constituted a powerful incentive to the 
crystallisation of customary rules in relation to self-determination in two ways. Firstly, in the 
process of negotiating these provisions, “Member States of the United Nations had a chance to 
voice their views and concerns as well as to react to the statements of other governments”.58 
Secondly, when these provisions were adopted, contracting states were “increasingly 
amendable to the adoption of the course of action dictated by these rules”.59 Therefore, the 
examination of the right to self-determination under the Twin Covenants should also be an 
important aspect of any analysis of the principle of self-determination as a customary rule of 
international law. However, it is important to note that 1) the development of the principle of 
self-determination as a customary rule of international law did not stop with the codification 
                                               
56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (n 49), Article 1(3). 
57 ibid, Article 1(3). 
58 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 67. 
59 ibid. 
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of the right to self-determination in the Twin Covenants and 2) the development of the human 
right to self-determination provided for by Common Article 1 has also continued after the 
adoption of the Twin Covenants.  
 
An interpretation of the provisions on the right to self-determination in Common Article 1 
should start with an analysis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.60 This should include an examination of the 
preparatory works of the Twin Covenants in order to confirm the ordinary meaning or to 
determine the meaning when the ordinary meaning leaves the provision 1) ambiguous or 
obscure or 2) manifestly absurd or unreasonable.61 However, human rights treaties are living 
instruments and in order to interpreted a human rights provision in light of its object and 
purpose consideration should be provided to the context of the time in which it is interpreted. 
As observed by Daniel Moeckli and Nigel White, the supervisory bodies tasked with 
authoritatively interpreting the obligations imposed by human rights treaties have adopted this 
so-called ‘living instrument’ method to interpret provisions of these treaties.62 This includes 
the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) tasked with the interpretation of the ICCPR, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) tasked with the 
interpretation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (“ICERD”), the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) tasked with the 
interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”).63 On a regional level, 
the Inter-American Court (“IACtHR”) of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (“IACHR”) have adopted the living instruments method in their 
interpretation of the American Declaration of Human Rights (“ADHR”).64 Moreover, the 
                                               
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 31(1): ‘A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
61 ibid, Article 32, Supplementary means of interpretation: ‘Recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the  treaty  and  the  
circumstances  of  its  conclusion,  in  order  to  confirm  the  meaning  resulting  from  the  
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. 
62 Daniel Moeckli and Nigel White, ‘Treaties as “Living Instruments”’ in Michael Bowman 
and Dino Kritsiotis (eds), Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of 
Treaties (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
63 See, ibid 152–154. 
64 ibid 150–152. 
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European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has also acknowledged that human rights treaties 
are living instruments that must “be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” in 
relation to their interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) in 
Tyrer v the UK.65  
 
According to Moeckli and White, it seems that the living instrument method of treaty 
interpretation is covered and even required by these rules of the interpretation of treaties.66 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, together with 
the context, there shall be taken into account “any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”.67 According 
to Moeckli and White, such “subsequent practice may include state practice as well as the 
practice of supervisory bodies and may be used to establish original or changing intent”.68 This 
would include the state practice that can be extrapolated from the statements made by states in 
the process of drafting General Assembly resolutions and the embracing of attitudes and 
behaviour consistent with the provisions included in these resolutions. Furthermore, if human 
rights treaties were not treated as living instruments that have to be interpreted with the context 
of the developing political, economic, social and cultural in mind this would seriously 
undermine their ability to fulfil their object and purpose.69  
 
Just as, as shown above, resolutions by the General Assembly have played a role in the change 
in how the principle of equal rights and self-determination provided by Article 1(2) of the UN 
Charter has been interpreted, General Assembly resolutions adopted after the adoption of the 
Twin Conventions have played a role in the interpretation of the right to self-determination 
under Common Article 1. Therefore, an examination of all the relevant General Assembly 
resolutions – both those adopted before and after the adoption of the Twin Covenants – is 
important for the analysis of both the human right to self-determination provided by the Twin 
Covenants and the principle of self-determination as a customary rule of international law. 
These two purposes overlap. In fact, there is no clear distinction between the human right to 
self-determination and the customary rule of international law. As Matthew Saul observed, this 
                                               
65 Tyrer v the UK Series A, Vol 26 (1987) [15–16]. 
66 See, Moeckli and White (n 62) 154–160. 
67 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (n 60), Article 31(3)(b). 
68 Moeckli and White (n 62) 156. 
69 The object and purpose of the ICCPR and ICESCR will be examined in Chapter 1.  
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is why the HRC “has not attempted, in its pronouncements, to develop Article 1 of the ICCPR 
as a stand-alone, conventional right to self-determination”.70 Moreover, this is why “scholars 
and states alike have also made little effort to distinguish between customary and conventional 
rules of self-determination in their accounts of the law”.71  
 
The right to self-determination in the International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice has played an important role in the recognition of self-
determination and a principle of customary international law through its judgments in 
contentious cases and Advisory Opinions.72 In fact, as observed by Higgins, the ICJ was the 
forerunner in the recognition of self-determination as a legal right.73 In 1970, in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
(“Namibia Opinion”), the ICJ resolved that the development of international law in regard to 
non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the UN Charter, subsequent to the adoption of 
the UN Charter made the principle of self-determination applicable to all territories whose 
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.74 The judges pointed to the 
adoption of the Declaration on Decolonisation of 1960 as an important stage in that 
development.75 As Rodríguez-Santiago stated, “[w]ith this opinion the ICJ recognised the right 
to self-determination for all peoples, including colonial ones, as well as the normative value of 
the principles contained in [the Declaration on Decolonisation]”.76 In 1975, the ICJ reiterated 
their findings from the Namibia case in its Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara.77 The ICJ 
defined self-determination as “the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples”.78 
                                               
70 Matthew Saul, ‘The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A 
Formula for Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?’ (2011) 11 Human Rights 
Law Review 609, 625. 
71 ibid 625–626. 
72 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 6) 225. 
73 R Higgins, ‘The International Court of Justice and Human Rights’ in Karel Wellens (ed), 
International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in honour of Eric Suy (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1998) 694. 
74 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1971, p. 16. (n 21), p 31 para. 52. 
75 ibid, p 31 para. 52. 
76 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 6) 226. 
77 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p 12 [54]; See, Karen Knop, Diversity 
and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 110–167. 
78 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12. (n 77), p 33, para. 59. 
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Moreover, it stated that “the application of the right of self-determination requires a free and 
genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned [emphasis added]”.79 However, for the 
simple reason that it was limited by parameters set out in the questions of the General 
Assembly,80 the Court only dealt with the  right of peoples to freely determine their political 
status. Consequently, in both the Namibia as the Western Sahara advisory opinions and did 
nothing to clarify the other aspects of the right. 
 
In 1995, the ICJ agreed with the assertion made by the applicant Portugal in the Case 
Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (“East Timor case”) that the principle of self-
determination is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law and that the 
erga omnes character of the right of peoples to self-determination was beyond reproach.81 In 
2004, the ICJ followed its own jurisprudence on the erga omnes character of the right to self-
determination in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall case”).82 Only a select group of obligations 
under international law have such an erga omnes character. In the Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (“Barcelona Traction case”), the ICJ 
explained that erga omnes obligations are those obligations that by their very nature are the 
concern of all states and that in light of their importance all states can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection.83 Consequently, a violation of the right to self-determination of any 
people could be brought before the ICJ by any state, without this state having a particular 
relationship to people in question. 
 
In his separate opinion to the Barcelona Traction case, Judge Fouad Ammoun argued that that 
the right to self-determination not only as an erga omnes but also has a jus cogens character.84 
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80 See, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
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As explained by Ian Brownlie, rules of international law with a jus cogens character are 
peremptory norms of general international law that are hierarchically superior to other rules of 
international law.85 In Article 53 of the Vienna Convention it is stated that  
 
“a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation 
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”.86  
 
If a treaty is entered into in violation of a jus cogens rule this treaty is null and void.87 According 
to Saul, the question whether the right to self-determination is such a peremptory norm has yet 
to be settled.88 The ICJ has not explicitly recognised the principle of self-determination as a jus 
cogens. However, in the separate opinion in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
case, Judge Dugard named the East Timor case as an example of a case where the ICJ did not 
invoke a norm of jus cogens where it could have.89 Moreover, as observed by Rodríguez-
Santiago, some authors have argued that its status as jus cogens was implied in the ICJ’s 
reference to the erga omnes right in the East Timor case and the Wall case.90 Indeed, many 
scholars argue that the right to self-determination is in fact such a peremptory norm of 
international law.91 However, as long as the ICJ has not explicitly declared the right to self-
determination to be jus cogens, it will likely remain a topic of debate. 
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In 2010, the ICJ was once again called upon to reflect upon the principle of self-determination. 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (“Kosovo case”), the ICJ was asked by the 
General Assembly if the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo was in accordance 
with international law.92 The ICJ noted that a number of participants in the proceedings had 
claimed that the population of Kosovo had “the right to create an independent State either as a 
manifestation of a right to self-determination or pursuant to what they described as a right of 
‘remedial secession’ in the face of the situation in Kosovo”.93 However, the ICJ did not find it 
necessary to address the question whether the declaration of independence was a legal exercise 
of the right to self-determination “outside the context of non-self-governing territories and 
peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”.94 This decision has been 
criticised by scholars as a failed opportunity.95 The reasoning of the ICJ was that the General 
Assembly had only requested its opinion on whether the declaration of independence was in 
accordance with international law. Their interpretation of this question was whether 
international law prohibits such a declaration instead of whether Kosovo had a right to make 
such a declaration.96 It concluded that that general international law contains no prohibition of 
declarations of independence.97 However, according to the ICJ, it is entirely possible for a 
particular act not to be in violation of international law “without necessarily constituting the 
exercise of a right conferred by it”.98 Therefore, the fact that it found that there is no such 
prohibition does not mean that it believes that the Kosovo had a right to secession. 
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The right to self-determination in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
On a regional level, the right to self-determination has also been included by the Organization 
of African Unity in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ RightsIn Article 20(1) of the 
African Charter the right to self-determination is linked to peoples’ right to existence.99 
Additionally, it states that peoples “shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue 
their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen”,100 
which mirrors the provision on the right to self-determination in Common Article 1(1) of the 
Twin Covenants. In the second chapter, I will show that by including the phrase “according to 
the policy they have freely chosen” the right to self-determination in the African Charter does 
not deviate from Common Article 1 but instead makes explicit what the Twin Covenants 
implied. Article 20 of the African Charter includes that “[c]olonized or oppressed peoples shall 
have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means 
recognized by the international community [emphasis added]”.101 Moreover, it states that “[a]ll 
peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the state Parties to the African Charter in their 
liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural [emphasis 
added]”.102 The phrasing of these provisions clarifies two important aspects of the right to self-
determination codified by the African Charter. First, it establishes that self-determination is not 
confined to the realm of anti-colonial struggle as refers to colonised or oppressed peoples. Of 
course, all colonised peoples are oppressed peoples but conversely not all oppressed peoples 
are colonised peoples. Secondly, it is clear that the three forms of domination included do not 
have to exist cumulatively as it includes political, economic or cultural domination. Therefore, 
each of these forms of foreign domination individually amounts to a violation of the right to 
self-determination under the African Charter.  
 
The unequivocal statement of the African Charter that not just political but also economic or 
cultural forms of foreign dominations violate the right to self-determination is a significant 
aspect of its provision on the right to self-determination. The inclusion of all three forms of 
domination is aligned with the statement in the preamble of the African Charter that it is 
conscious of the “undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism 
[…] and all forms of discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, color, sex, 
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language, religion or political opinions”.103 The absence of political domination alone does not 
guarantee the self-determination of peoples. The African Charter shows an understanding of 
this by including political, economic and cultural natures of domination. Whereas Article 20 
by itself already goes further than Common Article 1 of the Twin Covenants, the real expansion 
of the right came in Articles 21 and 22. In Article 21 the African Charter includes a more 
comprehensive provision on the right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources than any other international legal instrument.104 The scope of this provision results 
from the understanding that political domination is not the only possible means of infringement 
of self-determination. Combating political domination alone is not enough to eliminate 
colonialism, neo-colonialism and all other forms of foreign subjugation. The African Charter 
also contains a provision on the right to development. This provision builds upon Article 20 by 
adding a positive obligation of states to aid peoples in their pursuit of economic, social and 
cultural development.105 The African Charter provides peoples with the right to pursue 
economic, social and cultural development free from not just state interference but, to a certain 
extent, also from social and economic factors that might hinder such development.106 
 
Theoretical approaches to the right to self-determination 
As shown above, the development of self-determination as a right went through several phases. 
First, it was codified as a right of the sovereign members states of the UN by the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination in the UN Charter. Secondly, in the twenty years after the 
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adoption of the UN Charter, this principle was reinterpreted as a right to self-determination of 
colonial peoples in customary international law. Thirdly, the adoption of the Twin Covenants 
and further development of self-determination as a customary rule of international law 
established the right to self-determination as a human right of all peoples. These peoples came 
to include both the populations of sovereign states and non-self-governing territories and 
certain subpopulation groups – i.e. indigenous peoples. With this development, the emphasis 
shifted from the establishment of sovereign states by colonial peoples as an exercise of their 
self-determination to the relationship between sovereign states and their own population. The 
former is generally referred to as ‘external self-determination’ and the latter as ‘internal self-
determination’.107 However, as will be discussed below, many commentators have adopted a 
theoretical approach that views external and internal self-determination as separate rights, often 
with distinct beneficiaries. James Anaya calls this the internal-external dichotomy as this 
approach presents these two aspects of the right to self-determination as separate rights.108  
 
Internal self-determination, a term coined by the HRC,109 is 1) the right of the entire population 
of sovereign states to determine their own economic, social and cultural development and to 
choose a representative government110, and 2) the right of subpopulation peoples to participate 
in the political life of the state and the right to some degree of self-government or even 
autonomy.111 External self-determination is said to be a right of certain peoples to determine 
their political status by 1) the establishment of a sovereign and independent state, 2) the free 
association or integration with an independent state, or 3) integration with an independent 
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state.112 International law does not recognise a right to secession as an exercise of self-
determination.113 Instead, secession is treated as a matter of fact, which may or may not be 
recognised by the international community.114 Consequently, only those peoples subjected to 
colonisation and foreign oppression are said to be entitled to the right to external self-
determination as this includes the right to sovereign and independent state.115 Exercise of a 
right to external self-determination by peoples subjected by colonial domination or foreign 
oppression would not violate the territorial integrity of an existing state – and thus equate to 
the secession from a state – as the existing state that had colonised or oppressed them had no 
legitimate claim over the territory of these peoples.116 Other peoples would only be allowed to 
exercise the right to internal self-determination as an exercise of external self-determination 
would violate the territorial integrity of their state. 
 
According to Cassese, Vladimir Lenin was “the first to insist, to the international community, 
that the right of self-determination be established as a general criterion for the liberation of 
peoples”.117 Moreover, the current president of the International Court of Justice Abdulqawi 
Yusuf observed that that external self-determination is “based on Lenin’s anti-colonialist 
principles. In ‘The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, Lenin 
set out that a key objective for Socialism was the achievement of complete democracy and, 
consequently, the achievement of self-determination for oppressed nations.118 He focussed on 
the right to independence in a political sense, including a nation’s right to secession.119  Most 
importantly, Lenin argued that the principle of self-determination acknowledges the right to 
unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without compensation.120 However, as 
observed by Bill Bowring, the Soviet Union “gave crucial support for the anti-colonial 
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movement, while ruthlessly suppressing deviation within the Soviet camp”.121 This view is also 
adopted by James Anaya who stated the Soviet leaders used self-determination as a tool only 
where it served as a means to emancipate the proletariat in the pursuit of world Communism 
and was in no way a goal in itself.122  
 
Internal self-determination is said to be based upon the Wilson’s insistence on self-
determination as “a right of a people to freely select its government”.123 Wilson’s concept of 
self-determination was based upon the ideals of Western Liberalism.124 This is demonstrated 
by his argument that the principle of self-determination meant that people should be free to 
choose their own form of government. This argument built upon the principle of self-
determination found in the American Declaration of Independence that governments derive 
their power from the consent of those they govern. However, for Wilson self-determination 
was an issue for foreign states and he rejected the idea that the principle had a role in the 
internal politics of the United States itself. Furthermore, it never was Wilson’s intention that 
the principle of self-determination would be used to liberate the people living in oppression 
under colonial regimes.125  
 
An alternative theoretical approach to the internal-external dichotomy was put forward by 
James Anaya who divides the right to self-determination in a substantive and a remedial 
aspect.126 The substantive aspect is itself divided in a ‘constitutive’ aspect and an ‘ongoing’ 
aspect.127 The constitutive aspect is the right of peoples to freely determine their political status 
(“constitutive self-determination”), which is exhausted after “discrete episodes of institutional 
birth or change”.128 The ongoing aspect of self-determination is the right of peoples to freely 
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pursue their economic, social and cultural development and, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth (“the right to ongoing self-determination”), which “continuously enjoins 
the form and functioning of the governing institutional order”.129 The dimension of the right to 
self-determination that proponents of the internal-external dichotomy view as a distinct right 
to external self-determination, Anaya does not view as a separate right but as a possible 
remedial solution in exceptional situations in which the substantive aspects of self-
determination cannot be assured for a particular people.130 According to Anaya the 
decolonisation procedures  
 
“do not themselves embody the substance of the norm of self-determination; rather they 
were measures to remedy a sui generis deviation from the norm that existed in the prior 
condition of colonialism.”131 
 
I have chosen to adopt Anaya’s theoretical approach for the analysis of the right to self-
determination in this thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, Anaya’s theoretical approach 
removes the need to artificial divide between peoples with the right to both external and internal 
self-determination and peoples with only the right to the latter. Secondly, I believe that his 
view, that what other commentators refer to as external self-determination is instead a remedial 
solution to certain grave violations of what these commentators refer to internal self-
determination, fits better with the more recent development that certain grave violations of 
internal self-determination justify secession as an exercise of the right to external self-
determination.132 Thirdly, I believe that Anaya’s approach better reflects the fact that the 
continuing aspects of the right to self-determination include, as I will examine in the other 
chapters of my thesis, both an external and internal dimension. 
 
It has been argued that, outside of the colonial context, secession is a legitimate exercise of 
right to external self-determination as a remedy against forms of oppression.133 The Canadian 
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Supreme Court set out three situations in which peoples are entitled to the right to external self-
determination: 1) in a situation dealing with colonial emancipation, 2) in a situation where are 
oppressed under foreign occupation, and 3) in a situation where peoples are denied access to 
the government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development in a 
meaningful manner. The Supreme Court of Canada argued that in these situations peoples are 
entitled to this right because they have been denied the ability to exercise their right to internal 
self-determination.134 On a regional level, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (“African Commission”) has implicitly acknowledged secession as a justified exercise 
of the right to self-determination in Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire in situations where 
there is concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that the territorial integrity 
of a state should be called to question or evidence that a people is denied the right to participate 
in government.135 As observed by Frederic Kirgis Jr., there seemingly is an inverse relationship 
between the ability of a people to exercise its right to ongoing self-determination within the 
boundaries of the existing state and the level of autonomy the right to self-determination 
provides to this people.136 The fewer restrictions on a people’s ability to exercise its internal 
self-determination right within the existing state the less credence claims of self-determination 
that will have destabilising effects on the sovereign rights of states have.137 In this approach, 
secession as an exercise of the right to external self-determination, would only be allowed as a 
response to severe violations of the seceding people’s internal self-determination.138 However, 
if secession is only a right for those peoples that are prevented from exercising their ongoing 
self-determination it makes more sense to view secession not as a method by which a right to 
external self-determination can be exercised but instead as a justified remedy of certain 
violations of the right to ongoing self-determination. Furthermore, this relationship clarifies 
that that exercises of the constitutive self-determination right of peoples to freely determine 
their political status is not the objective of the right to self-determination but instead a means 
to enable peoples to freely exercise their ongoing self-determination rights. Even recent 
scholarship has primarily focussed on the right of peoples to determine their own political 
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status, often in relation to secession.139 However, because 1) constitutive self-determination is 
not a goal by itself but a means to achieve ongoing self-determination, and 2) remedial 
secession would be justified in certain cases where the ongoing self-determination right of a 
subpopulation group is violated, I believe that the most important task is to come to a clear 
understanding of the ongoing self-determination rights of peoples.  
 
The relationship between sovereignty and the right to self-determination 
There are many different theoretical approaches to sovereignty.140 The one that is relevant to 
this thesis is sovereignty as a construct of international law. As explained by Patrick Macklem, 
“[s]overeignty in international law refers to what the international legal order recognises as the 
aggregate of valid claims that States make in their relations with other States”.141 International 
law both regulates the exercise of sovereign power and determines who possesses 
sovereignty.142 However, as observed by Anghie, “[t]he origins of sovereignty have always 
constituted a major problem for the discipline”.143 In the words of Martti Koskenniemi, who 
represents what is probably the most common approach, in international law, state sovereignty 
is at the same time the authority delegated to states by international law and the authority 
delegated to international law by states.144 If this is the origin of sovereignty, the principle of 
state sovereignty is itself a product of the exercise of states of their sovereignty within the 
international sphere. Traditionally, international law regarded the sovereignty of states as an 
absolute sphere of power that was only limited by international law itself.145 However, 
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gradually this absolute conception of state sovereignty has been replaced by a more conditional 
understanding of sovereignty.146 The development of human rights law was the driving force 
behind this development. As stated by Macklem, “international human rights legally operate 
to mitigate some of the adverse consequences associated with the fact that international law 
entitles States to exercise sovereignty both internally […] and externally”.147 As I will show in 
this thesis, the right to self-determination is where state sovereignty and human rights intersect.  
 
The relationship between the right to self-determination and the sovereignty of states has 
changed a lot since the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples was codified 
by the UN Charter. As established above, the drafters of the UN Charter included the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination to strengthen the rights of already sovereign states. Only 
through the subsequent development of international law self-determination developed into a 
right that established conditions for sovereignty. Macklem observed that because of this 
development, the new role of the right to self-determination in contemporary international law 
is to mitigate 1) the adverse effects associated with how international law distributes 
sovereignty around the globe and 2) the adverse effects associated with how international law 
authorises the exercise of sovereignty by sovereign states.148 Anghie has explained that many 
these adverse effects are result from the fact that “because sovereignty was shaped by the 
colonial encounter, its exercise often reproduces the inequalities inherent in that encounter”.149 
The right to self-determination has developed into a standard that can be used to reflect upon 
the illegitimacies of this system.  
 
As observed by Matthew Saul, “it is also possible to identify a different type of relationship 
between the right to self-determination and sovereignty”.150 Namely, the right to self-
determination “provides a basis for arguing that popular sovereignty has now been 
legalised”.151 The concept of popular sovereignty has long been used as rhetorical device to 
either legitimise governmental authority or conversely reflect on the illegitimacy of a state’s 
claim of sovereignty over a people and the territory on which it resides. The idea that popular 
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sovereignty is the basis of the authority of the state can be traced back to the United States 
Declaration of Independence of 1776 (“US Declaration of Independence”) and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (“Declaration of the Rights of Man”), which 
were influenced by the ideology of the Enlightenment.152 In the preamble to the US Declaration 
of Independence stated that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.153 Similarly, the Article VI of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
of 1789 (“Declaration of the Rights of Man”) provides that the “principle of any sovereignty 
resides essentially in the Nation”,154 and that law is the expression of the general will of the 
population.155 Even though some scholars trace the genealogy of the principle of self-
determination back even further,156 these declarations are often pointed to as the origin of the 
principle of self-determination.157 According to Eugene Kamenka, self-determination could 
perhaps even be viewed as the central and fundamental concept elevated by the Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution that gave birth to most modern ideologies including liberalism, 
socialism and nationalism.158 
 
One of the commentators that promoted the reconceptualisation of the right to self-
determination as the basis of the sovereign rights of states was the Tanzanian scholar Issa 
Shivji. He suggested that that the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another state are secondary or derivative 
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elements of the right to self-determination of peoples.159 As explained by Saul, such a 
reconceptualisation “provides an ethically more convincing explanation for sovereignty, than 
the traditional explanation based on effective control of territory”.160 Furthermore, as Saul 
observed, scholars have used this type of relationship between the right to self-determination 
and sovereignty to identify or suggest changes in aspects of international law that currently still 
reflect the traditional conception of sovereignty.161 Most importantly, Saul showed that, like 
Shivji, scholars have argued that the right to self-determination is the legal basis of the principle 
of non-intervention.162 If the right to self-determination is indeed the basis of the principle of 
non-intervention, it could be argued that the right to self-determination provides a standard that 
measures the legitimacy of a state’s intervention in the affairs of another state. For instance, 
such a link between the right to self-determination and the principle of non-intervention be 
used to try to justify humanitarian intervention in situations in which the right to self-
determination of a people is violated by their domestic state. Instead of a violation of 
sovereignty, it could be argued that such an intervention is “as a means of furthering 
sovereignty in the sense of giving the people (eventually) the ability to exercise the continuing 
right of self-determination”.163 Similarly, if such a relationship between the right to self-
determination and sovereignty exists, the right to self-determination also provides a standard 
that measures the legitimacy of deviations from the principle of territorial integrity. In other 
words, such a relationship would provide the legal foundation of remedial secession in 
situations in which the right to self-determination of a people is violated by their domestic state.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have established that, even though it has often been pointed to as the first time 
to a right to self-determination of peoples was codified in international law, the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples provided in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter was 
only intended as a right of the sovereign member states of the UN. Overtime this principle has 
been reconceptualised as a right of peoples by subsequent developments in international law, 
including the development of the human right to self-determination. As I have established, this 
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development has led to two interesting theoretical developments. Firstly, as the emphasis 
shifted from the establishment of sovereign states by colonial peoples as an exercise of their 
self-determination to the relationship between sovereign states and their own population, 
human rights treaty bodies and scholars adopted a framework that separated the right to self-
determination into an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ right. For a long time, it was believed that 
only colonial peoples had a ‘right to external self-determination’, which would allow them, if 
they so choose, to establish an independent state, and other peoples only possessed a ‘right to 
internal self-determination’, which would at most allow some degree of autonomy short of 
independence and the right to pursue their economic, social and cultural development within 
the framework of an existing state. More recently, arguments have been made that such a right 
to external self-determination can also exist as a remedy for non-colonial peoples whose 
exercise of their right to internal self-determination is denied by their state. As explained, I 
have chosen not to adopt this ‘internal-external dichotomy’ as the theoretical approach for my 
thesis. Instead, I have adopted the alternative approach that divides the right to self-
determination into a ‘right to constitutive self-determination’ – the right of peoples to freely 
determine their political status – and a ‘right to ongoing self-determination’ – the right of 
peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. I have provided a 
number of reasons for my decisions of which the most important is that I want to focus on the 
continuing aspects of the right to self-determination and believe that this alternative approach 
better reflects the fact that these aspects include both an external and an internal dimension.  
 
Secondly, as the emphasis shifted from the external to the internal dimension of the right to 
self-determination, the relationship between the right to self-determination and sovereignty 
changed. When self-determination was first codified as the principle of equal rights and self-
determination in the UN Charter it was nothing more than a reaffirmation of the sovereignty of 
states. However, as the right to self-determination developed into a right of peoples its role 
changed to a standard that mitigate both the adverse effects associated with how international 
law distributes sovereignty and the adverse effects associated with how international law 
authorises the exercise of sovereignty by sovereign states. However, as I established, some 
scholars have argued that the relationship between the right to self-determination and 
sovereignty is not just that the former mitigates the adverse effects of how international law 
distributes and authorises the exercise of the latter but that the right to self-determination acts 
as the foundation of the sovereignty of states. Understood in this way, the right to self-
determination is basis for an argument that ‘popular sovereignty’ has now been legalised. 
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Whether you view self-determination as a right that merely mitigates the adverse effects of 
sovereignty or also as the legal foundation of the sovereignty of states, it is the premier standard 
that measures the legitimacy of a state’s sovereignty over a people and its exercise of its 
sovereign rights. In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I will focus on the right to ongoing 
self-determination in order to establish a contemporary standard for mitigating the adverse 
effects of how international law distributes and authorises the exercise of sovereignty.  
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Chapter 2 – The civil and political dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination of ‘entire populations’ 
 
As established in the previous chapter, the right to ongoing self-determination is the right of 
peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.164 Furthermore, I also 
established that the entire populations of states are peoples with the right to self-determination. 
In this chapter, I will analyse the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination of these entire populations. This includes an examination whether the right to 
ongoing self-determination provides obligations on states in relation to the population of 
foreign states.165 However, I will focus on the question whether this right also includes 
obligations of states in relation to their own population. Conversely, this is an examination of 
whether the right of peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development 
includes the right of entire populations to pursue such development free from both external 
interference and from manipulation or undue influence from their domestic authorities. I will 
argue that the right to self-determination provides obligations of states both in relation to 
foreign populations and in relation to their own population. Subsequently, through my analysis 
of the relevant scholarship and an examination of the relevant treaty provisions, General 
Assembly resolutions and comments and finding by the relevant treaty bodies, I will provide 
an argument that the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is 
1) best explained as a manifestation of all civil and political rights, 2) the legal foundation of a 
democratic system of governance that is both representative and participatory. 
 
The right to ongoing self-determination as a right of entire populations 
Whereas during the drafting of the Twin Covenants on Human Rights it was a matter of debate 
whether the right to self-determination only applied to the process of decolonisation, it is now 
generally acknowledged that populations of sovereign states belong to the group of 
beneficiaries of the right to ongoing self-determination. According to the former President of 
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the International Court of Justice Rosalyn Higgins, there are two possible interpretations of the 
term peoples. Peoples either means the ‘entire people’ of a state – the population of a state as 
a whole – or alternatively “all persons comprising distinctive groupings on the basis of race, 
ethnicity and perhaps religion”.166 From her analysis of the relevant instruments and state 
practices she concluded that ‘peoples’ “is to be understood in the sense of all the peoples of a 
given territory [original emphasis]”.167 However, after Higgins wrote this in 1994, international 
law has acknowledged the status of indigenous groups as peoples. This does not mean that the 
entire population of states, or in the words of Higgins ‘all the peoples of a given territory’,168 
are not also peoples in relation to the right to self-determination. As Cassese observed, under 
customary international law both the populations of sovereign states and certain subpopulation 
groups are peoples.169 The status as peoples of the populations of sovereign states has now been 
acknowledged by many scholars and some of the relevant treaty monitoring bodies.170  
 
Since the entry into force of the Twin Covenants, it has been generally accepted that the right 
to self-determination includes corresponding obligations of states in relation to the peoples in 
foreign states. This is clear from the application of the general rule of treaty interpretation to 
Common Article 1. As stated in Chapter 1, this rule is set out in the Vienna Convention, which 
stipulates that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.171 This means that the starting point of the interpretation of a treaty provision consists 
of finding the current and ordinary meaning of the words used.172 As stated by Nahuel Maisley 
“this empirical task can be covered by referring to regular, non-legal, dictionary definitions”.173 
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Following the to the ordinary meaning of the term ‘freely’,174 the right to ongoing self-
determination establishes that the pursuit of development by a people should not be under 
control of ‘another’.175 Obviously, foreign states are a prime example of the ‘other’ who the 
pursuit of development by a people should not be controlled by. This was acknowledged by 
Cassese who stated that one meaning of the word ‘freely’ in this provision is that it “requires 
that a State’s domestic political institutions must be free from outside interference”.176 Indeed, 
as established in Chapter 1, the idea that peoples should be able to pursue their development 
free from foreign control or interference was at the heart of the development of the right to 
self-determination in its earlier phases.177  
 
Slightly more controversial, than the question whether the right to self-determination provides 
obligations of states in relation to foreign peoples, is the question whether the right to self-
determination also provides obligations of states in relation to their own peoples. As 
acknowledged by Higgins, after the Second World War “many of the new states regarded self-
determination as a matter between them and their former colonial masters, but not as between 
them and their own population”.178 A good example of this is India’s declaration in relation to 
Common Article 1 as an example.179 This declaration states that the right to self-determination 
in Common Article 1 applies “only to the peoples under foreign domination and that these 
words do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation”.180 
India’s reservation to Article 1 has been objected to by several states. Whereas Pakistan seems 
to object solely to India’s statement that the right to self-determination does not apply to 
sovereign state – thus accepting that it does not apply to ‘a section of a people or nation’181 – 
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the governments of France, Germany and the Netherlands all objected to both aspects of India’s 
reservation.182 The Dutch statement argued that India’s reservation does not only conflict with 
the provision of Common Article 1 but also with the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which 
it referred to as the most authoritative statement of the law on the right to self-determination.183  
 
The HRC has clearly adopted the view that states have obligations concerning the right to self-
determination of their own population. This is shown by the fact that, in its examination of 
reports by state parties to the ICCPR, the HRC does not only ask about dependent territories 
that the state party might be responsible for but also about the opportunities that its own 
population has to determine its own political and economic system. In its General Comment 
No. 12, the HRC stated that “[w]ith regard to paragraph 1 of article 1, States parties should 
describe the constitutional and political processes which in practice allow the exercise of this 
right”.184 According to the HRC most states, when exercising their obligation to “submit 
reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the 
                                               
on Civil and Political Rights. The right of Self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations and as embodied in the Covenants applies to all peoples under foreign 
occupation and alien domination.’ 
182 See, ibid; France: ‘The Government of the Republic takes objection to the reservation 
entered by the Government of the Republic of India to article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, as this reservation attaches conditions not provided for by the 
Charter of the United Nations to the exercise of the right of self-determination.’; Germany: 
‘The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany strongly objects, ... to the declaration 
made by the Republic of India in respect of article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations and as embodied in the Covenants applies to all peoples and not only to those under 
foreign domination.  All peoples, therefore, have the inalienable right freely to determine their 
political status and freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’ 
183 ibid: ‘The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the declaration made 
by the Government of the Republic of India in relation to article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, since the right of self-determination as embodied in the Covenants is 
conferred upon all peoples. This follows not only from the very language of article 1 common 
to the two Covenants but as well from the most authoritative statement of the law concerned, 
i.e., the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Any attempt to 
limit the scope of this right or to attach conditions not provided for in the relevant instruments 
would undermine the concept of self-determination itself and would thereby seriously weaken 
its universally acceptable character.’ 
184 ‘UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right 
to Self-Determination), The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, 13 March 1984’ para 4. 
 45 
ICCPR] and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights”,185 either completely ignore 
Article 1 or provide inadequate information in regard to it. They often do so by confining 
themselves to a reference to the election laws of their state.186 However, the fact that virtually 
no state refuses to respond to probing comments and questions on its compliance with its 
obligations in relation to the right to self-determination of their domestic population,187 
combined with the fact that many states provide a reference to their election laws shows there 
is an acceptance that the right includes obligations in relation to the peoples under their own 
jurisdiction. 
 
In the first chapter, I established that initially the development of the human right to self-
determination emphasised the process of decolonisation. However, as stated by Higgins, 
“[s]elf-determination has never meant independence [but] meant the free choice of people”.188  
In the course of the second half of the 20th century, the attention shifted away from 
decolonisation and secession and towards the recognition that the right to self-determination 
provides obligations of states towards their own population. As recognised by Gillian Triggs, 
“if peoples’ rights are to have any meaning beyond States’ rights, they must include the right 
of a ‘people’ against its own government”.189 Moreover, as argued by Allan Rosas, to “say that 
the right of peoples to self-determination is exercised by the State and its government would 
seem to be a contradiction in terms”.190 The recognition that the right to self-determination 
establishes obligations in relation to domestic populations is in line with the context in which 
Common Article 1 should be interpreted. The mere fact that the right to self-determination is a 
human right should by itself discredit any interpretation that does not include obligations of 
states in relation to their own population.  
 
As stated before, the general rule of treaty interpretation, as set out in the Vienna Convention, 
states that the meaning of the terms of a treaty should be interpreted in their context and in light 
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of the object and purpose of the treaty.191 The object and purpose of a human rights treaty is to 
set out right of individuals or peoples and corresponding obligations of states in relation to 
these rights. In General Comment 24, the HRC established that the object and purpose of the 
ICCPR is to create legally binding standards for human rights and to place those standards in 
a framework of obligations that are also legally binding on states.192 In this sense, human rights 
treaties are different from other international treaties that establish a set of legal rules 
concerning inter-state relations. Whereas these treaties create legally binding rights of states in 
relation to other states and corresponding obligations of states again in relation to those other 
states, human rights treaties also create obligations of states in relation to the rights of the 
individuals and peoples under their jurisdiction or control. Even though the HRC has rejected 
communications under Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“First Optional Protocol”) concerning the right to self-determination 
provided by Article 1 of the ICCPR, it has acknowledged that the right to self-determination is 
“a provision of positive law”.193 In conclusion, interpreted in the context of a human rights 
provision, the right to ongoing self-determination establishes legally binding obligations of a 
state corresponding to the legal rights of both foreign populations and its domestic population. 
 
The notion that the right to ongoing self-determination provides obligations of states in relation 
to their own population can be further substantiated by an analysis of the General Assembly’s 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe held in 1975 (“Helsinki Final Act”). In the Helsinki Final Act, it 
is provided that 
 
“[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, 
their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue 
as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development”.194 
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Cassese argued that the inclusion of ‘always’ and the phrase ‘when and as they wish’ in the 
formulation of the right to self-determination in the Helsinki Final Act ensures that the right to 
self-determination “is considered a continuing right: it exists even after a people has chosen a 
certain form of government or a certain international status”.195 Moreover, he argues that the 
phrase ‘in full freedom’ has a “separate, distinct, and consequently broader meaning” than the 
phrase ‘without external interference’.196 However, Hurst Hannum argued that “the 1975 
Helsinki formulation may be seen merely as a Cold War reaffirmation of the right of the people 
of a state to be free from external influence in choosing its own form of government”.197 An 
careful examination of the structure of the formulation of the right to self-determination in the 
Helsinki Final Act seems to substantiate Cassese’s interpretation. The phrase ‘without external 
interference’ is included as a feature that is specific to the phrase ‘to determine, when and as 
they wish, their internal and external political status’. Indeed, the subsequent phrase “to pursue 
as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development” is not subjected to the 
same restriction. The Helsinki Final Act provides that by virtue of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, 1) to determine, when 
and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and 
2) to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development. This same 
distinction is included in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which provides that all peoples 
have 1) “the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status”, and 
2) the right “to pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.198 Therefore, it can 
be inferred that neither the drafters of the Declaration on Friendly Relations nor those of the 
Helsinki Final Act believed that the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely 
pursue their development only prohibits external interference with the exercise of this right but 
                                               
195 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 284–288. 
196 ibid. 
197 Hurst Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ (1993) 34 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 1, 29. 
198 See the wording of the UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV) (n 9): ‘By virtue of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, 
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every 
State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.’ 
 48 
also prohibits behaviour of domestic authorities that restrict peoples’ free pursuit of their 
development. 
 
The civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination as the sum of all 
civil and political rights 
Now that it has been established that populations of sovereign states fall within the definition 
of peoples and that their pursuit of economic, social and cultural development should not only 
be free from external interference but also from the manipulation or undue influence from their 
domestic authorities, the next step is to determine how a population exercises its right to freely 
pursue its development free from these domestic authorities. According to Cassese, Article 
1(1) has “established a permanent link between self-determination and civil and political 
rights”,199 which means that the internal dimension of the right to self-determination 
“presupposes that all members of a population be allowed to exercise those rights and freedoms 
which permit the expression of the popular will”.200 Consequently, this dimension is “best 
explained as a manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the [ICCPR]”.201 Cassese is 
not the only scholar that has found such a relationship between the right to self-determination 
and other human rights. For instance, Patrick Thornberry noted that the text and comments of 
the Twin Covenants suggest that “[t]here is a general relationship of reciprocity between self-
determination and human rights”.202 Moreover, in line with the view of Cassese, Dominic 
McGoldrick argued that whenever the rights included in the ICCPR “are recognized for 
individuals, the people as a whole enjoy the right of [ongoing] self-determination; whenever 
these rights are trampled upon, the right […] to self-determination is infringed”.203 This 
relationship between the right to ongoing self-determination and individual rights has been 
acknowledged by the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Aureliu Cristescu. He stated that “the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms contribute to the implementation of 
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the right of peoples to self-determination”.204 Cristescu continued by explaining that individual 
rights contribute, each in the area of its exercise, to the realisation of different aspects – 
political, economic, social and cultural – of the right to self-determination.205  
 
In his analysis of the influence the process of decolonisation had on the development of human 
rights, Burke has provided an extensive examination of the influence of the position of the non-
Western states on the development of the right to self-determination in its earliest stages. He 
showed that even in the earliest stages of development the right to self-determination was 
portrayed as inherently linked to individual rights. States mainly emphasised the importance of 
the right to self-determination for the realisation of individual rights.206 However, there were 
also states that claimed the relationship between the right to self-determination and individual 
rights goes even further. In their view, the right to self-determination is not only a prerequisite 
for the achievement of individual rights but conversely also the ability to exercise individual 
rights is a prerequisite for the exercise of the right to self-determination. Burke provided a 
number of examples to substantiate this claim. For instance, he quoted Adviser to the Iraqi 
Permanent Mission at the United Nations Bedia Afnan who represented Iraq in the UN General 
Assembly’s Third Committee who represented Iraq in the UN General Assembly’s Third 
Committee and who stated that self-determination was “the essence of all human rights”.207 
Another example he used is the quote of the Mexican Delegate to the Third Committee who 
stated that “the right to self-determination of peoples was both the basis of, and derived from, 
individual rights”.208 However, when Yugoslavia proposed a phrasing of the right to self-
determination that would include “the right of every person to participate in action to ensure or 
maintain the free exercise of that right by the people to which he belonged”209 this was rejected 
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by six votes to six, with six abstentions.210 Consequently, as concluded by Burke,211 initially 
the relationship between the right to self-determination and individual rights that the General 
Assembly adopted in its resolution on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination did 
not portray the right to self-determination as interdependent with individual rights but solely 
as “a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights”.212 
 
Over time acceptance has grown that the exercise of the right to self-determination is not only 
a prerequisite for the realisation of individual rights but itself also depends on the freedom to 
exercise individual rights. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (“Vienna 
Declaration”) recognises that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated”.213 Therefore, the Vienna Declaration implicitly also acknowledged the 
indivisibility, interdependency and interrelatedness of the right of peoples to freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development, which it included as part of the second article of 
the declaration,214 and the other included human rights. Moreover, when the General Assembly 
adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in 1960 it included the provision that 
“[a]ll states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of […] the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights”.215 By the time that the negotiations on the Twin Covenants were concluded 
the link between the right to self-determination and individual rights had been fully established. 
This is evidenced by the fact that, in 1965 – one year before the adoption of the Twin Covenants 
– the General Assembly adopted the resolution on the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and 
                                               
210 ‘Commission on Human Rights, Report to the Economic and Social Council on the Eighth 
Session of the Commission, Held in New York, from 14 April to 14 June 1952’ (n 209), Chile, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Uruguay, Yugoslavia had voted in favour, Australia, Belgium, 
Greece, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of 
America has voted against, and China, France, India, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had abstained from voting. 
211 Burke (n 177) 43. 
212 UN General Assembly, The right of peoples and nations to self-determination, 16 December 
1952, A/RES/637 637. 
213 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna, 25 June 1993 para 5. 
214 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna, 25 June 1993 (n 213), Article 2: ‘All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. 
215 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV) (n 20), Article 7. 
 51 
Sovereignty (“Declaration on Non-Intervention”), which stated that all states shall respect the 
right to self-determination “to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure, and with 
absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms [emphasis added]”.216  
 
In its General Comment No. 12 of 1984, the HRC acknowledged the interdependence of the 
right to self-determination and the other rights included in the ICCPR.217 On a regional level, 
even though the Helsinki Final Act does not include a statement on the indivisibility, 
interdependency and interrelatedness of the right to ongoing self-determination and individual 
rights, Cassese concluded from his analysis of its preparatory works that to the extent to which 
this formulation of the right to self-determination refers to its internal dimension “it 
substantially reflects the Western view and, in particular, the Dutch proposal”.218 The proposal 
of the Netherlands included the statement that  
 
“[t]he participating States recognise the inalienable right of the people of every State 
freely to choose, to develop, to adapt or to change its political, economic, social and 
cultural systems […] with due respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms 
[emphasis added]”.219 
 
This once again clearly linked the exercise of the ongoing self-determination right to freely 
pursue development with the exercise of individual rights. This link was also included in the 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe the participation states, which confirmed 
that “they will respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop, in accordance with 
international human rights standards, their political, social, economic and cultural systems 
[emphasis added]”.220 Whereas this was framed as a right of states, the sovereign right to 
choose and develop political, social, economic and cultural systems is one side of the coin of 
                                               
216 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 21 December 
1965, A/RES/2131(XX). 
217 ‘UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right 
to Self-Determination), The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, 13 March 1984’ (n 184) 
para 2. 
218 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (n 2) 285. 
219 Quoted in ibid 281. 
220 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
 52 
which the other side is the obligation of states to fulfil the right to ongoing self-determination 
of its population.221 The right to choose and develop such systems, and the obligation to fulfil 
the right to ongoing self-determination, with absolute respect for human rights establish a link 
between the right of the people as a group and the rights of the members of this people as 
individuals. The crux of the matter is that the peoples’ right to self-determination is a human 
right. There is no valid reason to treat it differently from other human rights. Therefore, the 
right to self-determination is indivisible, interdependent and interrelated with all civil and 
political rights. However, this reflects only the civil and political dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination. Cassese’s statement that the internal dimension of the right to self-
determination is best explained as a manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the 
ICCPR is incomplete. If the right to self-determination is indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated with civil and political rights it is equally indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated with other human rights. Therefore, it should be argued that not the internal 
dimension of the right to self-determination as a whole but instead only its civil and political 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is such a manifestation of the totality of 
rights included in the ICCPR.222 
  
The civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination as a right to 
representative democracy 
I have argued that 1) the populations of sovereign states fall within the definition of peoples 
and thus possess the right to ongoing self-determination, 2) the pursuit of economic, social and 
cultural development should to be free from both external interference and the manipulation or 
undue influence from their domestic authorities, and 3) the civil and political dimension of the 
right to ongoing self-determination can best be explained as the manifestation of all civil and 
political rights. Now I will analyse what the significance of these findings are. According to 
James Crawford, the consequence of the view that the right to self-determination is essentially 
a summary of other rights is that the right to participate democratically in the political system 
to which a person belongs and to participate in decisions as to the future of this system is a key 
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self-determination right.223 Cassese called the right of the population of sovereign states to elect 
and keep the government of its choice as one of the important elements of the internal 
dimension self-determination.224 He later added that this includes the right of peoples to 
“choose their legislators and political leaders [not only free from external interference by also 
free] from any manipulation or undue influence from the domestic authorities themselves 
[original emphasis]”.225 Recently Pau Bossacoma Busquets has observed that “[t]he internal 
side of the international principle of self-determination of peoples is closely related to the 
principle of democracy”.226  
 
A logical starting point for any argument that the right to ongoing self-determination includes 
a right to a representative democracy is the Declaration on Friendly Relations. Interestingly, 
the important part in relation to this issue is the savings clause at the end of the section on the 
principle of self-determination. This savings clause states that nothing in the preceding 
paragraphs on the principle of self-determination 
 
“shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour [emphasis added]”.227 
 
In 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights adopted an almost identical statement in the 
Vienna Declaration. The only change the drafters adopted was that it substituted the phrase 
“without distinction as to race, creed or colour” with the phrase “without distinction of any 
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kind”.228 The statements in the Declaration on Friendly Relations and the Vienna Declaration 
seem to imply that if a government does not represent the whole of the population it is violating 
its obligation to respect the right to ongoing self-determination of its population. To be 
represented by a government is not the same as to be represented in a government. At least 
theoretically, a government is able to represent its whole population without distinction of any 
kind without all possible groups being represented in this government. Nonetheless, as 
Thornberry argued, “representation should be representation in substance [which] may direct 
us from representation to participation”.229 The former Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Asbjørn Eide 
referred to the right of popular participation in the government of a state as “the most basic 
principle of self-determination”.230 Indeed, there is a good case to make that the ongoing right 
to political self-determination includes a right of populations to participate in the public affairs 
of their state both indirectly through freely chosen representatives and directly. 
 
Shivji stated that the right to self-determination contains “the freedom of the ‘people’ to choose 
the form of their governance and government”.231 Furthermore, Rosas stated that the right to 
self-determination appears to contain “[t]he right of a people to govern, that is, to have a 
democratic system of government” as one of its elements.232 According to Special Rapporteur 
Cristescu, the right of peoples to elect their government is an integral aspect of the right to 
ongoing self-determination.233 Similarly, Yusuf has even argued that that the right of people to 
freely choose a genuinely representative government is the most important entitlement peoples 
have in relation to the internal dimension of their right to self-determination.234 In General 
Comment No. 25, the HRC stated that peoples, in accordance with Article 1, “enjoy the right 
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to choose the form of their constitution or government [emphasis added]”.235 Moreover, the 
HCR specifically named Article 25 of the ICCPR as a right that is related to the right to self-
determination.236 Article 25 provides that individuals have the right to a) take part in the 
conduct, directly or through freely chosen representatives, b) vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections, and c) have access to public service in their country.237 According to the 
HRC, indirectly such participation is exercised through freely chosen representatives who 
exercise governmental power and are accountable through the electoral process for their 
exercise of that power.238 Higgins has argued that the relationship between the two rights is 
such that the latter article is concerned with the detail of how the free choice necessarily implied 
in Common Article 1 is to be provided. She argued this is done through periodic elections on 
the basis of universal suffrage.239 In relation to this issue Higgins once rhetorically asked how 
people could be free in pursuit of their economic, social and cultural development “if self-
determination does not also provide for free choice not only as to [political] status but also as 
to government”.240 Furthermore, Higgins observed that,  
 
“[t]he Human Rights Committee has consistently told states appearing before it for 
examination of their periodic reports that the right of self-determination requires that a 
free choice be afforded to the peoples, on a continuing basis, as to their system of 
government, in order that they can determine their economic, social, and cultural 
development [emphasis added]”.241 
 
In its Concluding Observations on the Republic of the Congo, the HRC expressed its concern 
that the people of the Congo were unable to exercise their right to self-determination under 
Article 1 of the ICCPR because the general elections had been postponed and called upon the 
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Republic of the Congo to organise general elections as soon as possible in order to enable its 
citizens to exercise their right to self-determination.242 
 
Following on her argument that the right to ongoing self-determination includes a right to a 
representative democracy, as it requires the free choice of peoples on a continuing basis as to 
their system of government, Higgins argued that one-party systems are in violation of the right 
to self-determination of the population. Her reasoning was that “[e]ven in one-party systems 
that allow some form of participatory democracy, the system itself is predetermined: the range 
of political, economic, and social choices is thereby already narrowed”.243 This argument not 
only promotes the idea that the right to ongoing self-determination includes the right of 
populations to freely elect the governments of their states but also sets criteria for the form of 
political system in which such elections are to be taken place. Higgins observed that according 
to the HRC it is virtually impossible for a one-party state to fulfil its obligations under the right 
to self-determination.244 Similar to Higgins, Cassese argued that even though initially under 
the ‘loose interpretation’ of the rights concerning democratic process of the HRC single-party 
systems were “regarded as compatible with the concept of representative democracy”,245 the 
HRC came to insist that political pluralism is a necessary precondition of democracy as it 
increasingly turned its attention to the internal dimension of the right to self-determination. 
Consequentially, the HRC considered non-multi-party systems as “scarcely compatible with 
the democratic model outlined in the [ICCPR]”.246 
 
Not all commentators agree that the right to self-determination includes a right of the 
population to democratically elect the government of its state. Saul, Kinley and Mowbray 
argued that the right to self-determination not yet requires the “full democratic political 
governance of the state for the benefit of its people”. They argued that instead the emphasis of 
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the right to self-determination lies on 1) the freedom from foreign interference, 2) the 
sovereignty equality of states, and 3) “various rights of political participation which do not also 
presuppose a particular political system”.247 The same line of reasoning can be found in 
statements by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination In its General 
Recommendation No. 21, the CERD acknowledged that there is link between the right to self-
determination and the right of individuals to participate in the conduct of public affairs as 
referred to in Article 5(c) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.248 This statement left out the other rights under Article 5(c). Namely, 
the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on the basis of universal 
and equal suffrage, and the right to have equal access to public service.249 However, if the self-
determination of populations to freely pursue their development has to be exercised with 
respect for human rights this should include the full set of rights provided for in Article 25 of 
the ICCPR and 5(c) of the ICERD, including the right to vote in elections and stand for election.  
 
Another argument of why the right to ongoing self-determination does not include a right to a 
representative democracy was put forward by according to Fabienne Peter. She argued that the 
rights included in Article 25   
 
“can be satisfied by political systems other than democratic self-government [and] 
clauses can thus be interpreted in ways that do not entail a democratic ideal of political 
equality. The right to political participation, understood in this way, neither presupposes 
democratic institutions nor does it demand that they be imposed where they are 
absent.”250 
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The question is whether the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs amounts to the 
right to shape this conduct. Such an interpretation would be in line with the so-called 
‘restrictive interpretation of treaties’, which contends that if a treaty provision could be 
interpreted in multiple ways the interpretation should be followed that binds states to the 
interpretation that provides the weakest set of obligations.251 However, even if it were possible 
to interpreted the provision in Article 25(1) and Article 25(2) in a manner that does not 
presupposes the necessity of a democratic system governance, such an interpretation would 
lack good faith and a respect for the context in which they were included.252 As explained by 
Hersch Lauterpacht, the ‘restrictive interpretation of treaties’ method goes against the principle 
of good faith. According to Lauterpacht, if a treaty could be interpreted in one or more ways 
the possible interpretation that gives most effect to the treaty should be followed.253 This ‘rule 
of effectiveness’ was later adopted by the International Law Commission in its commentary on 
its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties.254 With this in mind, the right of individuals to 
participate in their state’s conduct of its public affairs should be interpreted as a right of 
individuals to influence their state’s conduct of its public affairs.255 In the words of the HRC, 
“Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people”.256 
The relationship between the right to ongoing self-determination established by Article 1 and 
Article 25 is that the provision in Article 25 establishes a minimum standard that ensures 
populations are able to shape their state’s conduct of its public affairs, as part of its free pursuit 
of development, by exercising the right of individual members of the population to participate 
in this conduct. Although it is not yet clear whether the right to participate in the conduct of 
public affairs extends to the to the international sphere of decision making,257 it has been 
accepted that this right is applicable to the domestic sphere of decision-making in matters 
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related to international law.258 Therefore, individuals are free to participate in a states decision-
making processes in matters relating to the creation and adoption of international legal rules. 
In relation to the right of peoples to freely pursue their development, this 
is especially important to the negotiation and adoption of trade agreement. Such treaties have 
an enormous impact on the pursuit of development by the populations of the states involved. 
Consequently, if states do not allow their population to participate in their conduct in relation 
to the negotiations and adoption of international legal treaties this severely restricts its freedom 
to pursue the economic, social, and cultural development of its choice. 
 
The understanding that the right to ongoing self-determination provides populations with the 
right to shape their state’s conduct of its public affairs as part of its free pursuit of development 
should not be viewed as a refutation of the argument made by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray that 
the right to self-determination does not presuppose a particular political system but instead 
focuses on various rights of political participation. Indeed, the right to self-determination could 
not possibly prescribe a particular form of political system as that would go against its own 
nature – a right that provides that peoples should be free to shape their own political system 
and economic, social and cultural development. Even though history has taught us that one-
party systems are likely to become authoritarian and the right to self-determination includes a 
prohibition against authoritarian exercises of power, any suggestion that the one-party systems 
are by definition violations of the right to self-determination is ungrounded. At least in theory, 
it is possible that a one-party system complies with the full set of obligations included in the 
right to self-determination. States with one-party systems in which the population can freely 
pursue its development through the unrestricted participation in their state’s conduct of public 
affairs are just as able to abide by their obligations under the right to self-determination as 
states with a two- or multi-party system. As recognised in the General Assembly resolution on 
enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, “there is no 
single political system or electoral method that is equally suited to all nations and their 
people”.259 The right to self-determination does not presuppose a particular political system. 
Instead, the right to self-determination establishes a minimum standard that ensures that 
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populations are free to control their own pursuit of development. This minimum standard is the 
obligation of states to adopt a system of governance that is freely chosen by its population and 
allows this population to pursue the development of its choice. 
 
The civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination as a right to 
participatory democracy 
Essential to a population’s exercise of the right of peoples to freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development is not the ability to elect its government but its ability to pursue 
its development in accordance with its freely chosen policies. The election of representatives 
through which populations indirectly shapes their state’s conduct of its public affairs is by no 
means the ‘be all and end all’ of their right to freely pursue its development. As stated by Judith 
Butler,  
 
“[a]lthough elected officials are supposed to represent popular sovereignty (or the 
“popular will” more specifically) by virtue of having been elected by a majority of the 
population, it does not follow that popular sovereignty is in any way exhausted by the 
electoral process or that elections fully transfer sovereignty from the populace to its 
elected representatives”.260   
 
Even if a state’s government is elected by its population this by no means ensures that its 
population is free to pursue its development.261 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) recognised that free and fair elections are crucial components of 
the right to participate but are not enough to guarantee the enjoyment of this right by 
themselves.262 In the link between the right to ongoing self-determination and, what Saul, 
Kinley and Mowbray refer to as, “various rights of political participation”,263 the emphasis 
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should not be placed on the right to vote in elections but on their right to participate in the 
conduct of public affairs in a broader sense.  
 
According to Knut Bourquain the provision on the right to participate in Article 25 ICCPR 
“solely stipulates the right to participation in general public affairs, and includes the right to 
vote, but does not provide for an individual right to participate in the concrete administrative 
processes”.264 However, the HRC has interpreted ‘the conduct of public affairs’ as a broad 
concept relating to the exercise of political power, and in particular the exercise of legislative, 
executive and administrative powers.265 In its opinion this covers “all aspects of public 
administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, 
regional and local levels”.266 This suggest that, in contrast to the argument of Bourquain, it is 
the opinion of the HRC that individuals do in fact have the right to participate in concrete 
administrative processes. This interpretation of the right to participate was also adopted by the 
CESCR, which stated that “the international human rights normative framework includes the 
right of those affected by key decisions to participate in the relevant decision-making 
processes.267 The participation of a population in its state’s policymaking is a necessity for the 
exercise of its right to pursue the development of its choice. The link between the peoples’ 
right to freely pursue development and the right to participation of individual members of these 
peoples established that populations have the right to shape the political, economic, social and 
cultural systems of their state, and to pursue their development according to the policies they 
have freely chosen, by deciding how their state should conduct its public affairs. This includes 
both the right to elect the government of a state and participate in the state’s conduct of its 
public affairs. 
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This understanding of the link between the right of peoples to freely pursue their development 
and the right of individuals to participate in their state’s public affairs is especially evident in 
the regional framework established by the African Charter. Article 20 of the African Charter 
provides that peoples “shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their 
economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen [emphasis 
added]”.268 The inclusion of the statement that the economic and social development of peoples 
should be pursuit according to policy they have freely chosen reflects the idea that the right to 
self-determination includes a right to democratic participation. This relates to the Article 13(1) 
right of every citizen “to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or 
through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law”.269 This 
relationship was acknowledged by the African Commission in the Katanga case of 1995. The 
African Commission found that in absence of evidence that a people is denied the right under 
Article 13(1) this people is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible 
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.270 Therefore, the right to ongoing self-
determination is not violated to the extent that it calls for a remedial solution that impinges 
upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state as long as the Article 13(1) right of the 
members of peoples is guaranteed. Conversely, the right to self-determination if the Article 
13(1) right of members of a people is violated this could possibly amount to a violation of the 
right to self-determination. Whereas in the case of the Kantagese people the Commission dealt 
with a situation of a subpopulation people, it can be assumed that the African Commission 
would find the same violation of the right to self-determination in a situation where the 
members of the population of a state as a whole are deprived of their right under Article 13(1).  
 
According to Shivji, the “hesitant and ambiguous formulation” of the provision in Article 13 
at best “provides for a representative government rather than a democratic one”.271 Article 
13(1) states that every citizen has “the right to participate freely in the government of his 
country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the 
provisions of the law”.272 Shivji compares this with the stronger and unambiguous statement 
in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples (“Algiers Declaration”), 
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which is located in Section II under the right to political self-determination and states that all 
peoples have the right to “democratic government representing all the citizens without 
distinction as race, sex, belief or colour, and capable of ensuring effective respect for the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all”.273 If looked at in a vacuum, Article 13(1) seemingly 
provides for an obligation to possess a representative government but does not go as far as 
providing an obligation for a democratic government. In relation to this point, it is important 
to highlight the difference between the wording of Article 13(1) of the African Charter and 
Article 25(a) of the ICCPR. Whereas the provision in Article 25(a) established a right of 
individuals to participate directly or indirectly in the conduct of public affairs,274 Article 13(1) 
establishes a right to participate directly or indirectly, through freely chosen representatives, in 
the government itself. 275 This could be interpreted to mean that individuals have the right to be 
part of the government or be represented in the government but not a right to participate in the 
policymaking of the government. However, if Article 13(1) of the African Charter is 
interpreted in combination with the provision of Article 20, which establishes that all peoples 
have the right to freely pursue their development according to the policy they have freely 
chosen, it should be concluded that populations have the right to shape the policies by which 
they will pursue their development through the participation in their government and its 
government’s policymaking. 
 
In order for entire populations to shape the policies by which they shall pursue their 
development, they should not only have the right to determine their state’s conduct of public 
affairs indirectly through chosen representatives but also directly by shaping individual 
policies. Such participation in policymaking can for instance be exercised through referendums 
or other electoral processes in which individuals have a direct say over their state’s exercise of 
legislative, executive and administrative powers.276 As stated by the HRC, individuals can also 
take part in the conduct of public affairs though public debate, dialogue with their government, 
and their capacity to organise themselves. It also acknowledged that such exercises of 
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participation are supported by, in particular, their rights to freedom of expression, freedom of 
assembly and freedom of association.277 This is not exclusive to such exercises of the right to 
participation but also applies to all forms of direct and indirect exercises of participation. The 
guarantee of the full set of civil and political rights is a necessity for populations to shape their 
state’s conduct of public affairs in a genuine and effective way. The right of a population to 
freely pursue its development is meaningless without the right to freely develop a popular will. 
In this regard the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of 
association are indeed of special importance. The argument that the right to self-determination 
is best understood as a manifestation of the totality of civil and political rights is based upon 
the idea that the participation of peoples in the public affairs of their state can only be exercised 
in a genuine and meaningful manner if its members are not only free to exercise their rights 
under Article 25 but also all other rights included in the ICCPR.278 The individual civil and 
political rights can be seen as minimum standards that ensure that a population can exercise its 
ongoing self-determination right to pursue its development, free from external interference, 
and by means of its’ freely chosen policies. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that, the development of self-determination as a human right of 
peoples, has had two important consequences. The first of these consequences is that it 
established that the right to ongoing self-determination provides obligations of states in relation 
to both the populations of foreign states and their own population. The second important 
consequence is that as a human right the right to ongoing self-determination is indivisible from, 
interdependent and interrelated with, all other human rights. Thus, the right to ongoing self-
determination is best explained as a manifestation of the totality of human rights. In this 
chapter, I have focussed on the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination of the entire population of a state. This dimension provides the right of such a 
population to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development by participating in 
the civil and political life of their state. A population exercises such participation by the 
exercise of its individual members of their civil and political right. Therefore, whereas the right 
to ongoing self-determination is best explained as a manifestation of the totality of human 
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rights, the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is best 
explained as a manifestation of the totality of civil and political rights. This includes the right 
of individual to participate in the public life of their state, which is one of the key human rights 
that enables a population to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.  
 
From my examination of the relationship between the right to ongoing self-determination of 
entire population and the right of the individual members of these populations to participate in 
the public life of their state, I first found that it can be argued that the civil and political 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is the foundation of a right to a 
representative democratic system of governance. This includes the right of populations to both 
choose the form of their government and to indirectly participate in the decision-making 
processes of their government by freely electing its representatives. Subsequently, I also found 
that it could equally be argued that the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing 
self-determination is the foundation of a right to a participatory democratic system of 
governance. I concluded that it is not the form of governance, and the means by which 
populations participate in the decision-making processes of their government, that is important. 
Instead, what is important is that populations control the policies implemented by their 
government which will affect their development by their participation in their government’s 
decision-making processes in relation to these policies. In other words, peoples should have 
the right to pursue their development in accordance with policies they have freely chosen. I 
will examine the consequences of these findings in relation to 1) the civil and political 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination of subpopulation groups in the third 
chapter, 2) the socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination in the 
fourth chapter, and 3) the self-determination right of peoples to permanent sovereignty over 




Chapter 3 – The civil and political dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination of ‘subpopulation groups’ 
 
The previous chapter has focussed on the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing 
self-determination of the populations of sovereign states as a whole. This chapter will build 
upon that by analysing the ongoing self-determination rights of subpopulation groups, which 
are distinct subsections of the ‘entire population’ of a state. Since the entry into force of the 
Twin Covenants on Human Rights, the self-determination of subpopulation groups has become 
increasingly predominant in self-determination scholarship. Consequently, the interpretation 
of ‘peoples’ has become central to the discourse on the right to self-determination. In the 
previous chapter, I argued that the populations of states and non-self-governing territories are 
among the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination and that the civil and political 
dimension of ongoing self-determination is exercised through the ability of its members to 
freely exercise their civil and political rights. In the 90s, Higgins has argued that because all 
members of subpopulation groups are part of the population of the territory “they too, as 
individuals, are the holders of the right of self-determination”.279 According to Higgins, if the 
term peoples is interpreted as the ‘entire peoples’ – the entire population – of a state it is no 
longer necessary to answer the difficult question of whether a particular subpopulation group 
is a people for purposes of self-determination under Common Article 1 of the Twin 
Covenants.280  
 
In this chapter, I will first analyse the ongoing right of political self-determination of 
subpopulation groups whose status as peoples has not yet been recognised – i.e. ‘minority 
groups’ – and juxtapose this against the ongoing self-determination rights of indigenous and 
tribal peoples, which are subpopulation groups whose status as peoples is generally recognised 
in international law. I will argue that even though Higgins’ argument is valid – all 
subpopulation groups are indeed entitled to freely participate in the pursuit of development of 
the population to which they belong – her conclusion that it is no long necessary to establish 
what subpopulation groups are peoples is no longer correct now indigenous peoples are 
acknowledge as peoples with the right to self-determination. The rights provided to 
subpopulation peoples by the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-
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determination are more extensive than the rights provided to other subpopulation groups. 
Whereas subpopulation peoples have both the right to participate in the civil and political life 
of the state and the right to their own internal civil and political life, other subpopulation groups 
only have the former right. I will analyse how that the international human rights framework 
has balanced the right to ongoing self-determination of subpopulation peoples with the right to 
ongoing self-determination of the population as a whole. As a final note on this chapter, as this 
thesis focusses on the right to ongoing self-determination, this chapter will not analyse the 
constitutive self-determination right of subpopulation peoples to freely determine their own 
political status. Therefore, it will also not examine whether subpopulation peoples have a right 
to secession under international law. 
 
The right of subpopulation groups to freely participate in the civil and political life of the 
state 
When the emphasis of the development of the right to self-determination shifted towards its 
internal dimension one of the important issues was whether this dimension applied exclusively 
to the entire population of states or also to certain subpopulation groups. A central feature of 
the discussion concerning this issue became the interpretation of the statements on the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. As quoted in 
the previous chapters, in the savings clause included in the part on the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of this declaration it is stated that  
 
“[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour [emphasis 
added].”281 
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Cassese interpreted the inclusion of the phrase ‘without distinction as to race, creed or colour’ 
to mean that the subpopulation groups that fit under one of these categories are recognised as 
peoples with a possible claim to the right to self-determination.282 This led him to the 
examination of the drafter’s intended meaning of race, creed and colour. He concluded that 
race and colour express the identical concept of ‘race’.283 In relation to the inclusion of the term 
‘creed’, he examined whether it refers to a ‘system of religious beliefs’ or includes any ‘set of 
principles or opinions on any subject’ as suggested by the non-legal definition of the non-legal 
definition of the term.284 Cassese argued that the drafters could not have indented for the term 
‘creed’ to be interpreted as the latter – even though this is part of the ordinary meaning of the 
term – because “any political group not ‘represented’ by the government would have the right 
to self-determination, hence also – at least in exceptional cases – the right to secession”.285 
Cassese thus concludes that the right to ongoing self-determination as embodied in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations is only conferred on subpopulation groups that are defined 
by their race or religious beliefs.286 Moreover, he concluded that by “limiting self-
determination to racial and religious groups, the draftsmen made it clear that self-determination 
was not considered a right held by the entire people of an authoritarian State”.287 
 
Cassese’s argument is based upon the idea that the drafters intended for the inclusion of the 
phrase “without distinction as to race, creed or colour” to be interpreted as bestowing the right 
to self-determination upon these types of subpopulation groups. As stated in the previous 
chapter, Higgins argued that there are two possible meanings of the term ‘peoples’ in relation 
to the right to self-determination.288 The first is the meaning promoted by Cassese that 
‘peoples’ means all persons comprising distinctive groupings on the basis of race, ethnicity, or 
religion. Alternatively, there is the possibility that ‘peoples’ means the entire people of a state 
– in other words the population of a state in its entirety. According to Higgins, “[t]he emphasis 
in all the relevant instruments, and in the state practice [...] on the importance of territorial 
integrity, means that ‘peoples’ is to be understood in the sense of all the peoples of a given 
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territory [original emphasis]”.289 In line with Cassese, Thornberry acknowledged that a more 
flexible argument can be made in favour of interpreting the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
in a manner that bestows the right to self-determination on certain subpopulation groups. 
However, even so, he argued that  
 
“[t]he non-recognition of the existence of distinct peoples apart from the people of the 
State as a whole must be accounted for in any interpretation of the text [the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations]”.290 
 
Thornberry concluded this from the fact that “the text refers to ‘the whole people’, so it seems 
that self-determination benefits the people of the State as a unified group.291 In other words, 
Thornberry argued that the drafters of Declaration on Friendly Relations viewed self-
determination as a right belonging to the entire population of a state. If this interpretation is 
followed, the inclusion of the phrase “without distinction as to race, creed or colour” was not 
intended to bestow a right to self-determination on these categories of subpopulation groups. 
Instead, it was intended to convey the view that the right to self-determination of the population 
as a whole is infringed upon if a government represents this population with distinction as to 
race, creed, or colour. This interpretation is easier to reconcile with the savings clause included 
in the Vienna Declaration. The wording of this latter savings clause is almost identical to that 
in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The only change that was made is that the Vienna 
Declaration replaced the phrase “without distinction as to race, creed or colour” by the phrase 
“without distinction of any kind”.292 If we apply Cassese’s interpretation of the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations to the Vienna Declaration the latter declaration would convey the view that 
any kind of subpopulation group is a people with the right to self-determination. This was 
obviously not the intention of its drafters. Therefore, it should be concluded that the almost 
identical statements in the two declarations represent the view that 1) the right to self-
determination is a right of the population of a state as a whole, 2) the government of the state 
is to represent its population without distinction, and 3) that if the government fails to do so it 
is not a right to self-determination of the subpopulation group that is not represented by its 
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government that is violated but instead the right to self-determination of the population as a 
whole. 
 
Higgins has argued that – if ‘peoples’ is interpreted as ‘the entire peoples of a state’ – it is no 
longer necessary to answer the difficult question whether a particular subpopulation group is a 
people for purposes of the right to self-determination.293 This argument is based upon the idea 
that because all members of subpopulation groups are part of the entire people of the state “they 
too, as individuals, are the holders of the right of self-determination”.294 The members of all 
subpopulation groups have the right to participate in the free pursuit of development of the 
population of a state as a whole.295 This includes the right to participate in their state’s conduct 
of its public affairs. As argued in the previous chapter, this includes the state’s decision-making 
processes. This right been recognised in a number of treaties, UN General Assembly 
resolutions and the findings of UN treaty bodies. For instance, the CESCR has acknowledged 
that “the international human rights normative framework includes the right of those affected 
by key decisions to participate in the relevant decision-making processes”.296 As the individual 
members of a subpopulation group have the right to participate in the decision-making 
processes in relation to decisions that concern them, the group as a whole is able to participate 
in decision-making process that concerns its development. In other words, subpopulation 
groups have the right to participate in such decision-making processes through the exercise of 
its members of their individual right to participate.  
 
The right of subpopulation groups to ‘effective participation’ 
Article 4 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities (“Declaration on the Rights of Minorities”) provided that states shall 
take measures to ensure that individual members of minorities are able to exercise fully and 
effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in 
full equality before the law.297 In relation to the ongoing right to political self-determination, 
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this means that minorities are entitled to develop their own popular will and participate in their 
state’s public life on equal footing to all other individuals. As shown in the previous chapter, 
this entitlement is exercised through the enjoyment of all civil and political rights. This is 
reflected in the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities 
in Public Life (“Lund Recommendations”) by the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe’s High Commissioner on National Minorities (“HCNM”),298 and its ‘explanatory 
note’.299 These principles are themselves not legally binding but are considered as authoritative 
explanations of existing legal rules.300 In the words of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities,  
 
“[The Lund Recommendations] build upon fundamental principles and rules of 
international law, such as respect for human dignity, equal rights, and 
nondiscrimination, as they affect the rights of national minorities to participate in public 
life and to enjoy other political rights.”301 
 
In General Principle 6 of the Lund Recommendations, it is included that that states “should 
ensure that opportunities exist for minorities to have an effective voice at the level of the central 
government”.302 The Declaration on the Rights of Minorities specifically includes that 
individual members of minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the 
national and regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or regions in which 
they live.303 According to the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
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Rights, the right to effective participation establishes that minorities as a minimum have the 
right to have their opinion heard and fully taken into account before the state decides upon the 
adoption of matters to their concern.304 However, as stated by this Sub-Commission, “[t]he 
number of persons belonging to minorities is by definition too small for them to determine the 
outcome of decisions in majoritarian democracy”.305 This raises the question of how much 
influence the right to ‘effective participation’ really provides to minority groups. From her 
review of the UN standards and practice, Ilona Klímová-Alexander observed that the United 
Nations has not yet adopted a binding legal standard on the effective participation of minorities 
in the public affairs of their state.306 As she explained, only through the interpretation of Article 
27 of the ICCPR can states “be called upon to enact measures to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them”.307  
 
As Verstichel argued, the right of minorities to participate in the conduct of their state’s public 
affairs is an effect of applying the doctrine of non-discrimination to the provision of Article 
27.308 As Zdenka Machnyikova and Lanna Hollo explained, this doctrine is one of the key 
pillars of the system of protection of minorities.309 In Article 2(1) of the ICCPR it is provided 
that  
 
“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status”.310 
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Moreover, in Article 26 it is established that the law of the members states to the ICCPR “shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground”.311 The same argument as Verstichel made in relation to 
minorities can be made in relation to all subpopulation groups whose members’ right to not be 
discriminated against for their membership of that group is provided by the human right 
prohibition against discrimination. Therefore, it should be accepted that all these subpopulation 
groups have the right to participate in the conduct of their state’s public affairs as an effect of 
applying the doctrine of non-discrimination to the provision of Article 27.  
 
In her analysis of the right of minorities to effective participation the public affairs of their 
state, Verstichel stated that the qualifier ‘effective’ in the right to effective participation “refers 
to the fact that the ‘presence of minority representatives in the decision-making processes 
should be translated into ‘influence’ on the outcome of the decision-making”.312 She clarified 
that even though the presence of minority representation seemingly implies ‘influence’ this 
alone is often not enough to ensure the implementation of the right to effective participation of 
minorities.313 From her review of the relevant international instrument, Verstichel concluded 
that in relation to this right most attention goes to the ‘presence’ of minorities in the decision-
making bodies and processes and hardly any to the ‘influence’ of minorities on the outcome of 
it.314 As explained by Yash Ghai, “representation without self-government would serve limited 
functions, [as] the group would remain a minority, whereas self-governance would give it the 
right to conduct its own affairs in areas that matter deeply to it”.315 In relation to this issue, it 
is important to note that international legal standards have not confirmed the existence of a 
right of minorities to autonomy or self-government.316 Consequently, it is not possible to 
extrapolate such a right for subpopulation groups from the right to ongoing self-determination 
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of the population to which these groups belong. Nor is it possible to extrapolate this right from 
the right to constitutive self-determination as this right is a right exclusive to peoples. 
  
As the right to effective participation is extrapolated from a combination of the right to 
participation of individuals and the doctrine of non-discrimination, not only minorities but the 
members all subpopulation groups protected by the doctrine of non-discrimination possess this 
right. This has been acknowledged in relation to several other subpopulation groups. For 
instance, in the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women of 1979 
(“CEDAW”) it is provided that states shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that women, 
on equal terms with men, are provided with 1) the right to vote in all elections and be eligible 
for election to all publicly elected bodies, 2) the right to vote in all public referenda, and 3) the 
right to hold public office and to exercise all public functions.317 As established in the previous 
chapter in relation to entire population, the right to vote and be elected, in free elections is not 
enough to ensure that a state respects the ongoing self-determination rights of all subpopulation 
groups. In relation to subpopulation groups such elections are even less of a guarantee that they 
are able to genuinely participate in the free pursuit of development of the population. The 
CESCR acknowledged that, in relation to people living in poverty, even though free and fair 
elections are crucial for the exercise of the right to participate in the public affairs of the state, 
they are by themselves not enough to ensure the enjoyment of the right to participate in key 
decisions affecting the life of an individual and thus also in relation to decisions that affect the 
subpopulation groups individual belongs to.318 Just as the right of populations to shape their 
state’s conduct of its public affairs goes further than a right to free elections and includes a 
right to participate in the decision-making processes of a state, the rights of subpopulation 
groups provided by the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination 
of the population they are part of go beyond just a right to participate in free elections. The 
CEDAW provides that, apart from the right of women to “vote all elections and public 
referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies”,319 women also have the 
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right to “participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation 
thereof”.320 The right of subpopulation groups to have their opinion heard and fully considered 
as part of the process of formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof is 
an essential element of the right of the population as a whole to freely pursue its economic, 
social and cultural development. However, this right does not go as far as providing all 
subpopulation groups with the right to full autonomy or self-government over issues internal 
to these groups. Consequently, the influence of minorities and other subpopulation groups that 
are not recognised as peoples in the conduct of their state’s public affairs is still limited, even 
in relation to decisions concerning the subpopulation groups or regions in which they live.  
 
The right of indigenous peoples to freely pursue their development and freely participate in 
the civil and political life of the state 
In the previous subchapters, I established that 1) the self-determination rights of subpopulation 
groups provides them with a right to effectively participate in the free pursuit of economic, 
social and cultural development of the population to which they belong, and 2) these groups 
do not possess the right to freely pursue their own development separate from the rest of this 
population. However, commentators have acknowledged that indigenous peoples are the 
exception as they have strong claims to the right to self-determination.321 Also the General 
Assembly has acknowledged indigenous peoples possess the right to self-determination in the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.322 As established by Megan Davies in her 
review of the legal standards set by the UNDRIP, certain scholars have claimed that the articles 
in the UNDRIP already constitute emerging customary international law of indigenous 
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peoples’ rights before its adoption in 2007 but that this does not apply to the text as a whole.323 
In turn, in his review on the legal status of this UN declaration, Sylvanus Gbendazhi Barnabas 
concluded that even though it has not yet achieved the status of customary international law “it 
carries significant legal weight and far-reaching legal implications in international human 
rights law in relation to [Indigenous Peoples] and their rights”.324 The Human Rights Council, 
the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
have all acknowledged that indigenous peoples possess the right to self-determination.325  
 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does itself not provide clarification of 
what subpopulation groups are considered indigenous peoples. One of the commonly referred 
to definitions of indigenous peoples is the ‘working definition’ drawn up by Jose R. Martinez 
Cobo, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. According to Cobo, 
 
[i]ndigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems”.326  
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This definition was used in a joint publication of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights 
Institutions under the title ‘The United Nations Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples: 
A Manual for National Human Rights Institutions’.327 Cobo’s working definition shares several 
elements with the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ set out in Article 1 of ILO Convention 
169. In this article, the International Labour Organization has defined ‘indigenous peoples’ as  
 
“peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment 
of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all 
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions”.328 
  
Both this definition and Cobo’s ‘working definition’ note that indigenous peoples have 
preserved some of their own social, cultural and political or legal institutions. Both definitions 
also include the notion that indigenous peoples have a link to the geographical region that 
predates its conquest and colonisation. Moreover, similar to the statement in Cobo’s definition 
that indigenous peoples “consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies”, the 
ILC included the statement that “[s]elf-identification as indigenous […] shall be regarded as a 
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention 
apply”.329  
 
The legal framework set out by ILO Convention 169 does not only apply to indigenous peoples 
but also to tribal groups in independent countries as long as 1) “their social, cultural and 
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community”, and 2) 
“whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special 
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laws or regulations”.330 However, ILO Convention 169 does not include a provision on the 
right to self-determination and even includes the statement that the “use of the term peoples in 
this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which 
may attach to the term under international law [original emphasis]”.331 According to Macklem 
this statement was included to “foreclose the argument that its reference to ‘peoples’ links an 
indigenous population to the right of self-determination”.332 As Brad Roth observed, “[i]t was 
only in 2007, that, with near unanimity, the UN General Assembly finally ascribed to 
indigenous peoples this distinctive international legal personality”.333 This has linked the rights 
of indigenous peoples set out in ILO Convention 169 with the right to self-determination. In 
its observations the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly drawn 
from the framework set out by ILO Convention 169 in relation to the right to self-determination 
of indigenous peoples.334 Even though the use of ‘peoples’ was not intended to bestow the right 
to self-determination on the groups that fall within the definition it provided, the provisions 
ILO Convention includes are now an important guide to the methods by which indigenous 
peoples can exercise their self-determination. 
 
On a regional level, in Moiwana Community v. Suriname (“Moiwana Community case”), the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided to apply its jurisprudence regarding 
indigenous peoples to the Moiwana tribal community, which members are descendant from 
African slaves forcibly taken to Suriname during the European colonization in the 17th century 
and, therefore, not indigenous to the region. The Inter-American Court established that the 
Moiwana community “possess an ‘all-encompassing relationship’ to their traditional lands, and 
their concept of ownership regarding that territory is not centred on the individual, but rather 
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on the community as a whole”.335 In doing so, the Inter-American Court applied the 
characteristics of indigenous peoples that it had previously set out in The Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua: 
 
“Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal 
form of collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not 
centred on an individual but rather on the group and its community. […] For 
indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession 
and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even 
to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations. [emphasis 
added]”336 
 
In Saramaka People v Suriname (“Saramaka People case”), the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights followed its jurisprudence from the Moiwana Community case by reaffirming 
its applicability to the legal position of a people that was not indigenous to the region. The 
Court did so after concluding that the Saramaka people are 
 
“a tribal community whose social, cultural and economic characteristics are different 
from other sections of the national community, particularly because of their special 
relationship with their ancestral territories, and because they regulate themselves, at 
least partially, by their own norms, customs, and/or traditions”.337 
 
The Moiwana Community and Saramaka People cases show that in the opinion of the Inter-
American Court the rights of indigenous peoples should apply to all groups that share the 
characteristics of indigenous peoples. These indigenous peoples’ rights are also granted to 
groups that “at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
boundaries”338 were not yet inhabitants of their current state, or geographical region that is part 
                                               
335 Case of the Moiwana Community v Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, 15 June 2005, IACHR (Series C) No 124 [133]. 
336 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Merits, reparations and costs, 
IACHR, 31 August 2001, (Series C) No 79 [149]. 
337 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, 28 November 2007, IACHR (Series C) No 172 [84]. 
338 International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, C169 (n 328), Article 1(1)(b). 
 80 
of their current state. However, only on the condition that the subpopulation group in question 
shares the special relationship indigenous peoples have with their territory. A relationship that 
goes beyond individual ownership and instead focusses on the connection between the territory 
and the community as a whole. 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has adopted a similar approach to 
their decisions on who to include under ‘indigenous peoples’. In the case of Endorois Welfare 
Council v Kenya (“Endorois case”), the Commission noted that the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has “not hesitated in granting the collective rights protection to 
groups beyond the ‘narrow/aboriginal/pre-Colombian’ understanding of indigenous peoples 
traditionally adopted in the Americas”.339 It continued by comparing the Endorois case to the 
Inter-American Commission’s Saramaka People case.340 In its Advisory Opinion on the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the African Commission noted that it 
“considers that any African can legitimately consider him/herself as indigene to the 
Continent”.341 Like the Inter-American Commission, the African Commission grants the rights 
of indigenous peoples’ to all groups that share the characteristics of indigenous peoples. The 
main characteristics the African Commission, in relation to indigenous peoples, has recognised 
are the self-identification of a group as an ‘indigenous people’ and a “special attachment to and 
use of their traditional land whereby their ancestral land and territory have a fundamental 
importance for their collective physical and cultural survival as peoples”.342  
 
A similar approach was taken by the UN Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, which stated that “the terms ‘indigenous’ and ‘tribal’ are used as synonyms in the UN 
system”.343 In conclusion, it can be established that in order for a group to be protected by the 
framework on the rights of indigenous peoples its members do not have to descent from the 
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population that inhabited the region at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment 
of the present state boundaries but the group must have 1) have distinctive economic, social 
and cultural conditions that set them apart from other sections of the population, 2) have 
distinctive customs, traditions, laws or regulations, 3) have a special relationship – often a 
relationship of a spiritual nature – with the territory in which they preside, and 4) identify 
themselves as a group that is distinct from other sectors of the population. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the term indigenous peoples will be used to refer to all groups protected under the 
international legal framework on indigenous rights. 
 
The two pillars of indigenous peoples’ ongoing political self-determination rights 
An important feature of the framework established by ILO Convention 169 and the Declaration 
on Indigenous Peoples is that it is developed around the idea that indigenous peoples both a 
subpopulation group of the entire population to which they belong and a ‘peoples’ in their own 
right. Consequently, as observed by Cambou, an analysis of the rights of indigenous peoples 
shows that the right to ongoing self-determination of indigenous peoples has two pillars.344 It 
is difficult to draw a clear boarder between the two different pillars. Instead, the two pillars 
work in harmony with each other. Firstly, as ‘peoples’ in their own right, and unlike other 
subpopulation groups, indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. This right is not 
included in ILO Convention 169 but in Article 3 of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples it is 
stated that by virtue of their right to self-determination indigenous peoples have the right to 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.345 The former right is the legal foundation of the establishment of autonomous 
or self-governing systems. The latter right is the legal foundation of the continued exercise of 
autonomy or self-government. This is reflected in Article 4 of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which links their right to “autonomy or self-government in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs” to their exercise of their right to self-determination.346 In the 
words of Heather Northcott, the “exercise of the right to autonomy enables indigenous peoples 
within a state to establish and implement governing structures without posing a threat to the 
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territorial integrity of the state”.347 However, as the wording of Article 4 of the UNDRIP makes 
clear, the right to autonomy or self-government is limited to those matters relating to the 
internal and local affairs of indigenous peoples. As Cambou determined from her examination 
of the preparatory works of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, these internal affairs 
include those relating to “culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing, 
employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources management, 
environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these 
autonomous functions”.348 
 
The second pillar of ongoing self-determination rights of indigenous peoples is based upon 
their status as part of the entire population of a state. Indigenous peoples, like other 
subpopulation groups, have the right to participate in the free pursuit of the development of the 
to which they belong.349 As shown above, in relation to the participation of subpopulation 
groups in the free pursuit of development of the population as a whole, the key right is that of 
‘effective participation’ in the public affairs of the state. In his review of the political 
participation systems that are applicable to indigenous peoples, Luis Rodríguez-Piñero Royo 
explained that the endorsement of self-government right is simultaneous to the affirmation of 
indigenous peoples’ right to participate in the conduct of public affairs in the states in which 
they live.350 Therefore, the autonomy of indigenous peoples over matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs does not replace their right to participate in the conduct of public 
affairs of their state but is an addition to this right.351 Indeed, Article 5 of the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that even though indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their own political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions 
they also retain their right to participate fully in the political, economic, social and cultural life 
of the state.352 As clarified by Cambou, the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples “does not 
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impose any particular procedure to ensure the collective participation of indigenous peoples, it 
puts the obligation on the respective state to guarantee that this right is effectively 
guaranteed”.353 Rodríguez-Piñero Royo observed that the right of indigenous peoples to 
effectively participate in the public affairs of their state overlaps significantly with the rights 
of effective participation of minorities.354 As established above in relation to the right to 
effective participation of other subpopulation groups, the participation of indigenous peoples 
must have “the capacity to influence the outcomes of decision-making processes”.355 In ILO 
Convention 169 it is included that states are obligated to establish the “means by which 
[indigenous] peoples can freely participate […] at all levels of decision-making in elective 
institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which 
concern them”.356 In both ILO Convention 169 and the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, the 
right of indigenous peoples to participate fully in the political, economic, social and cultural 
life of the state is included as a corollary to the prohibition of discrimination against them on 
the grounds of their status as indigenous or tribal group.357 During the drafting process of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, the representatives of indigenous and tribal 
peoples stated that these rights are closely connected to the right to self-determination,358 and 
stressed their “fundamental importance” in order to ensure the effective and meaningful 
participation of indigenous and tribal peoples in the policy- and decision-making of states as 
an element of the right to self-determination.359 
 
The right of indigenous peoples to be ‘consulted’ 
As Cambou observed, even though the first pillar provides indigenous peoples with the right 
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to the internal and local affairs, “there are 
fairly few signs of such jurisdiction having been transferred from states to indigenous peoples 
during the more than ten years that have passed since the adoption of the [Declaration on 
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Indigenous Peoples]”.360 Instead, another element of the international legal framework for the 
protection of indigenous peoples has been emphasised in order to balances the self-
determination rights of indigenous peoples with that of the entire population to which they 
belong. This element is the obligation of states to consult indigenous peoples in these matters, 
and conversely the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted. This obligation is included in 
Article 6(1)(a) of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, which states that governments 
shall “consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through 
their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or 
administrative measures which may affect them directly”.361 In their article ‘Mitigating State 
Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples’, James Anaya and Sergio Puig 
argue that as a creation of human rights law the duty to consult can restrict the power of states 
over individuals and subpopulation groups under their jurisdiction but it cannot eliminate state 
sovereignty. They base this argument on the argument that the obligation to consult with 
indigenous peoples is a corollary of the international human rights system, which creates rights 
of individuals and peoples in relation to their domestic state.362 Instead of eliminating state 
sovereignty, “consultations serve a protective role for indigenous peoples within an 
international legal system in which power is distributed among sovereign independent 
states”.363 
 
Anaya and Puig summarised the minimum procedural and substantive requirements of states 
concerning the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted to legislative or administrative 
measures which may affect them. Firstly, consultations must be done in good faith with the 
objective of reaching an agreement on just terms. This obligation is included in Article 6(2) of 
the ILO Convention 169, which emphasises that the consultations carried out in application of 
this convention have to be undertaken in good faith and with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent to the proposed measures.364 These conditions were adopted by the 
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Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, which stated that the concept of consulting 
 
“includes establishing a genuine dialogue between both parties characterized by 
communication and understanding, mutual respect, good faith and the sincere wish to 
reach a common accord. A simple information meeting cannot be considered as 
complying with the provisions of the Convention [emphasis added]”.365 
 
Barring certain exceptions, in order for a state to abide by its obligation to consult, the 
realisation of an agreement or consent is not a requirement as long as the state fulfilled its 
obligation to consult, in good faith, with the objective of achieving such agreement or 
consent.366 Secondly, in the process of consulting the indigenous peoples the state has to engage 
with them directly and ultimately bears the responsibility for any inadequacy in the 
consultation or negotiation process.367 Third, as the aim of the consultation is to mitigate the 
adverse effects of the international legal order on the situation of indigenous peoples, the state 
must ensure that any power imbalances between the different actors is mitigated.368 Fourth, the 
consultation has to be undertaken in a transparent manner.369 Therefore, indigenous peoples 
should enjoy full access to the necessary information including access to the information 
gathered in impact assessments that are done by state agencies or business enterprises. Fifth, 
consultations must start before the state adopts and implements legislative or administrative 
measures or authorises undertakings that may affect the indigenous people.370  
 
The final requirement is that indigenous peoples should be consulted through their own 
representative decision-making institutions. As Anaya and Puig stated, the existence of 
indigenous institutions of representation and decision-making is a defining characteristic of 
indigenous peoples.371 Indeed, as shown above, it is one of the characteristics included in the 
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relevant definitions of indigenous peoples. The fact that indigenous peoples should be 
consulted through their own representative decision-making institutions establishes that it is 
the interests and popular will of the indigenous peoples that is consulted with their 
representatives acting as intermediate between the peoples and the state. Just as the election of 
representatives of a population is not the be all and end all of their right to freely pursue their 
development, neither is the election of indigenous representatives that for indigenous peoples. 
This raises the what obligations states have to ensure that the representatives of indigenous 
peoples they are consulting do not go against the interests or popular will of the indigenous 
peoples and the whole population of the indigenous peoples is free in the participation of such 
popular will. In the Lund Recommendations it was included that “[i]stitutions of self-
governance […] must be based on democratic principles to ensure that they genuinely reflect 
the views of the affected population”.372 In the explanatory note to the Lund Recommendations, 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities stated that the principle of democratic 
governance – articulated in Article 21 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights and Article 25 
of the ICCPR – is applicable at all levels and for all elements of governance.373 However, 
according to Anaya and Puig, if the institutions of indigenous peoples are perceived as illiberal 
or democratically deficient the indigenous peoples “should be encouraged to take steps to 
ensure the inclusion of different voices from within the community” but the state should not 
dictate or impose how indigenous institutions are composed or operated.374 
 
From the requirements summarised by Anaya and Puig, all but the ‘direct engagement’ 
requirement are included in the obligation to consult as provided for by Article 19 of the 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples. This article states that before adopting and implementing 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect indigenous peoples, are to consult and 
cooperate with the indigenous peoples concerned, through their own representative institutions, 
in good faith, in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent.375 This seemingly 
suggests that states must obtain the consent of the indigenous peoples on matters related to 
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them, which goes much further than the obligation to consult as provided for by ILO 
Convention 169. Similar to the obligation to consult provided for in ILO Convention 169, the 
obligation to obtain free, prior and informed consent through consultation is only recognised 
in certain exceptional situations.376 The extent of the required level of consultation is 
determined by the nature of the substantive rights of the indigenous peoples at risk.377 In most 
instances there is no requirement to obtain such consent as long as the consultation was 
undertaken with respect for the requirements set out by Anaya and Puig. 
 
The requirement to obtain prior consent of indigenous peoples through consultation arguably 
does exist in certain cases. For instance, when the measure adopted or implemented by a state 
affects the property rights of an indigenous peoples. As can be seen in the provided definitions 
provided above, indigenous peoples have a distinct relationship with their territory. It is 
therefore not surprising that, as mentioned by Luis Rodríguez-Piñero Royo, “[a] distinct 
characteristic of indigenous peoples’ autonomy or self-government arrangements is their 
territorial base”.378 In combination with their right to ongoing self-determination, this 
characteristic of indigenous peoples’ autonomy or self-government arrangements provides 
indigenous peoples with the right to permanent sovereignty over the natural wealth and 
resources pertaining to their territory.379 In relation to the issue of permanent sovereignty, the 
self-determination rights of indigenous peoples are more extensive than those provided to other 
subpopulation groups. This right provides indigenous groups with a greater autonomy over the 
pursuit of their development. In the fifth chapter of this thesis, I will analyse the extent to which 
the right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources provides indigenous 
peoples a more extensive protection of their self-determination. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined whether the argument made by Higgins – that if the term ‘peoples’ 
is interpreted as the entire peoples of a state it is no longer necessary to answer the question if 
a certain subpopulation group is a people as its members will be able to participate in the 
exercise of the right to self-determination held by the population of the state they are part of – 
hold up when reflected upon by the contemporary understanding of the right to self-
determination. I have done so by juxtaposing the ongoing political self-determination rights of 
minorities – as an example of a subpopulation group without the status of people – to those of 
indigenous peoples – whose status of peoples has since Higgins made that argument in the ‘90s 
been recognised. Even though this chapter has focussed on this right, the same legal foundation 
of this right – the doctrine of non-discrimination – applies to all civil and political rights. 
Moreover, in order for minorities and indigenous peoples to exercise their right to freely 
participate in the public affairs of their state they have to be able to freely exercise all other 
civil and political rights. Conversely, in order for a state to abide by its obligation to respect 
the ongoing right to political self-determination of its population, states are obligated to respect 
the exercise of all civil and political rights by minorities and the members of indigenous 
peoples. In the case of indigenous peoples, the same obligation applies in order to respect their 
right to political self-determination as a people distinct from the rest of the population. It should 
be possible to use the rights of minorities concerning the ongoing self-determination of the 
population they are part of as a blueprint for all other subpopulation groups protected by the 
doctrine of non-discrimination. Moreover, if other subpopulation groups are ever recognised 
as peoples, it should also be possible to use large parts of the framework on indigenous rights 
as a blueprint for these subpopulation peoples.  
 
In the second chapter, I argued that the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing 
self-determination should be understood as the manifestation of the totality of civil and political 
rights. Following this interpretation, it should be concluded that this right provides a more 
extensive protection to indigenous peoples than to minority groups. Both minorities and the 
members of indigenous peoples have the right to effectively participate in the public life of the 
population they are part of. This importantly includes the right to participate in the public 
affairs of the state. However, unlike minority groups whose ongoing self-determination rights 
only go as far as they can be extrapolated of the right to self-determination of the population 
they are part of, the right to ongoing self-determination of indigenous peoples has a second 
pillar. Namely, their right to pursue their own economic, social and cultural development as a 
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people distinct from the entire population of the state. As a means to balance the right ongoing 
self-determination of the population – the entire people of a state – with the right to ongoing 
self-determination of indigenous peoples – as a subpopulation peoples – the ‘right to effective 
participation’ includes the right to be consulted. This establishes the obligation on states to 
consult indigenous peoples on matters that might affect them, in good faith, through their own 
institutions. Even though concerning most issues this obligation only has to be exercised with 
the objective of achieving the agreement or consent of the indigenous peoples, on certain issues 
this right to be consulted includes an obligation of states to actually obtain consent of 
indigenous peoples. In Chapter 5, I will analyse how the right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural wealth and resources provides states with this latter obligation concerning the 




Chapter 4 – The socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing 
self-determination 
 
In the second chapter, I have argued that the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing 
self-determination is a manifestation of the totality of civil and political rights. This provides 
populations with the right to freely participate in the civil and political life of their state as a 
means to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. In the third chapter, I 
built upon this understanding by setting out an argument that 1) all subpopulation groups have 
the right to freely participate in the exercise of this right to political ongoing self-determination 
held by the population they belong to, and 2) subpopulation peoples have both this right and 
the right to be consulted on matters that relates to them as a peoples in order to provide them 
with a greater degree of autonomy over their economic, social and cultural development. Just 
as the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination provides peoples 
with the right to freely participate in the civil and political life of their state, the socio-economic 
dimension of the right to -economic ongoing self-determination provides peoples with the right 
to freely participate in the economic, social and cultural life of their state. However, most of 
the scholarship on the right to self-determination in its post-colonial conception relates to this 
civil and political dimension. Indeed, even students of human rights could easily be forgiven if 
they came to believe that that the right to self-determination is a political right. However, just 
as its civil and political dimension peoples with the right to freely participate in the civil and 
political life of their state, the socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination provides peoples with the right to freely participate in the economic, social and 
cultural life of their state.  
 
The civil and political and socio-economic dimensions are indivisible. Peoples cannot fully 
exercise their ongoing civil and political self-determination without the freedom to participate 
in the economic, social and cultural life of their state. Nor is it possible for peoples to fully 
exercise their socio-economic self-determination without participating in the civil and political 
life of their state. Civil and political self-determination and socio-economic self-determination 
are not distinct rights but two dimensions of the same right to freely pursue economic, social 
and cultural development. Like its civil and political dimension, the socio-economic dimension 
of ongoing self-determination embodies a process by which peoples freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. In this chapter, I will argue that the first pillar of 
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this socio-economic dimension is a manifestation of the totality of economic, social and 
cultural rights. First, I will examine how the right of a people to freely pursue their development 
through the exercise by its members of their economic, social and cultural rights can be 
extrapolated from the provision on the right to self-determination in Common Article 1 of the 
Twin Covenants. Secondly, I will examine the socio-economic dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination in relation to subpopulation groups and subpopulation peoples. 
Finally, I will examine how the provisions in the Declaration on the Right to Development can 
be used to clarify the obligations of states in relation to the socio-economic dimension of self-
determination. This will include an analysis of the two different theoretical approaches to the 
relationship between the right to development and the right to self-determination. Firstly, the 
approach that the right to self-determination and the right to development are parallel rights 
that are related because the former is a prerequisite of the latter. Alternatively, the approach 
that the right to self-determination is an aspect of the right to self-determination.  
 
The socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination as a manifestation 
of the totality of economic, social and cultural rights 
The idea that the right to ongoing self-determination does not only include the civil and political 
dimension discussed in the second and third chapter of this thesis but also a socio-economic 
dimension has been recognised by several commentators. For instance, Yusuf argued that “the 
right of peoples freely to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, and to 
participate; contribute to, and enjoy such development” is one of the normative strands of the 
right to self-determination.380 Important to note is that, in his description of socio-economic 
self-determination, Yusuf links the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to “freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development” with the right to “to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy” such development. I will come back to this later. The Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Héctor Gros Espiell acknowledged the existence of non-political dimensions of the 
right to self-determination. In a report on the right to self-determination, he emphasises that it 
includes political, economic, social and cultural aspects that are “all interdependent and each 
of them can only be fully realized through the complete recognition and implementation of the 
                                               
380 Yusuf (n 107) 375. 
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others”.381 As observed by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, “[d]espite the seemingly equal 
weighting of the political economic, social and cultural aspects of self-determination in Article 
1 [of the Twin Covenants], in subsequent international practice and doctrine the political 
aspects of self-determination have received the most attention”.382 Consequently, the content 
of the socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination has been far less 
well established than its civil and political counterpart.  
 
The socio-economic dimension of the right ongoing self-determination reflects the fact that 
peoples do not only pursue their economic, social and cultural development through their 
participation in the civil and political life of their state but equally through their participation 
in their state’s economic, social and cultural life. The freedom to participation in solely the 
civil and political life of a state would not guarantee a populations free pursuit of their 
development. In order for peoples to freely pursue their development their members should not 
only be able to freely exercise their civil and political rights but also their socio-economic 
rights. In her article ‘Self-Determination and Cultural Rights’, Ana Filipa Vrdoljak observed 
that from its earliest conceptions, self-determination has been inextricably tied to economic, 
social and cultural rights.383 Indeed, in his ‘Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires” of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, Marc Bossuyt showed how this link 
between self-determination and economic, social and cultural rights was discussed during the 
negotiations of the Twin Covenants.384 In his examination of these preparatory works he 
showed that, during the process of drafting the Twin Covenants, when the question was raised 
of the relationship between Article 1 and the other articles in the covenants it was pointed out 
that whereas under the ICCPR states would undertake to promote the ‘rights of self-
determination’ immediately, under the ICESCR the obligations of states in relation to the right 
to self-determination were to be applied progressively.385 As I will argue below, the obligation 
of states to progressively realise the economic, social and cultural rights of its population is 
one of the key aspects of the right to socio-economic self-determination.  
                                               
381 ‘The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, by 
Héctor Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1’ 113. 
382 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 55) 56. 
383 Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, ‘Self-Determination and Cultural Rights’ in Francesco Francioni and 
Martin Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 41. 
384 Marc Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987). 
385 ibid 35. 
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In his explanation of the economic, social and cultural dimensions of the peoples’ right to 
ongoing self-determination, Espiell acknowledged that the necessity that the members of a 
people have the full freedom to exercise the full breadth of their civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights in order for them to enjoy their socio-economic self-determination.386 
Furthermore, in its General Comment No. 21 on the right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life as provided by Article 15(1) of the ICESCR,387 the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights acknowledged that the right to take part in cultural life is also interdependent 
with the right to self-determination.388 This relationship between the right of peoples to freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development and the economic, social and cultural 
rights of their members was established by Article 1 of the ICESCR.  In the first chapter, I 
established that – in line with the rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention 
– the right of peoples to freely pursue their development means that their pursuit of 
development should be free from both external interference and manipulation or undue 
influence from their domestic authorities. I argued that this is an undeniable result from the 
ordinary definition of the term freely, as in “not under control of another”.389 However, another 
definition of ‘freely’ is “without restriction”.390 If this definition is used the right to freely 
pursue development would include a much broader set of obligations. Indeed, as shown in the 
previous chapters, the freedom of peoples to pursue their development can be restricted by the 
actions of states. However, equally, restrictions on the freedom to pursue development can 
originate from a people’s disadvantaged socio-economic status. For instance, a people’s pursuit 
of development would without a doubt be restricted if its members are unable to exercise their 
right to education, their right to work or their right to take part in cultural life. Therefore, if it 
is accepted that the right to ongoing self-determination is a manifestation of the totality of civil 
and political rights – because the exercise of these rights is necessary for the pursuit of 
development – should it not also be accepted that the right to ongoing self-determination is 
equally a manifestation of the totality of economic, social and cultural rights?  
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The progressive realisation of socio-economic self-determination 
Yusuf has argued that “socio-economic self-determination can provide the preconditions 
necessary to the fulfilment or individual human rights in the economic, social, and cultural 
sphere”.391 As shown above, during the drafting of the Twin Covenants it was pointed out that 
under the ICESCR the obligations of states in relation to the right to self-determination were 
to be applied progressively. This obligation results from an important feature of economic, 
social and cultural rights. Namely, the obligation of states not only to respect and protect these 
rights but also to fulfil them.392 The obligation to fulfil is referenced in Article 2 of the ICESCR 
as the legal duty of states to:  
 
“take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures”.393  
 
Moreover, these states shall do so “without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status”.394 In other words, the obligation to fulfil a right is an obligation to take the necessary 
steps with a view to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. However, the fact that the 
obligation to fulfil is linked to this concept of progressive realisation does not mean that states 
can justify their inability or unwillingness to guarantee the socio-economic rights of its 
population by pointing to a lack of sufficient resources. The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, in Fact Sheet No. 33 entitled Frequently Asked Questions 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, set out five areas in which members states of the 
ICESCR have to take immediate action irrespective of their available resources.395 These areas 
                                               
391 Yusuf (n 107) 388. 
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are 1) the elimination of discrimination, 2) the economic, social and cultural rights not subject 
to progressive realisation, 3) the obligation to ‘take steps’, 4) non-retrogressive measures, and 
5) certain minimum core obligations.396 
 
Regarding the ‘elimination of discrimination’, Article 2 of the ICESCR provides that “States 
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present 
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind”.397 As such an undertaking 
would not necessitate the allocation of resources it is an area in which state parties can, and 
therefore also must, take immediate action. Regarding the ‘economic, social and cultural rights 
not subject to progressive realisation’, certain included rights that do not necessitate the 
allocation of resources and other included rights that, even though they do necessitate the 
allocation of resources, are worded in a manner in which they are not subject to such 
progressive realisation have to be implemented straight away or within a specified period of 
time. Provisions that revolve mainly around ‘negative obligations’ of the state parties like that 
on the right to form and join trade unions398 and the right to take part in cultural life fall into 
the first category.399 An example of a provision falling under the second category is the one 
stipulating that primary education shall be compulsory and freely available to all,400 which 
clearly would necessitate the allocation of resources but gives states parties a “strict limit of 
two years to develop a plan of action to ensure the provision of free and compulsory primary 
education for all”.401 Regarding the obligation to ‘take steps’, even under the obligation of 
progressive realisation as part of the obligation to fulfil, states parties are obliged to take steps 
towards such progressive realisation a in a reasonably short time. States parties are, therefore, 
obliged to work towards improving the enjoyment of the relevant economic, social and cultural 
rights to the best of their abilities, which includes steps that can be taken without the allocation 
of resources.402 Regarding the ‘non-retrogressive measures’, states are under the obligation to 
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refrain from actions that would cause the existing protection of the rights included in the 
ICESCR to deteriorate. However, retrogressive measures could be justified if a state can prove 
that it is necessary to maintain a certain level of protection of either the affected right or other 
socio-economic rights.403  
 
Regarding ‘certain minimum core obligations’, the Committee has stated that “a minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of 
the rights is incumbent upon every State party”.404 In assessing whether a member state has 
discharged its minimum core obligation resource constraints on the country concerned are 
taken into consideration. If a member state would fail to meet such a minimum core obligation 
it has to demonstrate that it undertook every effort and made use of all available resources in 
an effort to satisfy this minimum core obligation standard and the obligation to endeavour to 
achieve the greatest enjoyment of the relevant right possible remains.405 These minimum core 
obligations are intrinsically linked to the minimum level of enjoyment of individual rights of 
members of a people that is necessary in order for this people to freely pursue economic, social 
and cultural development. Two examples of how such minimum core obligations are necessary 
for individual members of a people in order for the people to freely pursue economic, social 
and cultural development are the minimum core obligation to ensure free and compulsory 
primary education to all,406 and the right of access to employment – especially for 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.407 Below, I will show how the 
obligation of states to fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights of its population, are related 
to and, can be used as the legal foundation of, several, if not all, obligations included in the 
Declaration on Development.  
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The socio-economic self-determination of subpopulation groups 
In the third chapter, I argued that, as part of the ‘entire population’ of a state, all subpopulation 
groups have the right to participate in the civil and political dimension of the ongoing self-
determination of the population to which they belong. Similarly, the doctrine of non-
discrimination applied in relation to the socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination provides that all subpopulation groups have the right to participate in the 
economic, social and cultural life of the state. As stated above, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR 
provides that states are obligated to “undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.408 Combined with the rights ‘enunciated’ in the ICESCR, this obligation provides that 
those subpopulation groups should be able to freely participate in all aspects of the economic, 
social and cultural life of the state by the exercise of their members of their economic, social 
and cultural rights. Concerning persons belong to minorities, this right has also been explicitly 
included in Article 2(2) of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.409 Furthermore, concerning indigenous peoples, 
Article 5 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides that indigenous 
peoples have the right to “participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social 
and cultural life of the State”.410  
 
Both the Declaration on Minorities and the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples contain a 
number of rights that are associated with the ability of members of these subpopulation groups 
to freely participate in the socio-economic life of the state. For instance, in the Declaration on 
Indigenous Peoples it is provided that indigenous individuals, and especially indigenous 
children, have the right to “all levels and forms of education of the State without 
discrimination”.411 This right relates to the obligations concerning the right to education, which 
have been discussed above in relation to the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. 
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Therefore, it establishes that the members of indigenous peoples have the right to primary 
education and states are obligated to progressively realise their right to other forms of 
education. Another example of a provision that rounds out the right of indigenous peoples to 
participate in the socio-economic life of the state is the provision in Article 21(1) on the right 
of indigenous individuals to the improvement of their economic and social conditions – this 
includes improvements in relation to their socio-economic rights to, for instance, education, 
employment, housing and health.412 Moreover, Article 21(2) provides that states are obligated 
to take effective measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social 
conditions,413 which is derived from the obligation of states to fulfil the socio-economic rights 
of their population by means of progressive realisation. In the Report of the Working Group 
established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 
1995 it was included that during the drafting of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples 
representatives of indigenous peoples stressed that these rights are closely connected with the 
right to self-determination.414 
 
It is important to stress that the socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination provides subpopulation peoples, and other subpopulation groups, with the right 
to both participate in the economic, social and cultural life of the ‘entire population’ of the state 
and to pursue their own economic, social and cultural development. In the third chapter, I 
discussed rights of subpopulation groups concerning their representation and participation in 
civil and political life and above I have discussed rights that concern the participation of 
subpopulation groups in socio-economic life. When analysing the right to self-determination 
most of the attention goes to such components of ‘representation’ and ‘participation’. However, 
as observed by Vrdoljak, the right to self-determination also includes a third component that 
relates to ‘identity’.415 Whereas the civil and political dimension of ongoing self-determination 
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primarily relates to the former two components, ongoing socio-economic self-determination 
relates to not only representation and participation but also to identity.  
 
A number of provisions concerning the identity of indigenous peoples should be highlighted. 
First, the right of indigenous peoples and individuals “not to be subjected to forced assimilation 
or destruction of their culture”.416 Secondly, the right of indigenous peoples “to practise and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs”.417 Third, their “to manifest, practise, develop 
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, 
protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and 
control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains”.418 
Fourth, their right to “revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, 
languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and 
retain their own names for communities, places and persons”.419 Finally, the right of indigenous 
peoples “to their traditional medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the 
conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals”.420 During the drafting of 
the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, all indigenous organisations stressed the great 
importance of these rights in relation to the right to self-determination.421 
 
Whereas its civil and political dimension only provides subpopulation peoples with two pillars 
of self-determination rights – the first pillar consisting of their self-determination rights as part 
of the entire population of a state and the other consisting of their self-determination rights 
distinct peoples distinct from the rest of the population – the socio-economic dimension of self-
determination provides all subpopulation groups with two pillars of rights. The first pillar is 
the right of all subpopulation groups to participate in the economic, social and cultural life of 
the state. The second pillar is the right of subpopulation groups to maintain and develop their 
own identity distinct from the rest of the population. Both pillars are included in Article 5 of 
the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples. I have already shown above that this provision includes 
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the statement that indigenous peoples have the right to fully participate in the economic, social 
and cultural life of their state. However, it also includes their right to maintain and strengthen 
their own distinct economic, social and cultural institutions.422 Moreover, in article 20(1) it is 
provided that indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their own economic 
and social systems or institutions.423 
 
In relation to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, Article 2 of the Declaration 
on Minorities provides that persons belonging to minorities “have the right to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and 
in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination”.424 Similarly, Article 
27 of the ICCPR provides that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
“shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”.425 
Moreover, the Declaration on Minorities provides that states are obligated to take measures 1) 
to “create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their 
characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs”,426 and 
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2) “in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, 
language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory”.427 Again, these 
provisions relate to the obligation of states to fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights of 
their population by means of progressive realisation.  
 
In the words of Vrdoljak, the Declaration on Minorities “reproduces the classic binary 
contained in minority protection [by covering] effective participation of members of the group 
within the relevant state; and maintenance and development of the group’s identity”.428 Even 
though minority rights are phrased as individual right, minority rights by their nature relate to 
the collective. As observed by Vrdoljak, the HRC has “repeatedly affirmed that the right of 
enjoyment of culture, practice of religion, or use of language can only be realized meaningfully 
when exercised [as a group]”.429 Minority rights are generally viewed as a hybrid between 
individual and collective rights.430 The fact that Article 27 of the ICCPR provides that persons 
belonging to minorities exercise their right in community with the other members of their group 
shows that its drafters understood the fact that minority rights cannot be exercised by an 
individual in a vacuum. If the individual members of a minority group are able to enjoy their 
own culture the minority group as a whole is able to do so, and minority groups enjoy their 
own culture through the enjoyment of their individual members of their right to enjoy the 
culture of the minority group of which they are part. Conversely, if one person belonging to a 
minority is denied his or her minority rights this affects the ability for the other persons belong 
to that minority group to exercise their minority rights.  
 
The right to development as an aspect of the socio-economic dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination 
In 1986, the demands of developing countries “for better terms in the international market, 
greater aid and assistance and generally what has come to be known as the demand for the new 
international economic order” resulted in the General Assembly’s adoption of the Declaration 
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on Development.431 Even though there was some opposition among Western states, only the 
representative of the United States voted against the resolution and just nine states abstained 
from voting.432 In the first article of the declaration, the right to development is described as  
 
“an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized”.433 
 
On a regional level, the right to development had five years prior to the adoption of the General 
Assembly declaration already been included in the African Charter. In Article 22(1) it provides 
that “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with 
due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of 
mankind”.434 Furthermore, in the second paragraph of the same article, it is provided that states 
“have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to 
development”.435 As I will show below, the same obligation is extensively incorporated in the 
Declaration on Development. 
 
Whereas the Declaration on Development primarily provides obligations of states, the right to 
development seemingly also provides some obligations of non-state actors. For instance, in 
Article 2(2) the declaration provides that “[a]ll human beings have a responsibility for 
development [...] and they should therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social 
and economic order for development”.436 In her review of the right to development, Orford 
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argued that the focus of the declaration is boarder than that of traditional international human 
rights law that has been conceived as a means of constraining the power exercised by states.437 
Instead, the Declaration on Development recognises that non-state actors can be responsible 
for both the protection and violations of human rights.438 Orford examined some of the 
criticism bestowed upon this feature of the declaration. For instance, in his article ‘In Search 
of the Unicorn’, Jack Donnelly has criticised this shift in responsibility from only states to both 
states and non-states actors “as a means of avoiding state responsibility for human rights 
violations”.439 Furthermore, she also referenced the criticism of Yash Ghai that this “shifts the 
focus from domestic arenas (where most violations of rights take place) to the international”.440 
However, as Orford rightly argued, such criticism fails to address situations where individuals 
or peoples need protection from other powerful states, transnational corporations or 
international institutions. Nor does it address situations where decisions about the protection 
of economic, social and cultural rights are made by non-state actors.441 From the provisions 
includes in the Declaration on Development, it is obvious that the obligations that it includes 
primarily rest on the shoulders of states. However, by including obligations of non-states 
actors, the General Assembly showed their recognition of the fact that the sovereignty of states 
has diminished through economic globalisation.  
 
The question of who the beneficiaries of the right to development are has also been a matter of 
debate. From the description of the right to development included in the declaration, it is clear 
that both peoples and individuals are beneficiaries of the right to development. However, it has 
been argued that the Declaration on Development also refers to the right to development as a 
right of states.442 In Article 2(3) it is stated that states have both the right and duty “to formulate 
appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals”.443 Moreover, in Article 3(2) it is stated 
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that states should realise the rights and fulfil the duties the right to development includes “in 
such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, as well as to encourage 
the observance and realization of human rights”.444 Donnelly argued that if states hold the right 
to development they are placed in a position in which it can justify their violations of human 
rights by claiming to pursue the human right to development.445 However, according to Orford, 
it is clear that states are holders of the right to development as an agent of the entire population 
and all its individuals.446 Moreover, as Philip Alston argued, states act as “the medium through 
which the rights of individuals are able to be effectively asserted vis-à-vis the international 
community”.447 Therefore, the beneficiary of the provisions included in the Declaration on 
Development are peoples and individuals but in order for them to benefit states have to be able 
to assert certain aspects on behalf of their population. However, only in relation to external 
actors, including foreign states. 
 
In Article 1(2) of the Declaration on Development, the General Assembly proclaimed that the 
human right to development implies the full realisation of the right to self-determination, 
including the right to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.448 There are 
different theoretical approaches to the relationship between the right to self-determination and 
the right to development. The first approach is that the right to self-determination and the right 
to development are parallel rights that are related because the former is a prerequisite of the 
latter.449 An alternative approach to the relationship between the right to development and the 
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right to self-determination is the idea that the former is an aspect of the latter.450 A prominent 
proponent of this approach is former ICJ judge Mohammed Bedjaoui who argued that the right 
to development is an ‘inherent’ and ‘built-in’ right that forms an inseparable part of the right 
to self-determination.451 This approach reflects the emphasis of the Declaration on 
Development on ‘participation’ as the basis of the right to development.452 As established in 
the previous chapters, the right to participation means that peoples should have a certain degree 
of control over the outcome of a decision. In relation to the right to development, participation 
means that they should have “control over the direction of the development process, rather than 
simply being consulted about projects or policies that have already been decided upon”.453 
According to Orford, under Bedjaoui’s approach to the relationship between the right to 
ongoing self-determination and the right to development, the most important aspect of the right 
to development is “the right of each people to choose freely its economic and social system 
without outside interference or constraint of any kind, and to determine, with equal freedom, 
its own model of development”.454  
 
In his examination of the right to development, Donnelly acknowledged that the provision on 
the right to self-determination in Common Article 1 of the Twin Covenants is a promising 
source of a right to development. However, he argued that if “the right to development means 
the right of peoples freely to pursue their development […] such a right to development is 
without interest [as] it is already firmly established as the right to self-determination”.455 
Moreover, he argues that a broader right to development cannot be extracted from the right to 
self-determination as the right to self-determination is not a right to development but only a 
right to pursue such development. According to Donnelly, even if development is necessary 
for the enjoyment of the right to self-determination it does not follow that peoples have the 
right to development.456 He claimed that the argument that the right to development is a human 
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right because it is necessary for the exercise of the right to self-determination is an 
‘instrumental fallacy’. As an example, Donnelly argued that [a]lthough B cannot enjoy his right 
to life without a liver transplant, that does not entail that he has a right to a liver transplant, let 
alone a right to have a suitable liver implanted should one become available”.457 However, 
Donnelly does not provide sufficient recognition to the indivisibility and interdependency of 
human rights. To use his own example, because B has the right to life the human rights 
framework has also included the right to the highest attainable standard of health,458 which 
could include the right to a liver transplant should a liver become available. His argument that 
the right to self-determination does not imply a right to development because the former is only 
a right of peoples and the latter is a right of both peoples and individuals lacks the same 
consideration for the indivisibility and interdependency of human rights. Peoples exercise both 
their the socio-economic dimension of their right to pursue development and their right to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy development through their members’ exercise of their 
socio-economic rights. The right of peoples to ongoing self-determination is the foundation of 
the right to development not because participating in, contributing to, and enjoying 
development is necessary to freely pursue development. It does so because its socio-economic 
dimension is a manifestation of the totality of economic, social and cultural rights. This 
manifestation provides them will the ability to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
development. Every person that exercises his or her economic, social and cultural rights 
participates in, contributes to, and enjoys development. Therefore, people take part in pursuit 
of development of the peoples they belong to by participating in, contributing to, and enjoying 
development. Therefore, the right to development is not a new right but an affirmation of the 
indivisibility and interdependency of the right to ongoing self-determination and socio-
economic rights.  
 
The right to development as a system of duties relating to the socio-economic dimension of 
the right to ongoing self-determination 
Instead of creating new obligations, the right to development sets out particular processes that 
are needed to fulfil existing obligations. In the words of Margot Salomon, the right to 
development is “less about establishing a new substantive right, and more about framing a 
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system of duties that might give better effect to existing rights”.459 Similarly, Arjun Sengupta 
described the right to development as a vector of all the different rights and freedoms.460 
Similar to the right to ongoing self-determination, the right to development has both an internal 
and external dimension.461 Both the internal and external dimension of the right to development 
build upon the obligations set out by the right to self-determination. In the words of Margot 
Salomon, the “internal dimension of the right to development focuses on the duties of each 
state to ensure domestic policies that seek to contribute to the realization of the fundamental 
human rights of all its subjects”.462 This view was also adopted by the participants of ‘The 
Expert Meeting on legal perspectives involved in implementing the right to development’,463 
who in their concluding statement included that it was their view that the internal dimension 
of the right to development “referred to the duty of each country to ensure that its development 
policy is one in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”.464 
For instance, one of the key provisions in relation to the internal dimension of the right to 
development is the right and obligation of states to 
 
“formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”.465 
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This obligation sets out a means by which states should exercise their obligation to fulfil the 
economic, social and cultural rights of their population. Such development policies are 
necessary for the progressive realisation of the socio-economic rights. If interpreted as an 
aspect of the right to ongoing self-determination, the obligations included in the Declaration 
on Development should be exercised in a manner that respects all dimensions of the right to 
self-determination. Consequently, national development policies should be freely chosen by 
the population of the state – through the exercise of their right to ongoing political self-
determination. The fact that the provision in Article 2(3) is framed as both an obligation and a 
right of states should not be interpreted to mean that states hold this right in relation to their 
own population. In other words, states cannot ignore the will of their population by claiming 
that this right belongs to states and not to the populations of states. As argued above, states 
only act as the medium through which the rights of their population can effectively be asserted 
vis-à-vis the international community. The right of states to formulate these development 
policies only signifies that the exercise of their obligation to formulate them should be free 
from interference external interference. This reflects the right to ongoing self-determination – 
the right of peoples to pursue their economic, social and cultural development free from 
external interference.  
 
In their review of the role of international law in the development of the right to development, 
Stephen P. Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter and Nicolaas Schrijver describe its external 
dimension as a set of “duties of all States to cooperate with a view to achieving the right to 
development”.466 According to Salomon, this external dimension “addresses disparities of the 
international political economy which evidence massive global inequities, and the consequent 
post-cold war growth in social and material inequality between states”.467 The primary goal of 
the external dimension of the right to development is to remove obstacles that restrict the 
freedom of peoples to pursue their economic, social and cultural development placed by the 
international economic order. The duties representing the external dimension of the right to 
development not only flow from the external dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination but also from the obligation of states to promote the realisation of the right to 
self-determination, which is included in the third paragraph of Common Article 1.468 This 
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section is often overlooked in scholarship, presumably because of a belief that its importance 
has been exhausted with decolonisation. However, the importance of this section goes beyond 
the right to constitutive self-determination and is relevant to the socio-economic dimension of 
ongoing self-determination. The HRC has argued that Common Article 1(3) of the Twin 
Covenants imposes a specific obligation to promote the realisation of self-determination on 
state parties and to take positive actions to facilitate the realisation of and respect for the right 
to self-determination of all peoples.469 Furthermore, the duties that make up the external 
dimension of the right to development also reflect Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter in 
which the members pledged to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United 
Nations for the achievement of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, which includes conditions of economic and social progress 
and development.470 
 
The Declaration on Development provides a framework for the manner by which states should 
exercise the obligations of states under Common Article 1(3) of the Twin Covenants and 
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter. The key provisions of this declaration in relation to the 
obligation set out in Article 1(3) common to the Twin Covenants are those included in the third 
and fourth article of the declaration. In Article 3(1) it is provided that states have the 
responsibility to not only create the national but also international conditions that are 
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favourable to the realisation of the right to development.471 Moreover, Article 3(3) provides 
that in doing so  
 
“States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and 
eliminating obstacles to development. States should realize their rights and fulfil their 
duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on 
sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, 
as well as to encourage the observance and realization of human rights.”472 
 
Article 4(1) of the declaration doubles down on this duty by providing that states “have the 
duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development 
policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development”.473 These 
provisions establish that the external dimension of the right to development goes beyond the 
negative obligation to refrain from placing obstacles on the realisation of the right to 
development and includes the positive obligation to work towards the elimination of any 
existing obstacles. This is especially of importance in relation to developing countries and, 
thus, “[s]ustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing 
countries”.474 Without the national but also international conditions that are favourable to the 
realisation of the right to development the ability of peoples to pursue development is restricted 
by these unfavourable conditions. In other words, they would lack the freedom from these 
conditions in the pursuit of their development. Therefore, the obligations to create the 
conditions favourable to development and eliminate obstacles to development work towards 
providing peoples with greater freedom to pursue their development. By using the obligations 
included in the Declaration on Development as a guideline on how to exercise the obligations 
related to the right to self-determination, it can be established that a important feature of the 
obligations to promote the realisation of the right of self-determination is the obligation of 
states to co-operate with other states in the creation of an international political and economic 
order that is conducive to the ability of peoples to pursue the economic, social and cultural 
development of their choice.  
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This brings me back to the above quoted statement by Yusuf that the socio-economic 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is the right of to “freely to pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development, and to participate, contribute to, and enjoy such 
development”.475 There are two things I would like to note in relation to Yusuf’s statement on 
the socio-economic dimension of ongoing self-determination. Firstly, it does not include a 
reference to the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. 
However, in another statement in the same chapter he does refer to this right as another aspect 
of the socio-economic dimension of the right to self-determination.476 Secondly, in relation to 
the former aspect, I think a more accurate way of phrasing this aspect is that the socio-economic 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is the pursuit of economic, social and 
cultural development through the participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of such 
development. In turn, peoples participate in, contribute to, and enjoy development by means of 
their members’ exercise of their economic, social and cultural rights. In the Declaration on 
Development, the General Assembly has recognised both the importance of development for 
the realisation on other human rights and, conversely, the importance of other human rights on 
the realisation of development.477 Yusuf has acknowledged that despite its inclusion in various 
international instruments, the socio-economic dimension of the right to self-determination has 
not moved as significantly as its civil and political dimension in promoting peoples’ rights.478 
Approaching the right to development as a set of duties that give better effect to the right of 
ongoing self-determination can provide an impulse for the further development of the socio-
economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination. Simultaneously, such an 
approach can provide the legal framework that the Declaration on Development lacks.  
 
Conclusion 
When the right to self-determination was codified in the Twin Covenants it not only tied self-
determination to civil and political rights but equally to the so-called second generation 
economic, social and cultural rights. Because during the negotiations of the Twin Covenants, 
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and the period directly following their adoption, the emphasis of the development of the right 
to self-determination was first on its constitutive aspect and later on the civil and political 
dimension of its ongoing aspect, the socio-economic dimension of the ongoing aspect of the 
right has been largely neglected. In this chapter, I have argued that the exercise of economic, 
social and cultural right is equally as important to the ability of peoples to freely pursue their 
development as the exercise of civil and political rights. The right to freely pursue development 
does not only mean that peoples should be able to pursue the economic, social and cultural 
development of their choice through the formulation of policies – by exercising their civil and 
political rights. Equally, they should be able to pursue the economic, social and cultural 
development of their choice by their participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of such 
development. In turn, peoples participate in, contribute to, and enjoy development by their 
members’ exercise of their economic, social and cultural right. In this socio-economic 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination, the role of the states is to aid its 
population by exercising their obligation to fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights of 
their population. 
 
I have argued that the right to development should not be seen as a parallel right to the right to 
self-determination but instead as a delineation of duties that provide clarification of the role of 
states in their populations’ exercise of the socio-economic dimension of their right to ongoing 
self-determination. Consequently, the legal foundation of these duties can be extrapolated from 
the obligations provided by the right to ongoing self-determination. The right to self-
determination establishes that peoples and individuals have the right to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy development. The exercise of this right is a means by which peoples 
pursue their development. Peoples and individuals participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
development by the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights. The duties included in the 
right to development are aimed at abolishing both internal and external obstacles to 
development. The fewer obstacles there are to development the freer peoples are in their pursuit 
of such development. The internal dimension of the right to development sets out the duties of 
states to work towards the abolishing of domestic obstacles to development by ensuring 
domestic policies that contribute to the realisation of their population’s human rights. Equally, 
its external dimension sets out a set of duties that ensure the international cooperation of states 
to remove obstacles to development by addressing disparities of the international political 
economy. In the next chapter, I will examine how this relates to the self-determination right of 
peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. 
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Chapter 5 – The peoples’ right to freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources 
 
In the previous chapters, I have analysed on the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to 
freely pursue their development. However, the right to ongoing self-determination also 
includes the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, which some 
scholars have referred to as the right to economic self-determination.479 As established in the 
first chapter, the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources is at 
the core of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. That is 
why in this thesis I refer to it as the right to permanent sovereignty. Even though it has received 
less attention than the constitutive aspect of the right to self-determination and the civil and 
political dimension of its ongoing aspect, there is a larger body of work on right to freely 
dispose of natural wealth and resources than on the socio-economic dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination analysed in the previous chapter. This was acknowledged by Saul, 
Kinley and Mowbray, who stated that “[i]f the political aspects of self-determination have 
overshadowed its economic aspects, in turn its economic aspects have overshadowed its social 
and cultural dimensions”.480 For instance, even though Cassese in his seminal work ‘Self-
Determination of Peoples’ focussed on the civil and political dimension of the right to self-
determination and completely ignored the socio-economic dimension discussed in the previous 
chapter, he did include a section on the right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources.481 However, the fact that this section was only two pages longs is emblematic of 
how little attention this aspect of the right to self-determination is given compared to the 
constitutive self-determination right of peoples to freely determine their political status and the 
civil and political dimension of the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.  
 
In this chapter, I will analyse the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources. This will include an examination of 1) the provision on 
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the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources in Common Article 1(2) of the Twin 
Covenants, 2) the relationship between this right and the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural wealth and resources, 3) whether, as is the case with right to freely pursue 
development, the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources has both an external 
and an internal dimension, 4) the right to freely dispose of natural wealth in relation to both the 
entire population of states and the subpopulation peoples possess, 5) how peoples exercise this 
latter right, and 6) the relationship between the so-called ‘limiting clause’ in Common Article 
1(2) of the Twin Covenants – which establishes that the right to freely dispose of natural wealth 
and resources should be exercised without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation and international law – and the right to ongoing self-
determination. 
 
The principle of permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
As stated in the previous chapter, during the negotiations of the provision on the right to self-
determination that was adopted as Common Article 1 of the Twin Covenants, there was a clear 
understanding among the representatives of newly independent states and developing states 
that political independence alone was insufficient as long as the natural wealth and resources 
remained under the control of foreign states or private entities from such foreign states. This 
understanding was the driving force behind the development of the right to permanent 
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.482 In his examination of the development of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty, Nico Schrijver showed that its origin can be traced back 
to both the development of the right to self-determination and the principle of state 
sovereignty.483 Chekera and Nmehielle observed that this has resulted in three different views 
of who the beneficiaries of the right to permanent sovereignty are: 1) the view that right to 
permanent sovereignty is exclusively a right of states, 2) the view that the right to permanent 
sovereignty is exclusively a right of peoples, and 3) the view that the right to permanent 
sovereignty is a right shared jointly by states and peoples.484 Initially, the right to permanent 
sovereignty was seen exclusively a right of states. This approach to permanent sovereignty 
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resulted from the post-World War II struggle for political and economic emancipation of 
developing countries.485  
 
As observed by Schrijver, “[t]he circle of subjects [of international law] entitled to dispose of 
natural resources has changed considerably over the years.”.486 During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the General Assembly’s promotion of the self-determination of peoples and development of 
‘underdeveloped’ countries led to the addition of peoples, nations and underdeveloped 
countries to the list of subjects of international law with the right to permanent sovereignty.487 
Schrijver explained that “reference to ‘nations’ as subjects of the right to permanent 
sovereignty was probably meant to reinforce the right of peoples to economic self-
determination, both prior to and after the exercise of their right to political self-
determination”.488 Moreover, as argued by Alice Farmer, even though the discourse on the right 
to permanent sovereignty in the period immediately following the Second World War showed 
some ambiguity as to whether this was a right of states or peoples – because the General 
Assembly resolutions from this period used ‘peoples’ and ‘states’ interchangeably – by the 
1960s this right was clearly labelled as a right of peoples.489 Indeed, even though the General 
Assembly in the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty of 1962 first reiterated the sovereign 
rights of states to dispose of their natural wealth and resources, it subsequently provided that 
the right to permanent sovereignty is a right of peoples, which must be exercised in the interests 
of the national development and well-being of those peoples.490 As stablished in Chapter 1, this 
was subsequently codified by Common Article 1(2) of the Twin Covenants.   
 
As observed by Schrijver, “once most of the formerly colonial peoples had gained 
independence, emphasis shifted back to States as the main subjects invested with the right to 
permanent sovereignty”.491 In the 1970s and 1980s a tendency re-emerged to confine the circle 
of permanent sovereignty subjects solely to states. Firstly, in its GA resolution 3171 (XXVIII) 
of 1973 titled permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the General Assembly reaffirmed 
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“the inalienable rights of States to permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources”.492 
One year later the General Assembly adopted resolution 3281 (XXIX) containing the “Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States” adopted in 1974. In the first chapter of the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (“CERDS”), the General Assembly included the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as one of the principles that shall 
govern economic as well as political and other relations among states.493 However, in Article 
2(1) it stated that “[e]very State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, 
including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities [emphasis added]”.494 Moreover, in Article 2(2) the CERDS sets out a number of 
rights of states relating to their right to permanent sovereignty.495 Furthermore, the sovereign 
rights of states over their natural wealth and resources was also included in the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (“UNCLOS”). In Article 56 of UNCLOS it is provided that 
coastal states have “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources [in their exclusive economic zone]”.496 Moreover, in 
Article 193 it is provided that “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources 
pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and 
preserve the marine environment”.497 None of these important General Assembly resolutions 
or treaties during the 1970s and 1980s reaffirmed the right of peoples to permanent sovereignty 
of their natural wealth and resources.  
 
More recently, the General Assembly has adopted several resolutions that reaffirm the right to 
permanent sovereignty as a right of peoples. For instance, as I will discuss below, the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 includes provisions on the rights of 
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indigenous peoples over natural wealth and resources pertaining to their lands. The recognition 
of indigenous peoples as peoples with the right to self-determination – including the ongoing 
self-determination right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources – has added 
another dimension to the discussion on the right to permanent sovereignty. Furthermore, in the 
Declaration on the Right to Development, the General Assembly 1) recalled the right of peoples 
to exercise full and complete sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources,498 and 2) 
provided in Article 1(2) that the right to development “also implies the full realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination, which includes […] the exercise of their inalienable right 
to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources”.499 
 
The question of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources has also been raised 
before the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning East Timor.500 The Court did 
not address the status of permanent sovereignty in international law as it found that it lacked 
jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits.501 However, in their dissenting opinions, judges 
Skubiszewski and Weeramantry argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty was a rule 
of customary international law with an erga omnes character.502 Even though Judge 
Weeramantry referred to the principle of permanent sovereignty as an ancillary of the principle 
of self-determination, in his review of the principle he referred to the sovereign rights over 
natural wealth and resources of both peoples and states.503 In turn, Judge Skubiszewski only 
referred to the right to permanent sovereignty of the people of East Timor.504 However, as he 
does not review the relevant General Assembly resolutions and East Timor at the time was a 
non-self-governing territory only the permanent sovereignty of peoples was relevant to his 
argument.505 In the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the 
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International Court of Justice stated that the principle of permanent sovereignty is as principle 
of customary international law.506 Again, the ICJ did not explicitly clarify their position on who 
the beneficiary of the right to permanent sovereignty is. However, it did recall that the principle 
is expressed in the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty and further elaborated in the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. As showed above, whereas the General Assembly 
declared that the right to permanent sovereignty is a right of peoples in the first of those 
resolutions, it portrayed the right to permanent sovereignty as a right of states in the latter two 
resolutions. From the fact that the ICJ used all three these resolutions as evidence that the 
principle of permanent sovereignty is a principle of customary international law, it can be 
inferred that in its view the right to permanent sovereignty belongs to both peoples and states.  
 
As observed by Ricardo Pereira and Orla Gough in their journal article ‘Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: Natural Resource Governance and the Right to 
Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’, the reliance of the ICJ on 
the resolutions of the General Assembly “has been criticised because UNGA lacks the power 
to make legally binding resolutions”.507 Even so, prominent scholars have argued that the 
principle of permanent sovereignty is a rule of customary international law. For instance, 
Cassese argued that, even though it should be stressed that the Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty of 1962 can neither as whole be regarded as declaratory of customary international 
law nor can it be argued that this declaration as a whole has turned into customary international 
law subsequent to its adoption, “some of the general principles laid down in the Declaration 
have gradually led to the formation of corresponding legal rules or principles”.508 According 
to Cassese, only those general principles included in the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty 
that concern the rights of peoples could at that time be regarded as sanctioning general 
international law, as they are specifications of, and corollary to, the right to self-
determination.509 More recently, Pereira and Gough observed that  “today it is generally 
accepted that permanent sovereignty over natural resources is […] a fundamental principle of 
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contemporary international law”.510 However, they also observed that “most commentators do 
not consider that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties has transitioned into a rule of 
customary international law”.511 This seems to imply that their interpretation of the principle 
of permanent sovereignty that has developed into a customary rule of international law is the 
one set out in the Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty in which the General Assembly 
declared that peoples are the beneficiary of the right to permanent sovereignty. However, as I 
will argue below, even if Cassese’s claim is still true today and only the right to permanent 
sovereignty of peoples has attained the status of customary international law, certain right of 
states in relation to the right to permanent sovereignty can be derived from their obligation to 
protect and fulfil the right of permanent sovereignty of their peoples.  
 
The right to permanent sovereignty of entire populations 
As a basic constituent of the right to self-determination, the permanent sovereignty right of 
peoples to, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources should be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the other self-determination rights. Firstly, this means 
that the same peoples that are the beneficiaries of the self-determination right to freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development are the beneficiaries of the self-determination right to freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources. Therefore, both entire populations and subpopulation peoples 
have the right to permanent sovereignty. Secondly, the word ‘freely’ should be interpreted in 
manner that is consistent with the interpretation of ‘freely’ in the self-determination right of 
peoples to freely pursue their development. In the previous chapters, I have argued that in 
relation to the first paragraph of Common Article 1, the right of peoples to freely pursue their 
development should be understood to mean that peoples have the right to pursue their 
development 1) free from external interference by foreign states and non-state actors, 2) 
according to the policy they have freely chosen, and 3) free from economic, social and cultural 
obstacles to their pursuit of development. Furthermore, I have shown that states have the 
corresponding obligations to respect, protect and fulfil these rights and that these include both 
an external and internal dimension. As I will establish in this Chapter, all these observations 
are relevant to the permanent sovereignty right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural 
resources.  
                                               
510 Pereira and Gough (n 321) 12. 
511 ibid 11. 
 120 
 
The right to permanent sovereignty has both an external and internal dimension. According to 
Cassese, the internal dimension of the provision in Common Article 1(2) of the Twin 
Covenants on the right to feely dispose of natural wealth and resources “provides that the right 
to control and benefit from a territory’s natural resources lies with the inhabitants of that 
territory [emphasis added]”.512 He argued that “[t]his right, and the corresponding duty of the 
central government to use the resources in a manner which coincides with the interests of the 
people, is the natural consequence of the right to political self-determination”.513 According to 
Cassese, states would be in violation of their population’s right to permanent sovereignty if it 
1) “is exploiting the natural resources in the exclusive interests of a small segment of the 
population and is thereby disregarding the needs of the vast majority of its nationals”, or 2) 
“has surrendered control over its natural resources to another State or to foreign private 
corporations without ensuring that people will be the primary beneficiaries of such an 
arrangement”.514 The right of peoples to benefit from their natural wealth and resources is 
stipulated in several General Assembly resolutions. For instance, in the Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty, the General Assembly declared that the right to permanent sovereignty 
must be “exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the 
people of the state concerned”.515 However, the right of peoples to control their natural wealth 
and resources goes beyond merely the right to have those resources disposed of in a manner 
that benefits them.  
 
In the second chapter, I argued that the internal dimension of the ongoing self-determination 
right of peoples to freely pursue their development includes the right of peoples to pursue their 
development according to the policies they have freely chosen. Similarly, the right of peoples 
to freely dispose of their natural resources includes the right of peoples to dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources in a manner they have freely chosen. As Cassese himself 
acknowledged, Common Article 1(2) not only provide peoples with the right to benefit from 
their natural wealth and resources but also to control these resources. Just as the right of peoples 
to freely pursue their development provides peoples with the right to control the direction of 
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their development, the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources provides 
them with the right to control the disposal of their resources. This is reflected in the second 
paragraph of the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty, which provides that 
 
“[t]he exploration, development and disposition of [natural wealth and resources], as 
well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in 
conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider 
to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition 
of such activities”.516 
 
The right to permanent sovereignty provides peoples with both the right to benefit from the 
disposal of their natural resources and the right to decide the rules and conditions for the 
disposal of these resources. This does not only include the right to decide who can dispose of 
their natural wealth and resources but also under what circumstances the disposal of these 
resources should take place – i.e. regulatory rules that should be applied. As stated by Yusuf, 
this raises the question whether an unrepresentative and non-democratic government can fulfil 
the requirements set by the right to permanent sovereignty.517 Alice Farmer even goes as far as 
to claim that the right to permanent sovereignty is the right of peoples “to dispose of natural 
resources in accordance with democratically-taken decisions”.518 This includes the right of the 
population of a state to participate in the decision-making processes concerning the 
exploration, development and disposition of natural wealth and resources.  
 
As observed by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, the principle of public participation in decision-
making about public resources and development emerged in the 1970s.519 Both the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have 
acknowledged the existence of the right of those effected by a decision of their state or local 
authority on certain important matters to participate the process leading to that decision.520 
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Moreover, the CESCR has acknowledged that the ‘general public’ – the population of a state 
– has the self-determination right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.521 In 
one of its Concluding Observations, the CESCR connected the right to participation and the 
right to self-determination with the decision by Azerbaijan to privatize its natural oil resources: 
 
“With respect to specific provisions of the Covenant, the Committee calls attention to 
article 1 on the right of self-determination. The Committee regrets that, due to lack of 
information, it is unable to assess to what extent the general public is able to participate 
in the privatization process. It stresses the importance of managing this process in a 
way that is sufficiently transparent to ensure fairness and accountability.”522 
 
Moreover, it stressed the importance that “the privatization process should be conducted in an 
open and transparent manner and that the conditions under which oil concessions are granted 
should always be made public”.523 The importance of such transparency is a recurring feature 
in the Committee’s communications relating to the right of peoples to freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources.524  
 
On a regional level, also African Commission acknowledged that, in order for ‘participation’ 
to guarantee the freedom of peoples to dispose of their natural wealth and resources, it is 
important that states are transparent in relation to the decision-making process that affect this 
freedom.525 Without such transparency peoples would not be able to participate in a substantive 
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manner in the decision-making process on the disposing of their natural wealth and resources. 
From the statements by the CESCR and the African Commission, it can be concluded that the 
privatisation of such natural wealth and resources requires 1) the participation of the general 
public in the decision-making on such privatisation and 2) transparency to the general public, 
which includes the provision of relevant public information. Both the obligation to respect the 
right of their peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources and the obligation to fulfil this 
right can be deduced from these requirements as states have the obligation to take active steps 
towards providing their peoples with the required means to participate in an informed and 
genuine manner. The right of peoples to participate in these decision-making processes show 
the truth of the words by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray that “the political and economic aspects 
of self-determination are indivisible”.526 The primary method by which peoples exercise their 
right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources is by exercising the rights associated 
with the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination.527 
 
According to Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, one aspect of the internal dimension of the right to 
permanent sovereignty is the obligations of states to protect their peoples against the 
exploitative conduct of foreign states and non-state actors.528 In order to exercise this 
obligation, the principle of permanent sovereignty provides states with the right to regulate, 
through domestic legislation and policies, 1) the admission and activities of foreign investors, 
2) the methods of exploitation, 3) the conduct of the entities engaged in the exploitation, and 
4) the distribution of profits obtained from the exploitation.529 These rights are derived from 
the, above discussed, right of peoples to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in a 
manner that conforms to the rules and conditions which they consider to be necessary or 
desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of the exploration, 
development and disposition of their natural resources, as well as the import of the foreign 
capital required for such exploration, development and disposition. This exemplifies what 
Yusuf calls the interplay between internal and external factors in matters of the right of peoples 
to freely dispose of their natural resources.530 In the first chapter, I discussed Shivji’s view that 
the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention by one state in the 
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international affairs of another state are secondary or derivative elements of the self-
determination rights of peoples to feely decide their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.531 Furthermore, in the previous chapter, I discussed 
the argument by Alston that the beneficiaries of the right to development are individuals and 
peoples and that states are holders of certain right derived from the right to development so 
that they can act as the medium through which the right to development is effectively asserted 
vis-à-vis the international community by its beneficiaries.532 Similarly, in relation to the right 
to permanent sovereignty, Chekera and Vincent Nmehielle argued that in states merely act “as 
the medium through which the peoples could exercise their rights under international law”.533 
This view is also promoted by Yusuf who argued that “the state acts as an intermediary in 
dealings with external interests on behalf of the people as well as a trustee of the people in the 
management of the national wealth and resources”.534 This clearly relates to the civil and 
political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
On a regional level, Article 21 of the African Charter both provides that 1) peoples have the 
right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources,535 and 2) that “State Parties to the 
present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their 
wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African Unity and solidarity”.536 
James Crawford argued that what Article 21(1) of the African Charter “originally treated as a 
right of peoples is [in Article 21(4)] treated as a right of States, thus casting doubt upon the 
legitimacy of the assertion that peoples have a right to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources”.537 However, as I will show below, statements by the African Commission in 
relation to the right of indigenous peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources have 
clarified that the right provided for in Article 21(1) is a right of peoples and not states. Indeed, 
the role of states is to protect and fulfil this right on behalf of its peoples. The sovereign rights 
of states are secondary to, or even derived from, the self-determination right of peoples to 
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permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Therefore, these rights have to 
be exercised in a manner that confirms to their obligation to respect the right to permanent 
sovereignty of their peoples. As established above, these obligations have to come into 
existence by means of a democratic decision-making process and states cannot assert these 
rights vis-à-vis their entire population or subpopulation peoples. 
 
In its General Comment No.12, the HRC observed that the right of peoples to freely dispose of 
their natural wealth and resources “entails corresponding duties for all states and the 
international community as a whole”.538 Corresponding with the external dimension of the right 
to permanent sovereignty, the primary duty of states is to respect the right of peoples in foreign 
jurisdictions to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. Therefore, as the HRC 
observed, the right of to freely dispose of their natural resources includes the duty of states to 
refrain from interfering in the disposal of such resources by peoples in foreign jurisdictions.539 
As observed by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray this aspect of the right to permanent sovereignty 
“crosses with other long-established principles of international law”.540 The two most relevant 
principles in relation to the right to permanent sovereignty are the prohibition on the use of 
force by states in their international affairs and the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of another state. As Saul, Kinley and Mowbray argued, the former principle prohibits 
the use of military force to acquire the economic resources of another state and the latter 
principle prohibits the use of economic coercion aiming to acquire such resources.541 This was 
acknowledged by the General Assembly in its Declaration on Friendly Relations, which 
provided that states are prohibited from using “economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of 
its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind”.542 Violations of these 
principles would indisputably amount to an violation of the right of peoples of such a coerced 
state to be free from external interference by foreign states in their disposal of their natural 
wealth and resources.  
                                               
538 ‘UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right 
to Self-Determination), The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, 13 March 1984’ (n 184) 
para 5. 
539 ibid. 
540 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 55) 105. 
541 ibid. 
542 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV) (n 9). 
 126 
 
A more contentious issue is whether, apart from their obligation to respect the right of peoples 
in foreign jurisdictions to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, states also have 
the obligation to protect this right. If it were to be accepted that the right of peoples to 
permanent sovereignty includes an obligation on states to protect this right of peoples outside 
their own jurisdiction, it should be emphasised that these obligations would have to be 
exercised in a manner that does not obstruct the ability of the domestic states of those peoples 
to fulfil its obligations in relation to that right. As argued above, the obligations to protect the 
right to permanent sovereignty primarily rests with the domestic state. However, other states 
have a vital role in the protection and fulfilment of this right as well. As observed by Robert 
McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, developing countries are often unable or unwilling to 
impose stricter regulations or to hold transnational corporations (“TNCs”) accountable for their 
violations of the regulations they have imposed.543 This is especially problematic as the 
increasing privatisation of functions that traditionally belonged to the state means that 
corporations increasingly engage in state-like activity”.544 The home states of TNCs would be 
able to provide support to the developing states in which these TNCs operate. As observed by 
Christen Broecker, international law allows states to regulate the extraterritorial conduct if the 
entity being regulated is a national of the state.545 Therefore, states have the right to protect 
foreign peoples from violations of their right to freely dispose their natural resources 
perpetrated by TNCs. However, even though it provides states with this right, international law 
does not impose an obligation to exercise jurisdiction by regulating the extraterritorial conduct 
of corporate nationals in order to protect international human rights law.546 As McCorquodale 
and Simons recognised, this is problematic as there is not only a reluctance among states to 
regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their corporate nationals but most governments of 
industrialised states even “explicitly or implicitly acknowledge that one of their key foreign 
relations priorities is to assist their own corporations to ‘win contracts in foreign markets and 
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lobby against regulatory and political barriers’ in other states”.547 Luckily, as Olivier De 
Schutter observed, there is a growing recognition that the growing interdependency of states 
necessitates the imposition of “an obligation on all States to act jointly in face of collective 
action problems faced by the international community of States”.548 For instance, in its General 
Comment No. 14, the CESCR has acknowledged that states have the duty to prevent third 
parties from violating the right to health of individuals under the jurisdiction of foreign states 
“if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law”.549 If it 
were to be accepted that the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources includes 
an obligation of states to protect this freedom of peoples in foreign jurisdictions, the right to 
self-determination could provide both the moral and legal foundation of an obligation of states 
to regulate the conduct of their nationals – including the conduct of TNCs – in order to protect 
these peoples from violations of their right to permanent sovereignty by the nationals of the 
home state.  
 
Apart from an obligation to respect and protect the right to permanent sovereignty of foreign 
peoples, there is an argument to be made that states also have a duty to contribute to the 
fulfilment of the right of foreign peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources. Just as 
with the obligation to protect this right, the obligation to fulfil it primarily rests with the 
domestic state. However, developing countries often lack the technological, scientific or 
financial means to exploit their natural resources. In the previous chapter, I discussed how the 
external dimension of the right to development is a set of duties of all states to cooperate with 
each other in order to addresses disparities of the international political economy and the 
growth in inequality between states. Moreover, I argued that the primary goal of the external 
dimension of the right to development is to remove obstacles to the freedom of peoples to 
pursue their development placed by the international economic order. It could be argued that 
the duty of states, included in Article 3(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development,550 
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to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development 
includes the duty to cooperate to alleviate technological, scientific or financial obstacles to 
such development. This would include such obstacles to the exploitation of natural resources 
as the right to development implies the full realisation of the right of peoples to self-
determination, including the right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources.551 However, for now, this might be a bridge to far as the duty of states to cooperate 
with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development would first 
have to find widespread application and enforcement at the international level. 
 
The right to permanent sovereignty of subpopulation peoples 
In the third chapter, I established that international law has recognised indigenous peoples as 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination. This right is particularly relevant to their 
ongoing self-determination right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources as, in 
the words of Martin Scheinin, “for most indigenous peoples what self-determination is really 
about is their right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources”.552 During the 
negotiations of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, all the indigenous organisations that 
participated emphasised the critical importance of this right “for the survival of indigenous 
peoples because of the spiritual relationship indigenous peoples have with their land”.553 Even 
though the General Assembly did not explicitly include the right to permanent sovereignty in 
the provision on the right to self-determination in its Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, it did 
include the provision that that indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and 
control the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired.554 Moreover, it also provided that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the 
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right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands 
or territories and other resources”.555 Combined these provisions clearly reflect the idea that 
indigenous peoples have a right to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources.  
 
All the relevant human rights treaty bodies have acknowledged that indigenous peoples have 
the right to freely dispose of their natural resources in pursuance with their right to self-
determination. For instance, in its Concluding Observations on Norway, the HRC included the 
expectation that Norway would report on “the Sami people’s right to self-determination under 
article 1 of the [ICCPR], including paragraph 2 of that article”.556 Moreover, in its Concluding 
Observations on Canada, while discussing the situation of the aboriginal peoples, the HRC 
emphasised that “the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples must be 
able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that they may not be deprived 
of their own means of subsistence [original emphasis]”.557 Furthermore, in its Concluding 
Observations on Australia, the HRC stated that Article 1(2) includes the duty of states to “take 
the necessary steps in order to secure for the indigenous inhabitants, a stronger role in decision-
making over their traditional lands and natural resources”.558 Similarly, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has implicitly recognised the right of indigenous peoples 
to freely dispose of their natural resources in a series of concluding observations.559 On a 
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regional level, the African Commission has acknowledged that indigenous peoples have the 
right to freely dispose of their natural resources under Article 21 of the African Charter.560 
Furthermore, also the Inter-American Court acknowledged that, by virtue of their right to self-
determination, indigenous peoples have the right to freely dispose their natural wealth and 
resources.561 
 
In the third chapter, I established that the ongoing self-determination right of indigenous to 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development has two pillars. The first pillar 
is based upon their status as peoples with the right to self-determination and provides them 
with the right to autonomy or self-government over matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs. The other pillar is based upon their status as part of the entire population of a state and 
provides them with the right to participate in the public affairs of the state. I established that, 
in order to balance the right of the indigenous peoples and the entire population of a state, the 
international legal framework on indigenous rights provides indigenous peoples with the right 
to be consulted on relation to matters concerning them as an aspect of their right to effectively 
participate in the public affairs of their state. This two-pillar framework is applicable to the 
right of indigenous peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. Just as it 
attempts to balance the right of indigenous peoples to freely pursue their development with the 
right of entire population to freely pursue their development, the international legal framework 
on indigenous rights attempts to balance the right of indigenous peoples to freely dispose of 
their natural resources with the right of the entire population to freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources. 
 
The first method by which the framework on indigenous peoples attempts to strike a balance 
between the permanent sovereignty rights of indigenous peoples and those of the entire 
                                               
under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16 December 
2009, E/C.12/COD/CO/4’ (n 506) paras 14–16. 
560 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Communication No. 155/96, 
(2001) AHRLR 60, 27 October 2001 (n 525) paras 56–58; Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Communication No. 276/2003, 2009 AHRLR 75, 4 February 2010 (n 339) paras 255–268. 
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population to which they belong is by providing that indigenous peoples shall wherever 
possible participate in the benefits of the exploitation of these resources and shall receive fair 
compensation for damages which they may have sustained as a result of the exploitation of 
these resources. 562 However, I want to focus on the second method. As observed by Cambou, 
the resource aspect of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination includes 
“specifically the right of indigenous peoples to participate in the development of the resources 
located in their territories, including subsoil resources such as oil and gas”.563 This right can be 
found in Article 32(2), which provides that states “shall consult and cooperate […] with  the  
indigenous peoples concerned […] particularly in connection with the development, utilization 
or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources”.564 Just as the international legal 
framework on indigenous rights attempts to balance the self-determination rights of indigenous 
peoples with those of the entire population by including an obligation of states to consult its 
indigenous peoples on matters concerning their development, it also attempts to balance the 
permanent sovereignty rights of indigenous peoples with that of the entire population by 
including an obligation of states to consult indigenous peoples on matters concerning the 
natural wealth and resources pertaining to their lands. This is an element of their right to 
participate in the decision-making processes relating to the disposing of natural wealth and 
resources.  
 
The right of indigenous peoples to participate in the decision-making processes relating to the 
disposing of natural wealth and resources has also been included in both ILO Convention 169 
and the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples.565 The importance of this right has been stressed 
by the relevant human rights treaty bodies. For instance, in relation to the Sami people in 
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Sweden, the HRC has expressed concern at “the limited extent to which the Sami Parliament 
can have a significant role in the decision-making process on issues affecting the traditional 
lands and economic activities of the indigenous Sami people”.566 Also the CESCR has stressed 
the importance of the participation of indigenous peoples in such decision-making processes.567 
On a regional level, the African Commission has acknowledged the importance of the 
participation of the affected indigenous peoples in the decision-making process regarding the 
disposing of natural wealth and resources. In a case regarding the failure of the Nigerian 
government to protect the Ogoni people against the destruction of their lands by foreign oil 
companies, the African Commission found that the failure of the Nigerian government to 
involve, in all their dealings with the oil consortiums, the Ogoni communities in the decisions 
that affected the development of Ogoniland was in violation of the right of the Ogoni people 
to freely dispose their natural wealth and resources under Article 21 of the African Charter.568 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Court has determined that if states issue concessions over 
natural resources pertaining to the lands of indigenous peoples they “must ensure the effective 
participation of the members of the [affected indigenous peoples]”.569  
 
The extent of the right of indigenous peoples to participate in the decision-making processes 
concerning the disposal of natural resources pertaining to their lands is still rather vague. In 
Article 32(2) of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, the General Assembly provided that, 
in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting 
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilisation or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources, states have the duty to consult 
and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
                                               
566 ‘UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding 
Observations: Sweden, 24 April 2002, CCPR/CO/74/SWE’ para 15. 
567 ‘UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Concluding Observations: Norway, 23 June 2005, 
E/C.12/1/Add.109’ para 26; ‘UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of 
the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Ecuador, 7 June 2004, E/C.12/1/Add.100’ (n 334) paras 12, 34. 
568 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Communication No. 155/96, 
(2001) AHRLR 60, 27 October 2001 (n 525) para 55. 
569 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, 28 November 2007, IACHR (Series C) No. 172 (n 337) para 129. 
 133 
representative institutions.570 In his examination of the meaning of this obligation, Mauro 
Barelli explained that the ambiguity of whether this provision provides an obligation of states 
to obtain such consent or only to seek to obtain such consent was included on purpose to bridge 
the gap between the conflicting views of the states and indigenous peoples that participated in 
its drafting.571 Yet, Barelli argued that “it would be wrong to conclude that the [Declaration on 
Indigenous Peoples] has recognised a mere right of participation and consultation to indigenous 
peoples”.572 Instead he argued for a ‘flexible approach’ that does not provide indigenous 
peoples with a right to veto in relation to all matters affecting their lands but does affirm that 
“when a development project is likely to have a serious (negative) impact on the cultures and 
lives of indigenous peoples, states must obtain their consent before implementing it”.573 
Similarly to the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, ILO Convention 169 provides that  
 
“[i]n cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources 
or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain 
procedures through which they shall consult [indigenous] peoples, with a view to 
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before 
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands [emphasis added]”.574 
 
As observed by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, the CESCR has often invoked ILO Convention 
169 on “as a ‘best practice’ normative standard relevant to the exercise of indigenous self-
determination under Article 1, even though that Convention does not specifically mention self-
determination”.575 Moreover, also in relation to the situation described in Article 15(2) of ILO 
Convention 169 the condition applies that in no case peoples may be deprived of their own 
means of subsistence.576  On a regional level, the African Commission declared that indigenous 
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peoples have the right to dispose their natural resources in consultation with the state.577 
Furthermore, even though Surinam had not ratified ILO Convention 169, the Inter-American 
Court used the provisions in this convention to interpret the obligations of Surinam under 
Common Article 1 of the Twin Covenants. Consequently, the Inter-American Court declared 
that “in ensuring the effective participation of members of the [affected indigenous peoples], 
the State has the duty to actively consult with said community according to their customs and 
traditions”.578 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Article 6(2) of ILO Convention 169 emphasises that such 
consultations must be carried out in good faith and with the objective of achieving agreement 
or consent to the proposed measures.579 From his review of relevant statements made by ILO 
supervisory bodies, Anaya concluded that “in addition to the procedural safeguards that apply, 
and whether or not agreement is to be achieved, the consultations should lead to decisions that 
are consistent with indigenous peoples’ substantive rights”.580 According to Anaya, the burden 
is on the state to justify a decision that goes against the preferences of the affected indigenous 
people in a manner that is consistent with the full range of applicable international norms 
concerning indigenous peoples.581 In relation to the failure of ILO Convention 169 to uphold 
indigenous peoples’ rights to mineral or subsurface resources in cases in which the state 
generally retains ownership of those resources, Anaya notes that pursuant to the above 
mentioned norm of non-discrimination “indigenous peoples must not be denied subsurface and 
mineral rights where such rights are otherwise accorded landowners”.582 In relation to this, 
Pereira and Gough observed that “given that under general international law the unilateral 
expropriation of surface rights is generally prohibited, the same argument logically appears to 
apply in the case of a state’s concession for the extraction of subsoil resources in indigenous 
lands”.583 Therefore, even though ILO Convention 169 does not provide indigenous peoples 
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with the rights over the subsurface resources pertaining to their territory states should provide 
them with these rights if such rights are accorded to non-indigenous landowners and should 
refrain from the unilateral expropriation of surface rights if they have been afforded to 
indigenous peoples. 
 
In the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen claimed that “[f]ree, prior, informed 
consent is essential for the human rights of indigenous peoples in relation to major 
development”.584 As observed by Cambou, even though the implementation of the obligation 
to obtain free, prior, and informed consent “is still a controversial issue under international law, 
there is a growing corpus of decisions demonstrating the importance of the principle for the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights to land and resources”.585 For instance, in a 
Concluding Observations on Thailand, the HRC “should ensure that prior consultations are 
held with a view to obtaining their free, prior and informed consent regarding decisions that 
affect [indigenous peoples], in particular with regard to their land rights.586 The existence of 
such an obligation has also been acknowledged by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination in two separate Concluding Observations on Ecuador.587 In one of these 
observations, the CERD explicitly stated that in relation to the exploitation of the subsoil 
resources of the traditional lands of indigenous communities “merely consulting these 
communities prior to exploiting the resources falls short of meeting the requirements set out in 
the Committee’s general recommendation XXIII on the rights of indigenous peoples”.588 The 
Inter-American Court adopted this approach in the Saramaka case by stating that when dealing 
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with major development or investment plans that may have a profound impact the lands of an 
indigenous people the safeguard of effective participation must be understood to require the 
free, prior, and informed consent of the indigenous people, in accordance with their traditions 
and customs in addition to the consultation that is always required when planning development 
or investment projects within the territory of indigenous peoples.589 Furthermore, also the 
African Commission has stated that it is of the view that states have the duty to not only consult 
with indigenous peoples but also to obtain their free, prior and informed consent, according to 
their customs and traditions, to any development or investment projects that would have a 
major impact within their territory.590 Therefore, it seems that the international legal framework 
on indigenous rights has adopted, or is at least in the process of adopting, the above discussed 
flexible approach promoted by Barelli by which indigenous peoples lack the right to veto any 
matters affecting their lands but do possess that right in relation to developmental projects that 
are likely to have a serious impact on the indigenous peoples or their territory. 
 
The ‘limiting clause’ 
The right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources is not absolute. This 
is demonstrated by the limiting clause in Common Article 1(2) of the Twin Covenants, which 
states that the free disposition of natural resources has to be exercised “without prejudice to 
any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
mutual benefit, and international law”.591 Also the African Charter has included such a limiting 
clause in its provision on the permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources, which 
states that this right “shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting 
international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the 
principles of international law”.592 The wording of these provisions is to the effect that 
obligations either arising out of international co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, or out of international law limits the peoples’ right to freely dispose of their natural 
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wealth and resources. As the objective of the right to permanent sovereignty is not to frighten 
off foreign investment in the exploitation of natural wealth and resources,593 but to prevent 
foreign exploitation the drafters of the Twin Covenants included a limiting clause as 
 
“a concession to developed states concerned during the drafting to preserve their 
favoured international economic order, namely a climate conducive to free and 
competitive international trade (as opposed to cartelization or economic isolationism or 
self-sufficiency) and protective of foreign investment and the free flow of capital”.594  
 
To preserve this international economic order, the limiting clause was included in Common 
Article 1(2) in order to restrict the possibility that states would use the right to permanent 
sovereignty of their peoples as a legal justification to break their obligations regarding 
international trade and investment. The limiting clause does not prohibit the nationalisation, 
expropriation or requisitioning of natural wealth and resources but instead restricts it to 
situations “based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which 
are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and 
foreign”.595 As stated by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, this ‘public purpose’ test has “found 
acceptance in international law”.596 Moreover, it establishes that if such nationalisation, 
expropriation or requisitioning of natural wealth and resources takes place the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation.597 How such appropriate compensation determined has been a 
matter of dispute.598 However, I want to focus on the question which obligations are protected 
by this limiting clause. 
 
Saul, Kinley and Mowbray argued that, while treaties can limit economic freedom, entry into 
“treaty arrangements is itself an exercise of economic sovereignty and self-determination, 
signified by voluntary acceptance of treaty commitments”.599 The validity of this argument is 
dubious to say the least. The voluntary entry into international trade agreements by a state is 
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not always an exercise of the right to self-determination of the peoples of this state. Just because 
a state has voluntarily entered into such an agreement that does not mean that its decision to do 
so was in conformity with its obligations corresponding to the permanent sovereignty right of 
their peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources. Saul, Kinley and Mowbray themselves 
acknowledged that the economic freedom of states to enter into treaties is limited by the right 
to self-determination of its peoples.600 Precisely for this reason, the limiting clause in Common 
Article 1(2) has been qualified by identical Articles 47 of the ICCPR and 25 of the ICESCR 
(“Article 47/25”) by providing that “[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as 
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural 
wealth and resources”.601 Cassese observed that “[t]hese provisions were inserted in the 
Covenants much later than Article 1(2) and were aimed at ‘rectifying’ Article 1(2) in in order 
to meet new demands in the wake of the evolution of international politics and law that had 
taken place in the meantime”.602 
 
As argued by Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, the right to permanent sovereignty of peoples 
provided by Article 47/25 trumps obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation.603 Therefore, the effect of the provision included in Article 47/25 is that the limiting 
clause in Common Article 1(2) has to be interpreted in a in a manner that is consistent with the 
right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources. I 
would argue that in order to do so, this provision has to be understood as establishing a rule 
that the obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle 
of mutual benefit, and international law must have come into existence in accordance with the 
right of peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth and resources in order 
for them to limit a people’s freedom to dispose of the natural wealth and resources that form 
the subject of these obligations. Such an interpretation would ensure that such obligations 
arising out of international economic co-operation and international law do not take away the 
right to permanent sovereignty of peoples. Indeed, if states enter into treaty obligations in a 
manner that is consistent with the ongoing self-determination rights of the peoples under their 
jurisdiction, the act of entering into obligations that are protected by the limiting clause in 
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Common Article 1(2) would be an exercise of a state’s obligations corresponding the right to 
ongoing self-determination of its peoples. In such a way, the permanent sovereignty over the 
natural wealth and resources would be retained by the peoples but they would be restricted in 
using this right as a legal justification to break obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation and international law. The right to permanent sovereignty of peoples would only 
provide such a justification in relation to obligations that have come into existence in a manner 
that is inconsistent with their right to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and 
resources. Interpreted in this manner, the limiting clause ensures that states cannot use the right 
to permanent sovereignty of its peoples as a justification to escape certain obligations under 
international law as long as the obligations concerning these resources have come into 
existence in a manner consistent with the right to permanent sovereignty. In conclusion, in 
order to interpret the limiting clause from Common Article 1(2) of the Twin Convention in a 
manner that does not impair the right of all peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their 
natural wealth and resources, only those obligations should be understood to be protected by 
this clause that 1) arise out of international economic co-operation and international law, and 
2) were entered into in a manner consistent with the right to self-determination of the affected 
peoples. 
 
If obligations arising from violations of the right to ongoing self-determination are not 
protected by the limiting clause included in Common Article 1(2), the question is whether the 
right to self-determination can be used as a legal justification to break such an obligation. The 
answer to this question depends on the status of the right to permanent sovereignty in 
international law. The general rule is that there is no hierarchy of sources or rules in 
international law. As explained by Cassese, as a result of this lack of hierarchy,  
 
“the relations between rules generated by [treaties and customary international law] 
were governed by the three general principles which in all legal orders regulate the 
relations between norms deriving from the same source (a later law repeals, or may 
derogate from, and earlier one; a later law, general in character, does not derogate from 
an earlier one, which is special in character; a special law prevails over a general law) 
[original emphasis]”.604 
 
                                               
604 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press) 198. 
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Following these principles, Saul, Kinley and Mowbray argued that if there is a conflict between 
the right to permanent sovereignty and treaties imposing economic obligations inconsistent 
with it, the right to permanent sovereignty may be invoked as 1) a ‘later in time’ provision for 
treaty obligations assumed prior to those under the Twin Covenants and 2) as lex specialis, 
which takes precedence over general obligations of economic cooperation under other treaties, 
also those assumed later in time.605 As discussed in the first chapter, peremptory norms of 
general international law are the exception to the rule that there is no hierarchy of sources or 
rules in international law.606 According to Jochen Frowein, as a peremptory norm, the right to 
self-determination can be used as a limit to other international legal obligations.607 Similarly, 
specifically in relation to the right to permanent sovereignty, Saul, Kinley and Mowbray argued 
that jus cogens the right to permanent sovereignty may be invoked when there is a conflict this 
right and treaties imposing economic obligations inconsistent with it.608 Therefore, such 
treaties would be null and void. This would incentivise states to refrain from entering into an 
agreement with another state if they are aware that such an agreement would violate the self-
determination of the peoples of the other state. Moreover, it would incentivise states to abide 
by the above discussed obligations in relation to the self-determination of foreign peoples. 
However, as stated in the first chapter, even though many scholars have argued that the right 
to self-determination is a peremptory norm of international law, the question whether the right 
to self-determination is in fact jus cogens still has to be settled.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the self-determination right of peoples to, for their own ends, 
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources lies at the heart of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. Therefore, the beneficiaries of the 
right to permanent are peoples and states only possess rights that are secondary to, or derived 
from, the right to permanent sovereignty of the peoples under their jurisdiction. The fact that 
the permanent sovereignty right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources is a 
constituent of the right to self-determination has two important consequences. Firstly, it means 
that the same peoples that are the beneficiaries of the self-determination right to freely 
                                               
605 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 55) 111–112. 
606 Brownlie (n 85) 483–486. 
607 Jochen Frowein, ‘Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations’, Modern Law of Self-
Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 218–221. 
608 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 55) 112. 
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determine their political status and freely pursue their development are the beneficiaries the 
right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. Therefore, both entire populations 
and subpopulation peoples have the right to permanent sovereignty. Secondly, it means that 
the word ‘freely’ in the right of peoples to freely dispose of the natural resources should be 
interpreted in manner that is consistent with the interpretation of ‘freely’ in the self-
determination right of peoples to freely pursue their development.  
 
In my examination of the interpretation of ‘freely’ in the context of the right to permanent 
sovereignty, I establish that, just as the right of peoples to freely pursue their development, the 
right to permanent sovereignty has both an internal and an external dimension. The internal 
dimension provides the right of peoples to both benefit from, and control, the exploration, 
development and disposition of their territory’s natural resources. This right includes the right 
of peoples to participate in their state’s decision-making processes concerning such 
exploration, development and disposition. In relation to the rights of subpopulation groups, I 
found that 1) all subpopulation groups have the right to participate in their state’s decision-
making processes relating to the exploration, development and disposition of the natural 
resources pertaining to the territory of the entire population to which they belong, and 2) 
indigenous peoples also have the right to be consulted by the state on matters concerning the 
natural wealth and resources pertaining to their lands with the view to obtain their free, prior 
and informed consent.  
 
The external dimension provides the right of peoples to dispose of their natural resources 
without interference by foreign states and non-state actors. Consequently, the right to 
permanent sovereignty provides states with both the right and obligation to regulate the 
admission and activities of foreign investors, the methods of exploitation of natural resources, 
the conduct of the entities engaged in the exploitation of natural resources, and the distribution 
of profits obtained from the exploitation of natural resources. As rights derived from the right 
of their peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources, such regulation should be decided 
by decision-making possesses in which the affected peoples have participated freely. 
Therefore, states act as the medium through which the peoples exercise permanent sovereignty 
over their natural resources. In relation to this conclusion I examined the ‘limiting clause’ that 
provides that the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources has to be exercised 
without prejudice to obligations arising out of international economic co-operation and 
international law. I provided an interpretation of this clause that provides that such obligations 
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only restrict the free disposal of its natural wealth and resources if these obligations were 
created in a manner that was consistent with the ongoing self-determination rights of the 





In the first chapter, I established that the right to ongoing self-determination has developed into 
a standard that that can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of how international law both 
distributes sovereignty and authorises the exercise of sovereignty by sovereign states. This 
right provides the right of peoples to 1) freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and 2) freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. I found that both these 
rights include an external and an internal dimension, which means that these rights both 
regulate the relationship between peoples and foreign states and between peoples and their 
domestic authorities. Furthermore, I found that the ongoing right to self-determination of 
peoples to freely pursue their development includes both a civil and political dimension and an 
economic, social and cultural dimension. The civil and political dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination of entire population provides that these populations have the right 
to pursue their economic, social and cultural development according to the policies they have 
freely chosen. This includes the right to choose these policies without either external inference 
by other states, with the corresponding obligation of states to respect the right of foreign 
peoples to freely pursue their development, or by internal manipulation or undue influence 
from their domestic authorities, with the corresponding obligation of states to respect this right 
of their population themselves and protect it from the interference by foreign states and non-
state actors. The method by which peoples exercise the internal dimension of civil and political 
dimension of the right to pursue their economic, social and cultural development by the 
exercise of its members of their civil and political rights in order for the population to both 
develop a popular will and convert this popular will policies they have freely chosen. 
Consequently, the civil and political dimension is best understood as a manifestation of the 
totality of civil and political rights. I have argued that the consequence of this view is that the 
right to participate both indirectly, through chosen representatives, and directly in the decision-
making processes of the state are essential self-determination rights. Therefore, the civil and 
political dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination provides the foundation of an 
argument on the right to a democratic system of governance that is both representative and 
participatory. The external dimension of the civil and political dimension of the right of peoples 
to freely pursue their development establishes the state as the medium through which peoples 




The economic, social and cultural dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination of entire 
populations provides that these populations have the right to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development free from economic, social or cultural obstacles. This right is exercised 
by the exercise of the individual members of these populations of their economic, social and 
cultural rights. I have argued that if it is accepted that if its civil and political dimension is best 
understood as a manifestation of the totality of civil and political rights, the socio-economic 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination is best understood as a manifestation of 
the totality of economic, social and cultural rights. As socio-economic rights include the 
corresponding obligation of states to fulfil them by taking steps, to the maximum of their 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of these right, 
the obligations of states in relation to the right socio-economic dimension of the right to 
ongoing self-determination are to be applied progressively. This provides peoples with the right 
to pursue their economic, social and cultural development through the participation in, 
contribution to, and enjoyment of such development. This was the basis of my argument that 
the right to development is not a parallel right to right to self-determination but instead a 
delineation of duties that provide clarification of the methods by which states have to exercise 
their obligations concerning the socio-economic dimension of the right to ongoing self-
determination. Such an understanding of the relationship between the right to self-
determination and the right to development does not only provide clarification of the 
obligations of states in relation to this dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination but 
also establishes the right to self-determination as the legal foundation of the obligations 
included in the right to development. 
 
Following my interpretation of the civil and political and socio-economic dimensions of the 
right to ongoing self-determination, I argued that the ongoing self-determination right of 
peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources should be interpreted in a manner 
that is consistent with the ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely pursue their 
development. Therefore, this right that lies at the core of the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural wealth and resources, has both an internal and an external dimension. The internal 
dimension provides the right of peoples to both benefit from, and control, the exploration, 
development and disposition of their territory’s natural resources. In order to exercise this right, 
peoples have to be free to exercise the rights associated with both the civil and political and 
socio-economic dimensions of the right to ongoing self-determination. Especially important is 
the right of peoples to participate in their state’s decision-making processes concerning the 
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exploration, development and disposition of their natural resources, which clearly overlaps 
with the civil and political dimension of the right ongoing self-determination. The external 
dimension provides the right of peoples to dispose of their natural resources without 
interference by foreign states and non-state actors. This provides states with both the right and 
obligation to regulate the admission and activities of foreign investors, the methods of 
exploitation of natural resources, the conduct of the entities engaged in the exploitation of 
natural resources, and the distribution of profits obtained from the exploitation of natural 
resources. As a right derived from the right of their peoples to freely dispose of their natural 
resources, the decision-making processes concerning the exercise of this right should be 
exercised in a manner consistent with the full breath of rights established by the right to 
ongoing self-determination. In essence, the state acts as the medium through which the peoples 
exercise the permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. 
 
In my examination of the ongoing self-determination rights of subpopulation groups, which I 
defined as all groups whose rights are protected by the prohibition against discrimination in 
international law, I juxtaposed the ongoing self-determination rights of all subpopulation 
groups and those of indigenous peoples, as the primary example of subpopulation groups 
whose status as ‘peoples’ have been recognised in international law. Apart from establishing 
what standard the right to ongoing self-determination provides in relation to subpopulation 
groups, the goal of this juxtaposition was to examine whether it is still necessary to answer the 
difficult question whether a certain subpopulation group is a people for purposes of the right 
to self-determination if it is excepted that the entire population of states have the right to self-
determination. Firstly, I established that the civil and political dimension of the right to ongoing 
self-determination provides that all subpopulation groups have the right to freely participate in 
the right of the entire population to which they belong to freely pursue its development. Similar 
to how entire populations exercise their right to ongoing self-determination, this right is 
exercised by subpopulation groups through the participation in the political, economic, social 
and cultural life of their state through the exercise of the individual members of these 
subpopulation groups of the totality of their human rights. In relation to the civil and political 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination, this includes the right of their members 
to effectively participate in the public life of their state. In relation to the decision-making 
processes concerning issues that are of their specific affect them, this right does not just include 
a right to have their representatives present in the decision-making bodies but should translate 
into influence over the outcome of the decision-making processes. The of subpopulation groups 
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influence such decision-making processes does not amount to an obligation of states to seek to 
obtain the consent of subpopulation groups before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect, let alone provide them with a veto over such measures. 
  
In relation to the ongoing self-determination rights of indigenous peoples, I established that the 
rights provided to those subpopulation groups that are themselves peoples is based on two 
pillars. Firstly, as subpopulation groups they have the same right, to freely participate in the 
right of the entire population to which they belong to freely pursue its development, as other 
subpopulation groups. Secondly, as peoples, subpopulation peoples have the right to freely 
pursue their own development. The civil and political dimension of this right provides 
subpopulation peoples with a greater degree of control over the pursuit of their development 
and the socio-economic dimension of this right provides them with a greater degree of control 
over the disposal of their natural wealth and resources. However, even though the international 
legal framework on indigenous rights provides them with the right to autonomy over matters 
relating to the internal and local affairs, this right is not absolute. Instead, the civil and political 
dimension of the right to ongoing self-determination balances the rights of indigenous peoples 
with those of the entire population to which they belong. This balance is mainly established by 
the obligation of states to consult, and cooperate with, indigenous peoples, through their own 
representative institutions, in good faith, with the objective to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that 
may affect indigenous peoples. This obligation does not provide an absolute right of indigenous 
peoples to be consulted in order to obtain their consent. Therefore, this obligation does not 
provide them with an veto on all matters relating to their internal and local affairs. Instead, an 
obligation on states to obtain their consent seemingly only exists in relation to specific issues 
that relate to their ongoing self-determination right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources. Namely, when a proposed development project on their territory is likely to have 
serious negative impacts on the indigenous peoples or their territory. However, the fact that 
states have the obligation to consult indigenous peoples with the objective to obtain their 
consent to legislative or administrative measures that may affect them, which in certain 
situations amounts to an obligation to obtain this consent, provides indigenous peoples with a 
greater degree of control over their pursuit of their development and disposal of their natural 
resources than subpopulation groups without the status of ‘peoples’. Therefore, it is still 
necessary to answer the difficult question whether a certain subpopulation group is a people 




In summary, I have established that the right to ongoing self-determination is a standard that 
can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of how international law both distributes sovereignty 
and authorises the exercise of sovereignty by sovereign states. I have established that the 
ongoing self-determination right of peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development provides that all peoples have the right to 1) pursue their development by means 
of policies they have chosen free from external interference and manipulation or undue 
influence by their domestic states, and 2) through their participation in, contribution to, and 
enjoyment of development. Furthermore, I have established that that the ongoing self-
determination right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources provides 
that all peoples have the right to benefit from, and control, the exploration, development and 
disposition of their territory’s natural resources without external interference and manipulation 
or undue influence by their domestic states. The question that follows is what the effects of a 
state’s violation of this standard are. Two especially interesting questions that warrant further 
research are 1) whether subpopulation peoples can legitimately secede from a state as a remedy 
to this state’s violation of this standard and to what degree this standard needs to be violated 
for secession to become a legitimate remedy, and 2) what the effect of this standard is on 
international legal obligations that have been entered into by states in a manner that violates it. 
This latter question is especially relevant concerning the obligations of states provided by 
international trade and investment treaties as these are often negotiated by states with little to 
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